Campbell v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 29 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 12-01769 (RC)
• Citation: 202 F.Supp.3d 121
• Parties: Jennifer B. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

202 F.Supp.3d 121

Jennifer B. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 12-01769 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 29, 2016

Constance Travanty, Sara B. Safriet, Alan Lescht, Alan Lescht & Associates, Washington, DC, David C. Codell, Law Offices of David C. Codell, West Hollywood, CA, for Plaintiff.

Sarah L. Knapp, Taylor Nicole Anvid, Alex Karpinski, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

Re Document No.: 84

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dr. Jennifer Campbell brought suit against her former employer, the District of Columbia, in 2012. See Compl., ECF No.1. Dr. Campbell alleged that the District acted unlawfully when, amidst allegations that Dr. Campbell had steered contracts, the District terminated her employment as Chief Operating Officer of the District's Department of Health Care Finance. See id. ¶¶ 6–99. After a five-day jury trial held in December 2015, a jury found for Dr. Campbell on her constitutional claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Verdict Form at 2, ECF No. 65. The jury awarded Dr. Campbell $250,000.00 in compensatory damages for her physical pain, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, and medical expenses. See id. at 3; see also Jury Instrs. at 39–40, ECF No. 66 (instructing the jury to award monetary damages for physical pain, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, and medical expenses, but not for lost wages or other employment benefits). The Court added $304,823 in financial damages to which the District had stipulated. See Joint Pretrial Statement at 2, ECF No. 41.

Dr. Campbell now moves for attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and she also urges the Court to adopt an enhancement multiplier. See Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Fees & Costs at 1–2, ECF No. 84-2 [hereinafter Pl.'s Mem.]; Pl.'s Reply Def.'s Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Fees & Costs at 3, 10–13, ECF No. 101 [hereinafter Pl.'s Reply]. The District agrees that Dr. Campbell should receive a fee award, but it argues that her requested fees and costs are too high and that an enhancement is not appropriate. See D.C.'s Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Attorneys' Fees at 1, ECF No. 96 [hereinafter Def.'s Opp'n]. The Court concludes that, for the most part, Dr. Campbell's requested fees are, in light of her voluntary reductions, reasonable. But the Court declines to award fees for duplicative time spent at trial and will make minor additional reductions to account for aberrations in Dr. Campbell's attorneys' billing records. The Court also determines that an enhancement is not appropriate and that Dr. Campbell's requested costs include inappropriate items. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Dr. Campbell's motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ; Talley v. District of Columbia , 433 F.Supp.2d 5, 7 (D.D.C.2006). In doing so, the Court follows a two-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whether the party seeking attorney's fees is the prevailing party; second, the court must determine whether the requested fees are reasonable. See Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics , 354 F.3d 890, 895 (D.C.Cir.2004) ) ("The plaintiff ... bears the burden of establishing both entitlement to an award of attorney's fees as well as the amount properly due.").

A prevailing party "is one who has been awarded some relief by a court." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). A litigant need not succeed at every step of the litigation to be a prevailing party under § 1988 ; indeed, "a litigant ‘who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney's fees even for the unsuccessful stage.’ " Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA , 156 F.3d 1329, 1335 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Cabrales v. Cty. of L.A. , 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.1991) ).

If the Court determines that a plaintiff is the prevailing party, the court must then determine whether the fees sought are reasonable. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ; Turner , 354 F.3d at 895. "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the number of hours spent on a particular task is reasonable. See Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee , 353 F.3d 962, 969–70 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ). To that end, the plaintiff's "supporting documentation must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended." Id. at 970 (quoting In re Olson , 884 F.2d 1415, 1428 (D.C.Cir.1989) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court should exclude from a fee request "hours that were not ‘reasonably expended,’ " including hours "that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1101, at 6 (1976)).

A plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable hourly rate (or "lodestar") by submitting evidence of "the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995). In this circuit, plaintiffs may also demonstrate a reasonable hourly rate by relying on evidence such as an updated version of the Laffey Matrix created by the United States Attorney's Office. Id. at 1109.¹ Although a district court may not relieve plaintiffs of their obligation to demonstrate that rates such as those in the Laffey Matrix are reasonable, see Eley v. District of Columbia , 793 F.3d 97, 105 (D.C.Cir.2015), the Laffey Matrix can "provide a useful starting point." Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109.

In exceptional circumstances when "an enhanced award may be justified," a court may take a third step and apply an additional multiplier. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. "[T]here may be circumstances in which the basic standard of reasonable rates multiplied by reasonably expended hours results in a fee that is ... unreasonably low." Blum , 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541. But because "there are a few such circumstances," these " ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ " circumstances "require specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 554, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blum , 465 U.S. at 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541 ).

III. ANALYSIS

Dr. Campbell requests fees for the work of eight attorneys and one paralegal.² In support of her request, Dr. Campbell has provided billing records that provide descriptions of the work performed, the number of hours spent on various tasks, and the applicable rates for each individual. See generally Billing Records, Pl.'s Reply Ex. A, ECF No. 101-2. The District does not dispute that Dr. Campbell is the prevailing party, nor does the District argue against applying the 2015–2016 Laffey Matrix to determine reasonable hourly rates for Dr. Campbell's attorneys. See Def.'s Opp'n at 1, 3.³ Therefore, the Court will not address these issues and will use the 2015–2016 Laffey Matrix to determine hourly rates for Dr. Campbell's attorneys. See USAO Attorney's Fees Matrix—2015—2016 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney's Office for D.C., https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/file/796471/download (last visited July 29, 2016). The District does argue, however, (1) that Dr. Campbell's attorneys failed to exercise required billing judgment in a number of ways, so the Court should reduce their total claimed hours by thirty percent;⁴ (2) that Dr. Campbell should not receive an enhanced fee award; and (3) that Dr. Campbell's request for costs includes improper items. See Def.'s Opp'n at 4–10. In response, Dr. Campbell opposes most of the District's contentions and insists that an enhanced fee award is appropriate, but she has voluntarily reduced some of her claimed hours and costs. See Pl.'s Reply at 3, 10–13. The Court addresses each of the District's objections to Dr. Campbell's requested fees and costs in turn.

A. Exercise of Billing Judgment

1. Insufficient Exclusions

The District contends that Dr. Campbell's counsel failed to exercise proper billing judgment and did not "make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Def.'s Opp'n at 4 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ); see id. at 4–5. A lawyer requesting fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must do so "just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. "The fee application should therefore indicate whether nonproductive time ... was excluded and, if time was excluded, the nature of the work and the number of hours involved should be stated." Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def. , 675 F.2d 1319, 1327–28 (D.C.Cir.1982).

Here, the District argues that Dr. Campbell excluded "only two entries" and therefore did not exercise proper billing judgment. Def.'s Opp'n at 5. Dr. Campbell claims, however, that additional documented exclusions of entries were not required and that "affidavits averring that [couns...