Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor & Industry

• Citation: 94 A.2d 514,24 N.J.Super. 311
• Decision Date: 16 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. A--584,A--584
• Parties: CAMPBELL SOUP CO. v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR& INDUSTRY et al.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division

Page 311

24 N.J.Super. 311

94 A.2d 514

CAMPBELL SOUP CO. v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR& INDUSTRY et al.

No. A--584.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued Dec. 8, 1952.

Decided Jan. 16, 1953.

Grover C. Richman, Camden, argued the cause for the appellant.

Clarence F. McGovern, Jersey City, argued the cause for the Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industry.

Abraham Greenberg, Camden, argued the cause for John A. Hattel and others.

Before Judges EASTWOOD, GOLDMANN and FRANCIS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

EASTWOOD, S.J.A.D.

The question posed by this appeal of the Campbell Soup Company (hereinafter referred to as the 'employer') is whether, having reached the age of 65 years, the employees affected by the retirement provision in the collective bargaining agreement are eligible for benefits under the unemployment compensation statutes.

This appeal is one of several such cases evolving out of the same fundamental factual situation, and which have been consolidated by order of the court.

The employer, with an extensive plant in Camden, New Jersey, is engaged in the business of canning soup and other food products. The claimant, John A. Hattel, was employed by that company from July 21, 1941 until February 28, 1951, as a machine maintenance man. During the term of his employment claimant was a member of Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of America, Local 80, the collective bargaining agent for its members.

On March 22, 1950 an agreement was entered into between the union and the company which provided in part as follows:

'Section XII--Health, Safety and Welfare.

'(b) The Company agrees to wholly pay for the pension plan outlined below:

'Eligibility: Employees are eligible after 5 years of service and attainment of age 30 but under age 65.

'Retirement Age: 65 years of age; or earlier with consent of Company, on a reduced amount of pension.'

During the month of February 1951 the claimant, John A. Hattel, reached the age of 65 years, and at the end of that month the employer notified him that in view of the provision of the agreement set forth above, he could no longer be employed and thereafter he would receive a pension of approximately $25 per month. The claimant retired and accepted his pension payments.

Thereafter Hattel filed his claim for unemployment compensation benefits and was held eligible by the agency, and the Board of Review of the Division of Employment Security affirmed.

In other cases, referred to collectively as the Attanasio cases, the claimants were found to be production workers, possessing no skill or experience in any line of work other than food processing, wherein the board of review held that these workers had unreasonably restricted their availability for work by seeking employment in similar capacities, and were not entitled to benefits under the statute. The claimants involved in this class also appeal from the board's determination.

A third group of cases, referred to as the Piere cases, involved production workers who had removed from the local labor market and sought employment elsewhere and had thus not restricted their availability. These workers were found to hold compensable claims, from which holding the employer appeals.

The employer contends that the purpose of the unemployment compensation statutes was to provide economic protection to those involuntarily unemployed; that having contracted through the union the employees of the Campbell Soup Company called for a cessation of employment at the age of 65, through the retirement provision of the contract; that the same is not discretionary with the employer and that such separation from employment is, therefore, voluntary on the part of the employee and consequently not compensable under the unemployment compensation statutes; that to be compensatory the cessation of employment must have been 'for good cause,' which has generally been considered to mean attributable to something beyond the control of the employee; that this is not the situation in the matter Sub judice; that it is also a statutory prerequisite to benefits that the claimant be 'available for work,' and that by acceptance of the pension the employee has not shown an unequivocal exposure to the labor market.

The employer takes the position that the group of employees (in the Attanasio cases) who were unskilled production workers in food processing, found by the board to have non-compensable claims because they had unreasonably restricted their availability for labor, had non-compensable claims for the reason that they voluntarily severed their employment rather than for the reason assigned.

In the last group of cases (Piere cases) the board held that having removed themselves to another area, they had not unreasonably restricted their availability for work and were, therefore, possessed of compensable claims. The employer, however, contends that this holding is too narrow and that this group of cases should be held ineligible for benefits for the reason that they left their employment voluntarily without good cause and made themselves unavailable for work within the meaning of the act.

The employee argues that the board's distinction between semi-skilled and unskilled laborers in determining availability for work was arbitrary; that the employer represents a small percentage of this type of labor in the area and that those workers could be adapted to other industries; that labor confined to this class had not unreasonably restricted itself; that cessation of work at age 65 under the retirement provision was not voluntary, but merely conformed to the company policy formulated many years ago, and that termination of employment thereunder was 'with good cause' within the meaning of the statute; that retirement under a pension program does not so restrict a man as to render him unavailable for other employment and thus disqualify him from benefits under the statute; that the claimants in the production workers class had not unreasonably restricted their availability for employment and were available within the meaning and spirit of the statute.

The basic question for determination, and the one to which we direct our primary attention, is whether an employee terminating his employment under a union negotiated contract, providing for his retirement on pension, is unemployed for good cause so as to be possessed of a compensable claim for unemployment compensation under the statute, or whether he has voluntarily terminated his employment and, therefore, is not entitled to unemployment benefits. So far as we can ascertain, this question is one of first impression in our courts.

The statutory enactment to be considered is the Unemployment Compensation Law, R.S. 43:21--1 et seq., N.J.S.A., which has as its stated purpose or declaration of policy the equalization of and lightening of the burden of economic insecurity resulting from unemployment in the interest of the promotion of the general welfare of society of this State. (R.S. 43:21--2, N.J.S.A.). This principle has been recognized by our courts as paramount. In W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review, 129 N.J.L. 402, at page 405, 29 A.2d 858, at page 860, (Sup.Ct.1943), it was stated:

'* * * The objective--to protect against involuntary unemployment and the need for that kind of assistance known as 'poor relief'; the means--to provide more stable employment and to create a systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, 'thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance.' To give correct interpretation to the provisions of the statute we must carry in mind the dire and distressing situation against which the statute, as a matter of stated public policy, is directed.'

American Grocery Co. v. A. & W. Wine, etc. Corp., 131 N.J.L. 383, 36 A.2d 757 (Sup.Ct.1944); Valenti v. Board of Review of U.C.C. of N.J., 4 N.J. 287, 72 A.2d 516 (1950); Horsman Dolls, Inc., v. Unemployment, etc., of N.J., 7 N.J. 541, 550, 82 A.2d 177 (1951).

The pivotal point about which this controversy revolves is whether the employee's cessation of employment was 'voluntary' or 'involuntary' under the statute, in light of the provisions of the contract calling for retirement at age 65.

In construing contracts and other written agreements the court must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. Fletcher v. Interstate Chemical Co., 94 N.J.L. 332, 110 A. 709 (Sup.Ct.1920), affirmed 95 N.J.L 543, 112 A. 887, 17 A.L.R. 92 (E. & A.1921); Basic Iron Ore Co. v. Dahlke, 103 N.J.L. 635, 137 A. 423 (E. & A.1927); Moses v. Edward H. Ellis, Inc., 4 N.J. 315, 72 A.2d 856 (1950); Washington Construction Co., Inc., v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 84 A.2d 617 (1951).

There is no contention that the union was not the agent of the individual employees who were members thereof, nor that the contract entered into under date of March 22, 1950 was not the result of the mutual assent of the parties thereto. It is a legal consequence so generally recognized as to require no citation of authority, that the acts of one's authorized agent are considered to be those of his principal and that the principal is bound thereby as if he had participated therein personally. We, therefore, conclude that the provisions of the contract, and in particular the retirement provision under scrutiny, was an expression of assent of the employee.

The language of the retirement provision appears clear and unequivocal; I.e., that at age 65 the employer must pension the employee and he must retire, and under circumstances where the consent of the employer is secured one may retire earlier at a...