Camp v. The State Of Ga.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1858
• Citation: 25 Ga. 689
• Parties: Newton Camp, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia,defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

25 Ga. 689

Newton Camp, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

JUNE TERM, 1858.

Manslaughter, from Marion county. Tried before Judge Worrill, March Term, 1858.

Newton Camp was placed upon his trial under an indictment, the language of which was as follows:

"The grand jurors sworn, chosen and selected for Marion county, in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse Newton Camp, of the county and State aforesaid, with the offence of manslaughter, for that the said Newton Camp, in the county and State aforesaid, on the twelfth day of June, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, with force and arms and with a certain strap of leather, called a carriage trace, in and upon a certain negro man slave named Willis, the property of James M. Harvey, in the peace of God and said State, then and there being, did then and there make an assault, unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and with malic aforethought, and the said negro man slave Willis, with the carriage trace aforesaid, which he the said Newton Camp then and there had and held in both his right and left hands, in and upon the back and in and upon the shoulders, and the loins of him the said Willis, then and there unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did strike and beat, giving to the said Willis divers wounds of which said wounds, the said Willis, then and there died.. And the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths as aforesaid, do say, that he, the said Newton Camp, him the said Willis, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did kill, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof."

The jury returned the following verdict: "We the jury find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, in the commission of a lawful act, which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner."

Counsel for defendant then moved in arrest of judgment, on the following grounds.

1st. Because the indictment does not charge that said offence was committed contrary to the Constitution of this State, and the Act of the Assembly made in pursuance thereof.

2d. Because the indictment does not charge the defendant with any crime known to and punishable by the laws of this State.

3d. Because said indictment is void, and of no effect in law, as the same does not charge and set forth any offence known to the law.

4th. Because said indictment charges said defendant with being guilty of manslaughter, and the allegation and specification in the same, do not support said charge of manslaughter.

5th. Because the verdict of the jury rendered in said case, does not find the defendant guilty of any offence punishable by the laws of this State.

The Court overruled the motion; whereupon defendant's counsel excepted, and assigns the same as error.

Blandord & Crawford; Davis & Hudson; and A. G. Perryman, for plaintiff in error.

Sol.-Gen. Oliver, for defendant in error.

By the Court.—McDonald, J., delivering the opinion.

[1.| The first ground in the motion in arrest of judgment, can not be sustained. The conclusion of the indictment follows the form prescribed by the statute. Besides, it is an exception which goes merely to the form of the indictment, and can not be sustained in arrest of the judgment of the Court. Cobb's N. Dig. 833.

The argument, in support of the second and third grounds of the motion, is that manslaughter can not be com-mitted by killing a slave. That to kill a slave is either murder or justifiable homicide. The 19th section of the fourth division of the Penal Code answers that argument. That section declares, that the killing or maiming of a slave shall be put on the same footing of criminality as the killing or maiming of a white person.

The fourth ground in the motion is substantially, that the bill of indictment charges the plaintiff...