Campbell Cleaning & Dye Works v. Porter, 4369.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1944
• Docket Number: No. 4369.,4369.
• Citation: 183 S.W.2d 253
• Parties: CAMPBELL CLEANING & DYE WORKS, Inc., v. PORTER et ux.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

183 S.W.2d 253

CAMPBELL CLEANING & DYE WORKS, Inc., v. PORTER et ux.

No. 4369.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

June 1, 1944.

Rehearing Denied June 22, 1944.

Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County; Winter King, Judge.

Suit by Jack Porter against Campbell Cleaning & Dye Works, Inc., to recover overtime compensation for time worked in a laundry in excess of nine hours per day. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Judgment reversed and rendered in part and in all other respects affirmed.

Callaway & Reed and O. D. Montgomery, all of Dallas, for appellant.

Ellis P. House and Albert S. Reagan, both of Dallas, for appellees.

SUTTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the County Court at Law, Number Two, Dallas County.

The trial was to the court without a jury.

The suit was brought by Jack Porter and his wife against Campbell Cleaning & Dye Works, Inc., to recover for 630 hours overtime under the provisions of Art. 5169, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Statutes, as the same existed in 1940, prior to the repeal and amendment of 1943. Plaintiffs alleged Mrs. Porter worked as a laundress in a laundry establishment operated by the defendant at 2401 McKinney Avenue in the City of Dallas, and that she did all kinds of laundry work and was paid $15 per week. She claimed during the time she worked for the defendant between January 16, 1940, and August 6, 1940, she worked 630 hours overtime and attached a sheet showing the hours and minutes worked overtime each day, and sought to recover at the rate of 55 5/9 cents per hour for such overtime.

The defendant answered with numerous special exceptions, a general demurrer and general denial.

The controlling question presented here is whether or not under the proof plaintiffs are within the terms of the statute supra.

On request the court filed findings and conclusions. The trial court found the defendant did a general laundry business and operated a laundry and dry cleaning plant; that Mrs. Porter was employed as a general laundry worker and performed all the duties of a laundry worker and was thus required to work. He found the dry cleaning department was so intermingled with the laundry department that it was impossible to ascertain what portion of the work was done in the one department or the other.

The evidence is the defendant operates a laundry and dry cleaning department under the same roof but in separate spaces or rooms. The Neon sign exhibited read: "Laundry, Cleaning, Pressing and Dyeing." Mrs. Porter's testimony is she worked all over the plant in both the laundry and dry cleaning departments. The testimony of the defendant's employees is they saw her work as a silk finisher in the cleaning department which consisted of ironing silk garments with both steam and electric irons, but that she may have worked in the laundry department also.

Defendant's contention is plaintiffs cannot recover because neither the pleadings nor proof shows what portion of the overtime was done in the laundry department and what done in the dry cleaning department.

The statute, Art. 5169, under which the suit was brought reads:

"No female shall be employed in a laundry for more than fifty-four hours in one calendar week; the hours of such employment to be so arranged as to permit the employment of such female at any time so that she shall not work more than a maximum of eleven hours during the twenty-four hours' period of one day. If such female is employed for more than nine hours in any one day she shall receive pay at the rate of double her regular pay for such time as she is employed for more than nine hours per day."

The question presented is: Was all the work done by Mrs. Porter "in a laundry" under the facts here? It is not washing, ironing, dyeing,...