Campbell v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 04 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 563 CA 21-01114 |
| Citation | 2022 NY Slip Op 04875 |
| Parties | KEITH A. CAMPBELL, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JULIE A. CAMPBELL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
TABANO & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, LATHAM (MARIA C. TEBANO OF COUNSEL) FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CHARLES W. ENGELBRECHT, ROME, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND BANNISTER JJ.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Herkimer County (John H Crandall, A.J.), entered June 22, 2021 in a divorce action. The order determined that the parties' August 31, 2017 postnuptial agreement was invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the counterclaim in the second amended answer is granted insofar as it seeks a determination that the August 31, 2017 postnuptial agreement is valid and enforceable as a matter of law.
Memorandum: The parties were married in June 1989 and entered into a postnuptial agreement on August 31, 2017 (2017 agreement). They had entered into two prior postnuptial agreements in 2010 and 2013, which, like the 2017 agreement, set forth the financial separation of their assets and obligations in the event of divorce. Unlike the 2017 agreement, however, the prior agreements were never properly acknowledged pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (3). In July 2019, plaintiff commenced this action for divorce. Defendant served a second amended answer with a counterclaim seeking, inter alia, to incorporate but not merge into the judgment of divorce the 2017 agreement. In reply, plaintiff asserted affirmative defenses alleging that the 2017 agreement should be found null and void or set aside on the grounds that, inter alia, he signed the 2017 agreement under duress and that the 2017 agreement was unconscionable. Thereafter, defendant moved for summary judgment seeking, inter alia, an order dismissing plaintiff's affirmative defenses and determining that the 2017 agreement is valid and enforceable. Following a hearing, Supreme Court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, including plaintiff's allegations of emotional abuse in connection with the execution of the 2017 agreement, the 2017 agreement was unconscionable and manifestly unfair. Thus, the court determined that the 2017 agreement was invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law. Defendant appeals, and we reverse.
In general, postnuptial agreements are subject to ordinary principles of contract law (see Levine v Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 47 [1982]; O'Malley v O'Malley, 41 A.D.3d 449, 451 [2d Dept 2007]). New York has a "strong public policy favoring individuals ordering and deciding their own interests through contractual arrangements" (Matter of Greiff, 92 N.Y.2d 341, 344 [1998]; see Bloomfield v Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d 188, 193 [2001]). Thus, "there is a heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifest[s] the true intention of the parties" (Chimart Assoc. v Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 574 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, an agreement between spouses may nevertheless be invalidated if the party challenging the agreement demonstrates that it was the product of fraud, duress, or other inequitable conduct (see Christian v Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 73 [1977]; Skotnicki v Skotnicki, 237 A.D.2d 974, 974-975 [4th Dept 1997]; see generally Tuzzolino v Tuzzolino, 156 A.D.3d 1402, 1403 [4th Dept 2017]).
Initially we conclude that the court erred insofar as it held that plaintiff signed the 2017 agreement under duress as a result of defendant's emotional abuse. An agreement is voidable on the ground of duress "when it is established that the party making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of his [or her] free will" (Austin Instrument v Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130 [1971], rearg denied 29 N.Y.2d 749 [1971]). Generally, "the aggrieved party must demonstrate that threats of an unlawful act compelled his or her performance of an act which he or she had the legal right to abstain from performing" (Polito v Polito, 121 A.D.2d 614, 614-615 [2d Dept 1986], lv dismissed 68 N.Y.2d 981 [1986]). "[T]he threat must be such as to deprive the party of the exercise of free will" (id. at 615). Here, even accepting as true plaintiff's allegations that defendant persistently urged him to sign the 2017 agreement and threatened to tell the parties' children of plaintiff's wrongful actions in the past, such conduct did not amount to any unlawful acts on the part of defendant sufficient to constitute duress (see...
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