Campbell v. Chatwin
| Decision Date | 25 May 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 8935--PR,8935--PR |
| Parties | David H. CAMPBELL, Superintendent, Motor Vehicle Division, Arizona Highway Department, Petitioner, v. Kenneth C. CHATWIN, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court, Respondent, William J. Raible and Charlotte Raible, his wife, Real Parties in Interest. David H. CAMPBELL, Superintendent, Motor Vehicle Division, Arizona Highway Department, Petitioner, v. Kenneth C. CHATWIN, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court, Respondent, Mahlon C. Gaumer, III, Real Party in Interest. David H. CAMPBELL, Superintendent, Motor Vehicle Division, Arizona Highway Department, Petitioner, v. William H. HOLOHAN, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court, Respondent, David John Ryan, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen. and James R. Redpath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for petitioner.
Gerald A. Machmer, Phoenix, for respondents.
The instant matter is a combination of three causes wherein the real parties in interest, the plaintiff in the trial court, appealed to the Superior Court without first having obtained or requested a hearing by the Arizona Highway Department on the proposed suspension of their driver's licenses and motor vehicle registrations by that agency.
The case is before this Court on a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' opinion on the Arizona Highway Department's petitions in each case for writs of certiorari or prohibition.
The basic issues before this Court are whether persons who have their driver's licenses or vehicular registrations suspended under either the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (A.R.S. § 28--1101 et seq.) or under the Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act (A.R.S. § 28--401 et seq.) must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking review; and whether if such exhaustion is necessary, the Superior Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 28--1122, to return such matters to the Arizona Highway Department for an administrative hearing when the time for requesting such a hearing has expired; and whether under the Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act the Superior Court has power to stay suspension of driver's licenses until after notice to the agency.
The first case pertains to Mr. William Raible and Mrs. Charlotte Raible, who owned an Arizona licensed automobile which was involved in an accident while being driven by Mrs. Raible. The car was not insured at the time of the accident. The Director of the Financial Responsibility Branch of the Arizona Highway Department, upon review of the accident reports, pursuant to A.R.S. § 28--1142, estimated the damages from the accident to be $900. Official notices were then sent to the Raibles. They were informed that the failure to post security in the amount of $900 would result in the suspension of the motor vehicle registration on the Raible automobile, and of Mrs. Raible's driver's license. The notices required that security be posted by January 31, 1966. The parties did not request administrative hearing but instead filed suit on February 1, 1966 in the Superior Court of Maricopa County securing therein without notice, stay orders against the suspensions.
The second party, Mr. Mahlon Gaumer, was involved in an accident with his Arizona licensed, uninsured automobile. The Director, pursuant to A.R.S. § 28--1142, set security for damages at $154.00. The security was to be filed by February 21, 1966. No administrative hearing was requested; instead Gaumer filed suit in the Superior Court, Maricopa County obtaining, on February 23, 1966, a stay order against the Highway Department.
None of the aforementioned notices advised the recipients of their right pursuant to A.R.S. § 28--1122, subsec. A, to demand an administrative hearing.
On June 15, 1966 the Bureau of Driver Licensing, Division of Motor Vehicles of the State Highway Department issued, pursuant to A.R.S. § 28--446, subsec. A(3), and without prior notice an order of suspension on the driver's license of the third party here, Mr. David John Ryan. The suspension was effective on receipt and was to remain in effect for a minimum period of one year. The notice cited as the basis for its issuance, 'that the herein named person has bene convicted with such frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highway.'
The order advised Ryan that within twenty days after receipt of a request for such, a hearing would be held to determine whether the suspension would be rescinded, modified or affirmed. Ryan made no request for an administrative hearing, but filed an action in the Superior Court, Maricopa County. That court issued without notice an order requiring that Ryan's license be restored to him pending the decision of the court.
Each of these plaintiffs requested the Superior Court to provide a trial de novo, pursuant to either A.R.S. § 28--1122, subsec. B or A.R.S. § 28--451 (Ryan). In each cause the Highway Department urged that a failure to exhaust administrative remedies should deny the plaintiffs access to the Superior Court.
The Raible and Gaumer matters proceeded to trial; in each case the trial judge ordered that the cause be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, therein directing the plaintiff to pursue such remedies.
Pursuant to such an order the Raibles requested a hearing as provided for in A.R.S. § 28--1122, subsec. A. The Highway Department denied the request as not being within the time limit prescribed by statute. Counsel for the Raibles then secured another temporary restraining order staying the Highway Department from executing the suspension order previously given and ordering that the Raibles be allowed to retain the driver's license and automobile registration pending the outcome of the hearing.
No copy of the motion for rehearing was served on the Highway Department and hence no opportunity to answer was afforded. The Highway Department filed a motion to quash for the reason that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure 65(a) and (d), 16 A.R.S., and therefore the Highway Department was not a proper party to the action. The court entered an order denying the motion to quash and ordering the cause to be referred back to the Highway Department for hearing pursuant to the administrative remedies.
In the Gaumer case the court included with its order of dismissal a provision for the reduction of the required security. The Highway Department moved for a rehearing and requested oral argument on the ground that the reduction of security could only be ordered after the administrative remedies were exhausted. At the oral argument counsel for Gaumer argued that a request for a hearing which would be submitted to the Financial Responsibility Branch would be denied as not being within the time limit prescribed by statute. The motion for rehearing was denied; the court ordering further that the cause be referred back to the Highway Department for hearing pursuant to the administrative remedies.
In the Ryan case the plaintiff on filing notice of the appeal obtained an order restoring his license pending the outcome of the appeal based on A.R.S. § 28--451. No notice was served on the Highway Department prior to the issuance of this restraining order. The Highway Department filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Such motion was denied as was the Department's motion for a rehearing. The cause was set for trial and later postponed pending this decision.
The Highway Department sought relief in the Court of Appeals from the orders of the Superior Court in each of the involved causes. It petitioned for writs of certiorari to review the entire proceedings and orders staying any further proceedings of the court below or in the alternative for writs of prohibition to restrain the Superior Court from proceeding with hearings pursuant to A.R.S. § 28--1122, subsec. B or § 28--451, and further from enforcement of its restraining orders. A.R.S. § 28--1122 states, in part:
'
A.R.S. § 28--451 provides:
'A person denied a license, or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or revoked by the department except where the cancellation or revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this chapter, shall have the right to file a petition within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the superior court in the county wherein the person resides and the court is vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon thirty days written notice to the commission, and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of license under the provision...
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