Campagna v. Campagna
| Decision Date | 20 May 1958 |
| Citation | 150 N.E.2d 699,337 Mass. 599 |
| Parties | Fenecia L. CAMPAGNA v. Themistocles V. CAMPAGNA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Stanley S. Ganz and William R. Frothingham, Boston, for plaintiff.
Joseph J. Hurley and Thomas H. Bresnahan, Boston, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, COUNIHAN and WHITTEMORE, JJ.
This is a petition brought in the Probate Court by a wife against her husband for an accounting of moneys turned over to the husband by her and for the transfer to her of certain real and personal property held by her husband.
During the pendency of the hearing upon this petition, a decree was entered in the Probate Court on the petition of the wife that she was living apart from her husband for justifiable cause and he was ordered to pay her $50 a week for her support.
The evidence shows that the petitioner and the respondent were married on February 19, 1924. She was then a dentist and he was a physician. They lived together until 1953 when domestic difficulties culminated in her leaving him. Two children were born of their marriage who are now living and of full age.
In her petition the wife alleges that from the date of marriage until the end of 1949 she turned over and delivered to the respondent the entire proceeds of her professional practice upon the understanding and agreement that the respondent would hold said moneys or the proceeds thereof in trust for the petitioner; that the respondent told her that said moneys or the proceeds thereof would be held as a fund to provide for the petitioner 'in her old age'; that the respondent also told her that he would redeliver and return said moneys or the proceeds thereof upon the request or demand of the petitioner; and that the petitioner relied upon these representations.
After hearing the judge entered a decree in favor of the respondent which will be hereinafter referred to in detail. The case comes here upon the appeal of the petitioner. The evidence is reported but the judge was not requested to make and made no findings of material facts. The decree in favor of the respondent imports a finding of every fact essential to support the conclusion of the judge, Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 57, 22 N.E.2d 622; Williams v. Howard, 330 Mass. 323, 325, 112 N.E.2d 247, and 'Findings made upon oral testimony are not to be reversed unless they are plainly wrong.' Nowicki v. Nowicki, 335 Mass. 392, 394, 140 N.E.2d 175, 176.
The petitioner testified that in a talk with the respondent before their marriage he said that 'we could take that step [get married] if I continued on working; and I said I would and that would help conditions in getting on our feet; then, afterward we--he would manage and everything and save money if I kept on, because I had a wonderful practice--and we would take care of our old age.'
The respondent admitted that his wife gave him a substantial part of the receipts of her practice from the time they were married up to 1949 when domestic difficulties arose. The respondent admitted that he mingled the moneys which he received from his wife with moneys he received from his practice. He deposited some of such money in joint accounts in several savings banks, and invested some of the money in government bonds amounting to $10,000 which stood in their joint names, in a jointly held note for $6,000, in the purchase of a dwelling house at 195 Bay State Road, Boston, title to which was in their names as tenants by the entirety and in which they had offices and the family lived, and in a mortgage on real estate in their names as tenants by the entirety. He also bought a paid up insurance policy on his life in the sum of $5,000, opened joint accounts in savings banks in his name and that of each of his children, and bought government savings bonds jointly with each of his children. All of the joint savings accounts, the savings bonds, the $6,000 note, and the real estate mortgage standing in the names of the husband and wife jointly or as tenants by the entirety were undisturbed when this petition was filed.
In her petition the wife sought an accounting of the moneys turned over by her to her husband and that the court determine the interest of the wife in all the assets in the name of the husband or in the name of the husband jointly with others.
The decree which the judge caused to be entered reads substantially as follows: I. That the title of the real estate located at 195 Bay State Road is in the parties as tenants by the entirety. III to IX. That the moneys standing in a joint account, in the names of the petitioner and the respondent, in the several savings banks, are the sole property of the respondent.
1. The evidence does not permit the conclusion that a trust had been created in the moneys given by the wife to her husband. The evidence in respect to this is vague and meager. The husband denied any trust and insisted that what his wife gave him constituted a gift. He paid all the bills incurred in the dental practice of his wife, and supplied her with money for household help, for the support of the family, for clothing for herself, for her personal medical bills, and for education and clothing for their children.
The 'mere fact that the wife contributed to an account in the husband's name did not give rise to a trust. 'It was held in English v. English, 229 Mass. 11, 12, 13, 118 N.E. 178, that when either husband or wife pays money or transfers property to the other, there is no presumption that it is received in trust. If a trust is alleged to exist, it must be proved. 'In the absence of such proof, it must be deemed that the money, property or conveyance was received with the intention, that it be applied to the use and benefit of either or both at the discretion of the recipient.'' * * * If the wife had contributed to the purchase price of real estate, title to which was taken in the husband's name, before there could be a resulting trust in her favor she would have had to show that she paid a clearly defined sum of money for the whole or an exact part of the property. * * * The same principle applies to personal property.' Tenczar v. Tenczar, 332 Mass. 105, 106-107, 123 N.E.2d 359, 360. See Hogan v. Hogan, 286 Mass. 524, 526, 190 N.E. 715; Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 71, 199 N.E. 383; Frank v. Frank, 335 Mass. 130, 135, 138 N.E.2d 586.
2. The petitioner now argues that on the evidence she is entitled to a decree of a half interest in the joint accounts and the bonds and note. We disagree.
There is no evidence that the petitioner knew of the accounts or the bonds and the note prior to an examination into the respondent's affairs after marital difficulties developed. There was not a completed gift either by delivery of the bank books or the bonds and the note, or by action having the same effect. See...
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