Campana v. Board of Directors of Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency

• Decision Date: 23 March 1987
• Citation: 505 N.E.2d 510,399 Mass. 492
• Parties: Richard A. CAMPANA v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 510

505 N.E.2d 510

399 Mass. 492

Richard A. CAMPANA v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 3, 1986.

Decided March 23, 1987.

Wade M. Welch, Boston (Nancy F. Gans, Wellesley, with him), for defendants.

Christopher Pilavis, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The plaintiff, Richard A. Campana, was terminated from his employment with the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency ² (MHFA) on August 15, 1979. At that time, the plaintiff was a member of the contributory retirement system for public employees. G.L. c. 32 (1984 ed.). Members of this system who are "employees," ³ and meet certain age and length-of-service requirements, are entitled to various rights on retirement, removal, or discharge. ⁴ G.L. c. 32, § 16. Because the plaintiff is a veteran and has served more than ten years' "creditable service," ⁵ he met the basic requirements necessary for entitlement to the rights provided in § 16 of G.L. c. 32. The primary issues presented here are (1) whether the plaintiff is an employee who is entitled to the procedural protections outlined in c. 32; and (2) if he is entitled to these protections, what is the appropriate remedy for the violation of these provisions. Both the judge who heard his action for declaratory relief in the Superior Court and a single justice of this court ruled that the provisions of G.L. c. 32, § 16, apply to the plaintiff and that the appropriate remedy is reinstatement. We agree. We affirm those rulings and remand this matter to the Superior Court for a hearing on damages.

The plaintiff was hired originally by the MHFA as a mortgage analyst in 1971. In the spring of 1978, the plaintiff changed positions within the MHFA and assumed the position of office manager. As office manager, the plaintiff worked under both the special assistant to the executive director and the executive director. In 1979, a series of disputes arose between the plaintiff and the executive director of the MHFA. As a result of these disputes, in August, 1979, the director sent a notice of termination to the plaintiff which detailed the reasons for his discharge.

The plaintiff responded to the director's charges by letter shortly after he was terminated. In addition, the secretary of the MHFA retirement board advised the plaintiff that he had the right to request a hearing before the retirement board. ⁶ The plaintiff also was advised of his right to seek review of any action taken by the retirement board in a District Court.

Initially, the plaintiff sought a review of his termination by the board of directors of the MHFA. The plaintiff's attorney made a presentation before the board of directors on September 16, 1980. The transcript of the directors' meeting indicates that the board concluded that the plaintiff's only avenue of relief was through the courts. ⁷ Approximately eighteen months later, in March of 1982, the board of directors notified the plaintiff that it was the board's position that he was properly discharged and that the board would take no further action.

In May of 1980, the plaintiff's attorney also requested a hearing before the retirement board of the MHFA pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 16(2). On October 7, 1980, the retirement board met and voted ⁸ not to grant the plaintiff a hearing. The board's position was that the matter was not within its authority. Moreover, the retirement board determined that because the MHFA board of directors had decided not to take action on the plaintiff's request for reinstatement, it would not be appropriate for the retirement board to overrule that judgment. The retirement board notified the plaintiff of its decision by letter dated October 8, 1980.

The plaintiff accepted another position in March of 1981 with the Committee on Criminal Justice of the Commonwealth. The plaintiff worked in this position for one year. The salary was approximately the same as the plaintiff had been earning at the MHFA. In the spring of 1982, the plaintiff took a leave of absence from the Committee on Criminal Justice to run for a seat on the Governor's Council. The plaintiff has not, as of the date of the record sought reinstatement with the Committee on Criminal Justice. ⁹

In a letter dated March 2, 1982, the chairman of the board of directors of the MHFA sent written notice to the plaintiff of the board's refusal to take any further steps regarding his dismissal. In response to this letter, the plaintiff instituted an action for declaratory relief in the Superior Court on March 3, 1982. ¹⁰ See G.L. c. 231A (1984 ed.). On June 25, 1982, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment asserting that, as a matter of law, he was entitled to the procedural protections set out in G.L. c. 32, § 16. After hearing, this motion was denied. The motion judge ruled that questions of fact existed concerning the plaintiff's status as a veteran and his years of creditable service. ¹¹

In June, 1983, the matter went to trial. The trial lasted two days and, in August, the judge rendered his decision. Because the parties stipulated at the outset of the trial that the plaintiff was a veteran with ten or more years of creditable service, the primary focus of the trial was on the nature of the plaintiff's duties and the scope of the plaintiff's authority at the MHFA. There is no dispute as to the plaintiff's job title. The trial judge found that, as office manager, the plaintiff did not have supervisory authority. Because the plaintiff was an employee who lacked authority and responsibility and was required to report to one or two supervisors who possessed the authority and responsibility for the job, the judge concluded that, as a matter of law, the provisions of G.L. c. 32, § 16, were applicable and that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing before the retirement board of the MHFA. ¹² The trial judge also concluded that the plaintiff's termination was ineffective, and that the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement without loss of pay. The judge ruled that a hearing should be held to determine the plaintiff's damages. Finally, the judge determined that the plaintiff was entitled to legal fees pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 36. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 37, as amended, 390 Mass. 1208 (1984).

The defendants have never complied with the decision of the Superior Court. After trial, despite the findings and conclusions of the trial judge, the MHFA did not reinstate the plaintiff. ¹³ Instead, one month after the judge's ruling, the board of directors filed with the retirement board a "fair summary of facts" on which the plaintiff's termination was based. That summary was not filed by the appropriate authority, as required by § 16 (1), (2). See Appendix. Nevertheless, without further action by the Superior Court judge, the retirement board held a hearing on October 13, 1983. The plaintiff appeared at the hearing and argued that the retirement board did not have jurisdiction over the matter. ¹⁴ The board ruled that jurisdiction was proper without deliberating on the issue. In conducting the hearing on the merits, the board decided that the plaintiff would not have the right to cross-examine witnesses. At that point, the plaintiff and his attorney refused to participate in the proceeding and left the hearing. The board held the hearing despite the plaintiff's absence, and the only witness was the plaintiff's supervisor, the executive director of the MHFA at the time of the plaintiff's discharge. The director stated his reasons for terminating the plaintiff. The hearing was concluded after this testimony.

Because the plaintiff was not present at the hearing, in a letter dated the same day as the hearing, the retirement board requested that the plaintiff submit any material which he wanted the retirement board to consider in making its decision. The letter stated that the retirement board would render a decision on October 28, 1983. Without notice to the plaintiff, on October 26, 1983, the retirement board met and voted that the removal of the plaintiff was justified. Because of this determination, the defendants have not reinstated the plaintiff.

After the retirement board rendered its decision, the plaintiff sought review of the matter pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 16(3) in the Boston Municipal Court. At that same time, the defendants filed various motions in the Superior Court seeking to persuade the trial judge to reconsider his rulings in light of the action of the retirement board. No action has been taken on these motions. ¹⁵

Against this background, the plaintiff commenced an action under G.L. c. 211, § 3 (1984 ed.), for extraordinary relief from a single justice of this court. The single justice reviewed the findings and conclusions of the trial judge. The single justice concluded that there was no error in these findings and conclusions, see infra at 515-516, and ruled that the plaintiff's discharge was not effective because the defendants did not comply with G.L. c. 32, § 16. Moreover, the single justice concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to benefits and back pay, with interest, from the date of the ineffective discharge to the present. The single justice also agreed with the trial judge in the award of attorney's fees pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 37(c). Finally, the single justice ruled that the hearing held by the retirement board was without legal basis and thus the plaintiff's action in the Boston Municipal Court could not be maintained. The single justice ordered the case transferred to the Superior Court for the hearing on damages.

The defendants appeal from the memorandum and order of the single justice. ¹⁶ The defendants argue that the plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing under G.L. c. 32 because he was hired as a "professional [or] business adviser[ ]." ¹⁷ The defendants also argue that even if the...