Campbell-Salahuddin v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 16 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 C 268,18 C 268 |
| Parties | SHRANDA CAMPBELL-SALAHUDDIN, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY; UNITED AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 588; and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW), AFL-CIO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Virginia M. Kendall
Currently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Shranda Campbell-Salahuddin's Second Amended Complaint to Vacate Arbitration Award pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 20). For the reasons explained below, the Motion is granted and the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Salahuddin is given until 7/30/18 to file a third amended complaint consistent with this opinion to the extent that she can do so.
Plaintiff Shranda Campbell-Salahuddin ("Salahuddin"), a former member of Defendant The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("IUAW") and its local chapter, Defendant United Auto Workers Local 588 ("Local UAW") (collectively, "UAW Defendants"), worked for Defendant Ford Motor Company ("Ford") at its Stamping Plant in Chicago Heights, Illinois. (Dkt. 20) at ¶¶ 16-18. However, on August 29, 2016, Ford terminated her employment for an alleged assault on another worker. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 35; see also (Dkt. 20-1) at 2. Salahuddin subsequently grieved her discharge pursuant to the UAW Defendants' and Ford's Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") and an arbitration hearing was held about one year later on October 17, 2017. (Dkt. 20) at ¶¶ 20-25, 32, 38. There, the Local UAW served as the "nominal party" and was represented by Reggie Ransom. Id. at ¶¶ 42-43. Kathryn A. VanDagens—an attorney who is associated with the National Academy of Arbitrators and other national arbitration associations—served as the arbitrator. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 56, 58, 67, 81, 88. As relevant herein, VanDagens's brother is a member of Ford's Senior Management who has worked for Ford for more than 30 years. Id. at ¶¶ 53, 55. VanDagens never disclosed to Salahuddin this information. Id. at ¶¶ 87, 89, 91, 93. Salahuddin alleges that this created a conflict of interest for VanDagens in the face of which she failed to recuse herself. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 100.
In addition to Ransom, Local UAW representative Matt Kolanowski attended the October 17 arbitration hearing. Id. at ¶ 105. When it was over, Kolanowski drove VanDagens to her car, and at that time VanDagens told Kolanowski that her brother worked for Ford. Id. at ¶¶ 105-06. About two months later, on December 13, 2017, VanDagens issued an award denying Salahuddin's grievance and affirming that Ford had cause to discharge her. See (Dkt. 20-1). Sometime shortly after the issuance of the award, Ransom informed Salahuddin about VanDagens's brother and he disclosed to her that he had learned about the brother in June 2017. (Dkt. 20) at ¶¶ 108-110. Kolanowski also later told Salahuddin the same information. Id. at ¶ 112.
On January 12, 2018, Salahuddin brought this action against Ford and the UAW Defendants. Her Second Amended Complaint seeks to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA") and for the Court to order a rehearing before an unbiased arbitrator, or alternatively, to reverse the arbitration awardand find in her favor. Id. at 21. Although her complaint does not contain delineated counts, she appears to bring the following claims: (1) Ford breached the CBA by terminating her without just cause; (2) VanDagens violated numerous ethical duties and infected the ultimate arbitration award, discussed below, with "evident partiality"; (3) Ford and the UAW Defendants breached the CBA by selecting a biased arbitrator instead of a neutral umpire; and (4) the UAW Defendants breached their duty of fair representation by (a) failing to disclose VanDagens's familial relationship to a Ford employee to Salahuddin until after the arbitration; (b) failing to object to VanDagens; (c) agreeing to VanDagens without disclosing the relationship; and (d) failing to notice VanDagens's termination pursuant to the CBA.
On April 3, 2018, Ford moved to dismiss Salahuddin's Second Amended Complaint, arguing that Salahuddin lacks standing to challenge the arbitration award and, alternatively, that Salahuddin has failed to set forth sufficient allegations to support her request for vacating the arbitration award. See (Dkt. 21). At a court status hearing on April 25, 2018, the UAW Defendants orally joined Ford's Motion. (Dkt. 35).
A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 841 (7th Cir. 2012); Jimenez v. Illinois, 2012 WL 174772, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2012). In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw[s] reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[ ]." Bultasa Buddhist Temple of Chicago v. Nielsen, 878 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2017). "[I]f a plaintiff cannot establish standing to sue, relief from this court is not possible, and dismissal under 12(b)(1) is the appropriate disposition." AFGE, Local 2119 v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012). However, the Court need not accept as true statements of law or unsupported conclusory factual allegations. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). For both 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) motions, the Court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," as well as "additional facts set forth in [plaintiff's] district court brief . . . so long as those facts are consistent with the pleadings." See Matthews v. Hughes, 2015 WL 5876567, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2015) (citing Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013)) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 301 of the LMRA provides for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization [such as a collective bargaining agreement] representing employees in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); see also Lippert Tile Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, District Council of Wis. & Its Local 5, 724 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 2013) ().1 However, a plaintiff represented by a union generally lacks standing to challenge an arbitration award because "when employees are represented by a union they are not parties to either the collective bargaining agreement or any union-company arbitration." Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1994). "Anexception to this general rule exists which 'allows employees to challenge or confirm a union-company arbitration award but only if the employees state a claim for a Section 301 fair representation case and the challenge or confirmation is integral to the case.'" Id. at 297; see also Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2013) (); Shores v. Peabody Coal Co., 831 F.2d 1382, 1384 (7th Cir. 1987) (). This type of claim—where an employee alleges an employer's breach of the CBA in conjunction with a breach of a union's fair duty of representation—is commonly referred to as a hybrid Section 301/fair representation claim under Section 301 of the LMRA. See, e.g., Yeftich, 722 F.3d at 914; Neal v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 349 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2003). The "two claims are inextricably interdependent. . . If one claim fails, 'neither claim is viable.'" Rupcich v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 833 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Salahuddin attempts to assert such a hybrid claim. In addition to alleging various breaches of the CBA, she alleges that the UAW Defendants breached their duty of fair representation because they "(a) [f]ailed to inform [her] of the Arbitrator's conflict-of-interest and partiality; (b) [f]ailed to object to the Arbitrator; (c) [a]greed to the Arbitrator without disclosing the conflict-of-interest; [and] (d) [f]ailed to Notice the Arbitrator's termination." (Dkt. 20) at ¶ 116. But a breach of the fair duty of representation "occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Yeftich, 722 F.3d at 915 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)); accord Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). Salahuddin's complaint makes no allegations of arbitrary, discriminatory,or bad-faith conduct, nor does it allege facts from which an inference of such conduct could be reasonably inferred.2
Examining the first potential category of breach—arbitrariness—"[w]hether a union's actions are arbitrary calls for an objective inquiry." Neal, 349 F.3d at 369. A "union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness, as to be irrational." O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 (citation and internal quotation...
To continue reading
Request your trial