Campbell v. Campbell, 13222

Decision Date03 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 13222,13222
Citation617 S.W.2d 795
PartiesWilliam Bruner CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. Laura Fenner Williams CAMPBELL, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Guy C. Fisher, Austin, for appellant.

Roy Q. Minton, Minton, Burton, Fitzgerald, Inc., Austin, for appellee.

SHANNON, Justice.

Appellant William Bruner Campbell filed a motion to modify in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in the district court of Travis County. 1 Specifically, appellant sought an order appointing him managing conservator of his twelve-year-old son Thomas Mitchell Campbell IV and naming appellee, his former wife, Laura Fenner Williams Campbell, possessory conservator of the child. Appellant alleged in the motion that circumstances affecting his son's life had so materially and substantially changed that the retention of his former wife as managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare, education, and the best interest of the child.

Appellee filed a special appearance pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 120a objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over her and the child on the ground that they were not amenable to process issued by the courts of Texas. After hearing, the district court rendered judgment dismissing appellant's motion to modify based on lack of jurisdiction over appellee and the child. This Court will affirm that judgment.

The facts, applicable to this appeal, are as follows. On June 14, 1976, the district court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties. In September, 1975, appellant had removed Thomas Mitchell Campbell IV and his sister from the jurisdiction of the court in violation of temporary rules of the court, and at the time of the trial had concealed the children from appellee and the district court. Before entry of the judgment of divorce, appellee established residence in New Orleans. Appellant and the children were finally located in Scotland, and a Scottish court in December, 1976, removed the children from appellant and ordered them returned to the custody of appellee in New Orleans. Since December, 1976, the parties' son has resided with appellee, his managing conservator, in Louisiana.

Appellant has a single point of error: "The trial court erred in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction." Under the point, appellant claims that the district court of Travis County has jurisdiction of his motion to modify the managing conservatorship by virtue of the continuing jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.05 (Supp.1980). Section 11.05 provides as follows:

" § 11.05. Continuing Jurisdiction

Text of subsection (a) as amended by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1201, ch. 584, § 1, and Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1888, ch. 763, § 1

(a) Except as provided in Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section and in Section 11.052 of this code, when a court acquires jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, that court retains continuing jurisdiction of all parties and matters provided for under this subtitle in connection with the child. No other court of this state has jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship with regard to that child except on transfer as provided in Section 11.06 of this code."

The exceptions provided in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) are not germane to appellant's contention.

Appellee's response to appellant's argument is that the continuing jurisdiction of the district court was superseded by operation of Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.052 (Supp.1980) which provides:

" § 11.052. Exceptions to Continuing Jurisdiction

(a) Except on the written agreement of all the parties, a court may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify:

(1) the appointment of a managing conservator if the managing conservator and the child have established and continued to maintain their principal residence in another state for more than six months unless the action was filed and pending before the six-month period; or

(2) any part of a decree if all of the parties and the child have established and continue to maintain their principal residence outside this state.

(b) This section does not affect the power of the court to enforce and enter a judgment on its decree."

In connection with the applicability of § 11.052(a)(1), it is agreed that appellee and the parties' son had established and maintained their principal residence in Louisiana for at least twenty-seven months before appellant filed the motion to modify.

It is true, as argued by appellant, that the district court has continuing jurisdiction to hear modification suits pursuant to § 11.05. Nonetheless, the Legislature limited the district court's continuing jurisdiction by enactment of § 11.052(a)(1). Therefore, if proof is made that the managing conservator and the child have maintained their principal residence in another state for six months prior to the filing of the suit to modify, the district court's continuing jurisdiction pursuant to § 11.05 is superseded by § 11.052(a)(1).

Appellant claims, in addition, that the district court was empowered to entertain the suit to modify pursuant to Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.045. Section 11.045 provides:

" § 11.045. Original Jurisdiction

(a) A court has original jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, whether or not the child is physically present in the state, only if one of the following conditions is met:

(1) this state:

(A) is the principal residence of the child at the time the proceeding is commenced; or

(B) was the principal residence of the child at any time during the six-month period before proceeding was commenced, and a parent or person acting as a parent resides in this state at the time the proceeding is commenced; or

(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because:

(A) the child and the child's parents or the child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with this state and there...

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4 cases
  • Carroll v. Jones
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 22 Junio 1983
    ...months before the action was filed...." (Emphasis added.) Kelly v. Novak, supra, at 29. See also Campbell v. Campbell, 617 S.W.2d 795, 797-798 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Although Kelly, supra, dealt with the application of § 11.052(a)(1), the language "may not" also app......
  • Soto-Ruphuy v. Yates, SOTO-RUPHU
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 12 Diciembre 1984
    ...Pettiette v. Morrow, 661 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); and Campbell v. Campbell, 617 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), all of which reach the same conclusion under the predecessor statute to section 11.53(d). Ernesto argues that......
  • M.D.T., In Interest of, 04-82-00603-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 21 Diciembre 1983
    ...be predicated on Section 11.045 (original jurisdiction) of the Family Code, absent fraud or mistake. Campbell v. Campbell, 617 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The evidence shows that the child was not in California at the time of filing of the suit by the mot......
  • Pettiette v. Morrow
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 13 Octubre 1983
    ...the child legally resides in New Mexico, and In a case involving a similar fact situation, Campbell v. Campbell, 617 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin, 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Justice Shannon the exception of Sec. 11.052(a) clearly applies. It is true, as argued by appellant, that the......

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