Campbell v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 22 February 1952 |
| Citation | 57 So.2d 34 |
| Parties | CAMPBELL v. CAMPBELL. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William H. Maness, Jacksonville, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final decree entered in divorce proceedings instituted by appellant against the appellee, which decree dismissed the appellant's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The sole issue here is whether a plaintiff in a divorce action is required to be physically present in this state for the full 90-day period prescribed by Section 65.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in the following language: 'In order to obtain a divorce the complainant must have resided ninety days in the State of Florida before the filing of the bill of complaint.'
The undisputed facts are, in substance, as follows: The appellant, who is a career naval officer, was born in the State of Oregon and entered the United States Naval Academy immediately upon his graduation from high school in that state. Since his graduation from the Naval Academy, he has been continuously on active duty in various parts of this country and in foreign countries. He is now and was at the time of the filing of his complaint living in Germany, where he has been stationed since June of 1949. It does not appear that he had ever established or attempted to establish a domicile in any state other than his domicile of origin until December of 1950. At that time, while in the United States on business, he came to Jacksonville, Florida, to visit a Mr. Pavelka, a retired naval officer, whom he had known in Germany. While visiting Mr. Pavelka, he determined to make Florida his permanent home. Accordingly, he filed an affidavit of intention to make Florida his permanent home with the Clerk of the Circuit Court and established a bank account in a Jacksonville Bank. Since returning to his duty post in Germany, he has had correspondence with various real estate companies in Jacksonville, looking toward the purchase of a home there. He changed his official permanent home address as listed with the United States Navy Department to '1921 Woodmere Street, Jacksonville, Florida,' which is the home of his retired naval officer friend, Mr. Pavelka. It appears that Mr. Pavelka's home is open to the appellant for his use at any time he is in Jacksonville on leave, or until such time as the appellant purchases a home of his own. The exact length of the appellant's sojourn in Florida is not shown by the record, but our impression is that it was only a few days.
The Special Master was of the Opinion that the appellant entertained a bona fide intention to make Florida his permanent home, and such conclusion is amply supported by the evidence. The contention of the appellant is, in effect, that the requirements of the statute, Section 65.02, supra, are satisfied by the establishment of a 'domicile of choice' more than ninety days before the filing of his complaint. This contention cannot be sustained.
On the general question of the establishment of a 'domicile of choice,' the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Section 20, adopts the following rule: 'For the acquisition of a domicil of choice the intention to make a home must be an intention to make a home at the moment, not to make a home in the future.' Also, this intention must be 'to make a home in fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil.' Ibid., Section 19. When tested by these rules, it does not appear that the appellant has actually succeeded in establishing a 'domicile of choice.'
But even if it be assumed that the appellant succeeded in effecting a change of domicile, and that Florida is now his 'domicile of choice,' we do not think he has complied with the residence requirements of Section 65.02. 'It is usually held that a statutory requirement of residence for a specified period means actual, and not constructive,...
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Keveloh v. Carter
...Finally, the intention to acquire a new domicile must be to make a home at the moment, not to make a home in the future. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla.1952). In this case, it was unrefuted that Keveloh was a life-long resident of Illinois. She was born in Illinois, attended school ......
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Reynolds v. Reynolds, B-10
...trial court's finding that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause and the persons of the parties. Unlike Campbell v. Campbell, Fla.1952, 57 So.2d 34, in which our Supreme Court held that the proofs indicated constructive residence only, the husband's proofs in this case cl......
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Beaucamp v. Beaucamp, s. 85-2480
...that purpose means an actual presence in Florida, coupled with an intention at the time to make Florida one's residence. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla.1952); Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Curran v. Curran, 362 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Residency for p......
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Brown v. Brown
...of our statute. 3. Our Supreme Court has expressly stated that actual residence is required for a divorce action. See Campbell v. Campbell, Fla.1953, 57 So.2d 34. $4. Our Supreme Court has also equated the terms 'domicile' and 'residence' in Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539.......