Campbell v. Ailion

• Decision Date: 08 June 2016
• Docket Number: A16A0239
• Citation: 338 Ga.App. 382,790 S.E.2d 68
• Parties: Campbell v. Ailion et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

338 Ga.App. 382

790 S.E.2d 68

Campbell

v.Ailion et al.

A16A0239

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 8, 2016

Reconsideration Denied July 28, 2016

Herald J. A. Alexander, Atlanta, for Appellant.

S. Bradley Shipe, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Branch, Judge.

Jolaunda Boone Campbell filed suit in Cobb County State Court against Bruce Ailion and two LLCs that Campbell alleges Ailion controls: ATL Investments, LLC, and Next Chapter Investments, LLC (collectively, the defendants are referred to herein as “Ailion”). Campbell's complaint asserted two claims, one of which she labeled “Theft of Labor and Materials,” and the other of which she captioned “Mental Anguish and Emotional Distress and Attorney[ ] Fees.” Ailion moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Following a hearing, the trial court granted that motion and dismissed Campbell's complaint with prejudice. Campbell now appeals from that order. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We review de novo a trial court's determination that a pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, treating all material allegations set forth in the complaint as true, treating all denials set forth in the answer as false, and resolving any doubts in favor of the plaintiff. Wylie v. Denton , 323 Ga.App. 161, 162–163, 746 S.E.2d 689 (2013) ; Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources , 319 Ga.App. 205–206, 734 S.E.2d 206 (2012), rev'd on other grounds, 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).

In support of Count I of her complaint, captioned “Theft of Labor and Materials,” Campbell alleged that she and Ailion entered into an oral agreement for Campbell to oversee the rehabilitation of a residential investment and\or rental property located in Atlanta and owned by Ailion or related entities.¹ Ailion provided Campbell with a budget of $72,275 and an itemized list of repairs and improvements to be made to the property. Although Campbell was not to be compensated for her time, the parties agreed that she would retain contractors to perform the repairs and improvements, that she would fund the work, and that Ailion would then reimburse Campbell. Campbell thereafter spent $43,000 making repairs and improvements to the property, but Ailion only reimbursed her for $26,000, leaving a balance owed of $17,000. Campbell further alleges that Ailion entered into this agreement knowing that Ailion did not intend to reimburse her for any of the work she funded.

In support of Count II of her complaint, captioned “Mental Anguish and Emotional Distress and Attorney Fees,” Campbell alleged that Ailion acted intentionally and in bad faith and that its refusal to reimburse her has caused and continues to cause her “mental anguish and emotional distress.” She further contended that Ailion has caused her “unnecessary trouble and expense,” including forcing her to hire an attorney to file suit in an effort to recover the amounts owed. Campbell therefore requested that the trial court award her compensatory damages, punitive damages, interest on the amount owed, and reasonable costs and attorney fees.

Ailion moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Georgia does not recognize a cause of action for civil theft. Ailion further asserted that because Georgia does not recognize a cause of action for civil theft, Campbell could not premise her claim for emotional anguish on such a theft. Additionally, Ailion argued that Campbell could not pursue both of her claims simultaneously, as both were predicated on the same conduct.² In her response, Campbell pointed out that the allegations of her complaint supported, at the very least, a claim for breach of contract.

Following a hearing at which it heard oral argument from the parties, the trial court granted Ailion's motion to dismiss.

In its order, the trial court held that Count I failed as a matter of law because Georgia does not recognize a civil cause of action for theft. Additionally, the trial court found that Count I could not state a breach of contract claim because Campbell acknowledged “that she was not to be compensated for the services she allegedly performed.” With respect to Count II, the trial court found that “a claim for damages for mental anguish and emotional distress will not lie where, as in this case, the plaintiff is also claiming pecuniary damages.” The court further found that even though the allegations of Campbell's complaint might support a claim of fraud, Campbell had failed to “adequately plead” such a claim. Campbell now appeals from the order of dismissal.

Under current Georgia law, it is not necessary for a complaint to set forth all of the elements of a cause of action in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Rather, the Georgia Civil Practice Act requires only notice pleading and, under the Act, pleadings are to be construed liberally and reasonably to achieve substantial justice consistent with the statutory requirements of the Act. Thus, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof. Put another way, if, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.

Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. , 324 Ga.App. 750, 752, 751 S.E.2d 545 (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also, Charles H. Wesley Ed. Foundation v. State Election Bd. , 282 Ga. 707, 713–714, 654 S.E.2d 127 (2007) (the Civil Practice Act requires only that a complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of the type of litigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling in details”) (punctuation and footnote omitted); Lathem v. Hestley , 270 Ga. 849, 850, 514 S.E.2d 440 (1999) (“the issue is not whether the petition pled a claim in an ideal manner but whether it sufficiently gave [defendant] fair notice of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved”) (citations omitted). Here, the allegations of Campbell's complaint gave Ailion fair notice that Campbell was asserting a claim for breach of an oral contract. Alternatively, those allegations would also support a cause of action for unjust enrichment (breach of an implied contract), promissory estoppel, and fraud.³

1. Under Georgia law, an enforceable contract may exist even though it “rests only in words as remembered by witnesses.” OCGA § 13–1–5 (b). See also Cline v. Lee , 260 Ga.App. 164, 168, 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003). To assert a claim for the breach of such a contract, a plaintiff must allege that the parties agreed to the terms of the contract, that consideration was given for the contract, that the defendant thereafter breached the agreement, and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach. See Cline , 260 Ga.App. at 168(1), 581 S.E.2d 558. Here, the trial court found that Campbell could not state a claim for breach of an oral contract because she “acknowledges that she was not to be compensated for the services she allegedly performed.” Thus, the trial court appears to have concluded that any oral contract would fail for lack of consideration. The flaw in the court's reasoning is that it assumes only monetary compensation can serve as the good and valuable consideration required for a contract. Georgia law is clear, however, that things other than money may constitute contractual consideration. See id. (finding an enforceable oral contract where a builder agreed to construct homes in a particular subdivision in exchange for certain promises from the developer). See also OCGA § 13–3–43 (“[i]f the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or of a loss, disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee”). Here, Campbell alleged that she agreed to oversee the renovation and rehabilitation of certain real property in which Ailion had an interest in exchange for Ailion's promise to reimburse her for certain budgeted expenditures. These allegations are sufficient to at least state a claim for breach of an oral contract. See Cline , 260 Ga.App. at 168(1), 581 S.E.2d 558.

2. Alternatively, Campbell's complaint also states a claim for unjust enrichment.

A claim of unjust enrichment will lie if there is no legal contract and the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefited party equitably ought to return or compensate for. The concept of unjust enrichment in law is premised upon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party and avoid payment for the value received.

Jones v. White , 311 Ga.App. 822, 827–828(1)(b), 717 S.E.2d 322 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, a claim for unjust enrichment exists where a plaintiff asserts that the defendant induced or encouraged the plaintiff to provide something of value to the defendant; that the plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant with the expectation that the defendant would be responsible for the cost thereof; and that the defendant knew of the benefit being bestowed upon it by the plaintiff and either affirmatively chose to accept the benefit or failed to reject it. See Crook v. Foster , 333 Ga.App. 36, 39, 775 S.E.2d 286 (2015) ; Morris v. Britt , 275 Ga.App. 293, 294, 620 S.E.2d 422 (2005).

Here, Campbell's complaint alleges that Ailion, acting as an agent for the property owner and/or acting for Ailion's own benefit, induced Campbell to spend her own money improving property owned either by Ailion or the entity for whom Ailion...