Campbell v. Cook

• Decision Date: 27 November 1906
• Parties: CAMPBELL et al. v. COOK.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

193 Mass. 251

79 N.E. 261

CAMPBELL et al. v. COOK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

November 27, 1906

COUNSEL

John T. Coughlin and David R. Radovsky, for appellant.

Jennings Morton & Brayton, for appellee.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

Under the agreement between the parties the defendant while authorized to act as their agent also was given an irrevocable power for a term of five years to manage their property consisting of improved real estate, accounting to each of the plaintiffs for one third of the rents, after retaining in his discretion such sums as might be required for the disbursements enumerated in the instrument. The bare relation of principal and agent may be insufficient to maintain a bill in equity by the principal for an accounting unless the account is so complicated that it cannot conveniently be stated or settled at law, but the fiduciary character of the relations created by the agreement constituted the defendant, who accepted the appointment, a trustee. Rev. Laws, c. 159, § 3, cl. 6; Badger v. McNamara, 123 Mass. 117; Pratt v Tuttle, 136 Mass. 233; Makepeace v. Rogers, 4 De G J. & S. 649; Sawyer v. Cook, 188 Mass. 163, 165, 74 N.E. 356. By his acceptance it then became his duty to faithfully administer the property, to keep accounts of all expenditures, and to render an account to the plaintiffs at reasonable times with full information as to all details of his management. The bill charges that in addition to the statement contained in the accounts rendered, the plaintiffs requested that the amount of insurance procured and placed on each parcel of the estate might be further itemized by including the rate paid, and the name of the companies who issued the policies. The presiding judge having found that these corporations were solvent declined to order the defendant to disclose their identity. No satisfactory reason, however, appears why this information should not be given. The plaintiffs were entitled to a full discovery, which was not limited to the financial soundness of the insurers, to be determined by the opinion of their agent, although this opinion, upon his testimony alone, was confirmed by the court. It was the money of the plaintiffs that had been paid, and they had a right fully to explore the entire field of their agent's operations for the purpose of ascertaining if the disbursements charged had actually been made, and this would include the...