Cameron v. State
Decision Date | 12 July 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 04-12-00294-CR,04-12-00294-CR |
Citation | 535 S.W.3d 574 |
Parties | Vanessa CAMERON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Gerald H. Goldstein, Goldstein, Goldstein & Hilley, 310 S. Saint Mary's St., Ste. 2900, San Antonio, TX 78205, Donald H. Flanary III, Flanary Law Firm, 1005 South Alamo Street, San Antonio, TX 78210.
APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Jay Brandon, Assistant District Attorney, 101 W. Nueva, 3rd Floor, San Antonio, TX 78205.
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice, Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice, Irene Rios, Justice
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
This case is before us on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals. Vanessa Cameron was convicted of the murder for hire of her child's father and sentenced to seventy years in prison. On appeal, Cameron raised several issues, including that she was deprived of her constitutional right to a public trial during voir dire. A majority of this court agreed, and we reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially affirmed, but issued a new opinion on rehearing reversing and remanding. In its opinion on rehearing, the Court held that a defendant bears an initial burden of proof on appeal to show that the courtroom was "in fact closed" to the public before an appellate court may consider whether the closure was justified. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the case for our reconsideration of the public trial issue under the sequential two-step test. See Cameron v. State , 490 S.W.3d 57, 70 (Tex. Crim. App.) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 95, 196 L.Ed.2d 38 (2016).
The only facts relevant to this appeal are those surrounding the alleged closing of the courtroom to the exclusion of Cameron's family and friends, as well as the public, during the voir dire phase of trial. In a nutshell, Cameron's family and friends were instructed by the bailiffs to leave the courtroom prior to the start of voir dire so the large venire panel could be seated. Cameron's family and friends understood that they were not allowed to re-enter the courtroom during the voir dire proceedings. Defense counsel made the trial court aware they had been excluded from the courtroom and objected to a violation of Cameron's right to a public trial. A lengthy discussion occurred both on and off the record, with the trial court repeatedly stating the courtroom was not "closed" but there was no room for the family or public inside the courtroom to observe voir dire. The relevant statements made by the trial court and counsel on the record are discussed in detail in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as well as the prior majority and dissenting opinions by this court. See id. at 65-67 ; see also Cameron v. State , 415 S.W.3d 404, 406-408 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013), rev'd , 490 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ; see also id. at 415-21 (Angelini, J., dissenting).
After Cameron was tried and convicted, she filed a motion for new trial alleging her right to a public trial was violated during voir dire. She attached twelve affidavits from her family and friends stating the bailiffs instructed them to leave the courtroom before the jury panel entered and they did not witness any of the voir dire proceedings. The affidavit by Cameron's mother, a San Antonio police officer, also states that she requested to come in and sit on the floor during voir dire, but the bailiff denied her request and stated she would be a security risk. The State filed a response to the motion for new trial and attached affidavits from two bailiffs stating they did not close the courtroom to the public during voir dire. One of the bailiffs confirms in his affidavit that he denied the request by Cameron's mother to sit on the floor based on security concerns. The trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion for new trial. It signed an order acknowledging presentment of the motion for new trial and stating the motion would be determined based solely upon the affidavits. Although the court did not enter a written order denying the motion, it adopted the State's proposed findings of fact in opposition to the motion. Specifically, the trial court made the following sixteen findings of fact:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a public trial in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST . amend. VI ; Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). The right extends to the jury selection phase of trial, including voir dire of prospective jurors. Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209, 212-13, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (per curiam). Violation of a criminal defendant's right to a public trial is structural error that does not require a showing of harm. Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544 ; Steadman v. State , 360 S.W.3d 499, 510-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).1
The Court of Criminal Appeals clarified in its opinion on rehearing in this case that, under Lilly v. State , the proper approach to determine whether a defendant's right to a public trial was violated is a sequential two-step analysis. Cameron , 490 S.W.3d at 68-69 (citing Lilly v. State , 365 S.W.3d 321, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ). Cameron , 490 S.W.3d at 69. Under the first step, "[t]o determine if a trial was closed, a reviewing court should look to the totality of the evidence, rather than whether a spectator was actually excluded from trial." Id. at 68 (citing Lilly , 365 S.W.3d at 331 ). If the totality of the evidence shows the defendant's trial was closed, then the reviewing court must proceed to the second step and determine whether the closure was justified. Cameron , 490 S.W.3d at 68. Under the second step, the reviewing court considers whether the trial court took every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance before closing the proceeding. Lilly , 365 S.W.3d at 331. Under the standards established by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), the closure must be necessary to protect an overriding interest, the closure must be no broader than necessary, the trial court must consider all reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Lilly , 365 S.W.3d at 330-31.
In its opinion on rehearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals not only clarified that the Lilly analysis is a sequential two-step test, it also clarified the applicable standard of review.
Cameron , 490 S.W.3d at 69-70. The Court explained that the question of whether a defendant's trial was closed to the public is a mixed question of law and fact that does not turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. at 70. Therefore, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact to the extent they are supported by the record. Id. ( ).
As all the prior opinions in this case have acknowledged,...
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Cameron v. State
...a public trial was violated, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Cameron v. State , 535 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref'd).Cameron pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial for the second time. The State presented e......
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