Camp v. State, CA

• Decision Date: 08 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. CA,CA
• Citation: 764 S.W.2d 463,26 Ark.App. 299
• Parties: Donald CAMP, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. CR 88-157.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Page 463

764 S.W.2d 463

26 Ark.App. 299

Donald CAMP, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CA CR 88-157.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division II.

Feb. 8, 1989.

Lynn Frank Plemmons, Morrilton, for appellant.

J. Blake Hendrix, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

CRACRAFT, Judge.

Donald Camp appeals from his conviction of the offenses of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, and operating a vehicle while his driver's license was suspended. He contends the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence obtained by police officers at the time of his stop and arrest. We find no error and affirm.

The facts are not in dispute. On the afternoon of March 20, 1987, the Arkansas State Police established a roadblock at the intersection of two state highways for the purpose of checking driver's licenses and vehicle registrations of the persons using those highways. There was no evidence that the roadblock was established for any other purpose or as a pretense for seeking evidence of other criminal activity. All vehicles passing through the roadblock were required to stop long enough for the officers to accomplish the purpose for which the roadblock had been established. When the appellant was stopped at this roadblock, the officers had no reason to suspect that he had violated any law or was engaged in any unlawful activity.

When the officers asked appellant for his driver's license, he responded that his license had been suspended. While the officers were talking to him, appellant continued to drink from an open can of beer which he was holding at the time he was stopped. The officers concluded from their observations of him that he was also intoxicated. A breathalyzer test subsequently confirmed that conclusion.

Appellant was tried for and convicted of both offenses. He appeals solely on the ground that the stop of his vehicle, without reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the trial court erred in not suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of that stop. We disagree.

The validity of arrests based on vehicle stops made on less than reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has been addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States on at least four occasions. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Although none of these cases are directly on point factually, their declarations do furnish guidance. They declare that Fourth Amendment rights are implicated in such stops because the detention of a vehicle's occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of that amendment. They point out, however, that not all seizures are prohibited--only unreasonable ones. Therefore, the permissibility of stops on less than reasonable suspicion must be judged in each case by balancing the effect of its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of a legitimate government interest.

In Brignoni-Ponce, the court had occasion to review the admissibility of evidence obtained as the result of an arrest made by border patrol officers who were authorized by their superiors to stop vehicles in an area near the Mexican border in order to determine if the occupants were legal residents. Under this system, the stops were made at random, and officers in the field had unbridled discretion as to which vehicles to stop and the places at which to stop them. The Court held that, although the control of illegal aliens was an important governmental interest, the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights of the individuals outweighed the legitimate interest the government sought to promote. The Court relied heavily on the lack of any supervision of the individual officers in the field and their unbridled discretion to stop vehicles at random where there were less intrusive methods for detecting vehicles which might contain illegal aliens.

In Martinez-Fuerte, supra, the Court again reviewed the policy of the border patrol to control illegal entry by establishing permanent checkpoints at which all vehicles crossing that point were stopped to determine if the occupants were residents. The Court there held that these systematic stops of all vehicles were not violative of Fourth Amendment rights. It pointed out that the checkpoint stops were less intrusive on the motorists' Fourth Amendment rights, and that the subjective intrusion--the generation of concern or fright on the part of lawful travelers--was appreciably less in such stops than in the "roving-patrol" or random stops. The Court further pointed out that such stops were not made at the unbridled discretion of the officers in the field but were directed by officials responsible for making decisions as to the effective allocation of law enforcement resources, that the potential interference with legitimate traffic was minimal, and that motorists were not taken by surprise or alarmed by the stops as they could see the officers performing legitimate duties. It also emphasized that the probability of harassment by the police officers was limited, because only those travelers passing through the checkpoint were stopped and there was supervisory control over the operation.

In Prouse, supra, the Court considered the action of police officers acting under a police regulation permitting officers to stop vehicles at random for the purpose of checking driver's licenses and vehicle registrations in the State of Delaware. While the Court recognized that the sovereign had a legitimate interest in promoting highway safety, it held that the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights...