Campbell v. Graham-Armstrong

• Decision Date: 17 May 1973
• Docket Number: GRAHAM-ARMSTRONG,S.F. 22958
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 509 P.2d 689 Barbara CAMPBELL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Eleanoret al., Defendants and Appellants. In Bank

Page 777

107 Cal.Rptr. 777

9 Cal.3d 482, 509 P.2d 689

Barbara CAMPBELL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Eleanor GRAHAM-ARMSTRONG et al., Defendants and Appellants.

S.F. 22958.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

May 17, 1973.

LaCroix & Schumb and Joseph G. Schumb, Jr., San Jose, for plaintiffs and appellants.

William M. Siegel, County Counsel, and Leland D. Stephenson, Deputy County Counsel, San Jose, for defendants and appellants.

McCOMB, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County granting a peremptory writ of mandate compelling defendant governing board of the Campbell Union School District to reclassify plaintiffs as full-time kindergarten teachers for certain years prior to the 1965--1966 school year, to pay them back salaries for the school year 1964--1965, and to pay plaintiffs, or the State Teachers' Retirement System, any sums necessary so that they will be entitled to all retirement benefits they would otherwise have been entitled to receive had they been classified as full-time kindergarten teachers. Plaintiffs appeal from that portion of the judgment denying back salaries for years preceding 1964--1965.

Facts: Each of the plaintiffs was employed by the school district as a part-time employee to teach a one-session kindergarten class requiring 180 minutes of classroom instruction per day. Their salaries were substantially below the $6,000 minimum salary set by section 13525 of the Education Code for full-time employees, as well as the salaries set by defendant governing board for full-time employees, which latter salaries exceeded the minimum salary required by the code. ¹ A two-session kindergarten teacher was required to teach each day two classes of 150 minutes each and was paid on a full-time basis. In addition to the appropriate salary according to the governing board's salary schedule, they were paid a 9 percent bonus for teaching two classes.

Plaintiff Campbell began her employment with the district in the 1962--1963 school year. Plaintiff Petersen was first employed for the 1963--1964 school year, and plaintiff D'Attilo began working for the district in the 1964--1965 school year. According to plaintiffs, they first discovered they were entitled to classification and salary as full-time employees in January 1966. Consultations with field representatives for the California Teachers Association and with the superintendent of schools resulted in plaintiffs' being reclassified as full-time employees for the school year 1965--1966.

In May 1966, plaintiffs wrote to the superintendent of schools requesting reclassification to a full-time status for prior years and adjustments for sick leave, retirement, and back pay. According to plaintiffs' the governing board delayed making a decision upon their request awaiting advice of the county counsel. On December 4, 1967, plaintiffs filed their petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court. After trial, the court granted a peremptory writ ordering payment of back wages for the school year 1964--1965 but held that recovery for prior years was barred by the statute of limitations.

Questions: First. Is mandamus an appropriate remedy?

Yes. Defendants contend that plaintiffs were entitled to money damages only and that they therefore should have brought an action at law, the remedy of mandamus being unavailable to them under the circumstances. It will be noted, however, that in addition to back salary, plaintiffs sought reclassification as probationary teachers for the periods in question as a basis for being entitled to the back salary and proper credit for retirement benefits. Accordingly, mandamus was an appropriate remedy. (Fry v. Board of Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 112 P.2d 229.)

Second. Does plaintiffs' agreement to accept part-time employment as onesession kindergarten teachers at part-time salaries preclude them from being reclassified as full-time kindergarten teachers entitled to be paid as such?

No. Defendants contend that by agreeing to teach one session of kindergarten per day at part-time salaries, plaintiffs have waived their right to be paid as full-time employees. As will hereinafter appear, however, such a waiver is not permissible under the applicable statutory provisions.

Section 13503 provided, in part: 'Every person employed by the district in a position requiring certification qualifications in a day school of the district for not less than the minimum schoolday for each day the schools of the district are maintained during the school year is a full-time employee and his compensation shall be fixed accordingly. . . .' (Italics added.) Section 13525 required the governing board of each school district to 'pay to each person employed in a day school of the district for full time in a position requiring certification qualifications . . . an annual salary of not less than six thousand dollars ($6,000).' Section 13525 further provided: "Full time' means not less than the minimum schoolday for each day the schools of the district are maintained during the school year.' Section 11003 provided: 'The minimum schoolday for pupils of kindergartens . . . is 180 minutes inclusive of recesses . . ..' ²

In Heckley v. Board of Education, 53 Cal.2d 218, 1 Cal.Rptr. 4, 347 P.2d 4, this court held that the statutory scheme provides for payment of full-time salary to a one-session kindergarten teacher but that the teacher there involved, by accepting her part-time contract, waived the provisions guaranteeing a full-time salary and agreed to the rules and regulations which the school district had adopted fixing the time and duties for full-time positions.

In Heckley, the teacher had refused a position teaching a full day as fixed by the board of education (8:45 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) and at her own request was employed to teach only a morning session of the kindergarten class (9 a.m. to 12 noon). None of the plaintiffs here refused to teach two sessions, and Heckley is therefore distinguishable from the present case. More importantly, however, shortly after the decision in Heckley was filed, section 13338.1 was enacted (Stats.1961, ch. 1071, p. 2801, § 1), providing: 'Except as provided in Sections 13406 (waiver of hearing by permanent employee) and 13448 (rights of terminated permanent employee), any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this chapter or any part thereof Is null and void.

'Notwithstanding provisions of this or any other section of this code, governing boards of school districts may employ persons in positions requiring certification qualifications on less than a full-time basis.' (Italics added.)

Contrary to defendants' contention, the second paragraph of section 13338.1 does not serve to preserve the specific holding of Heckley. Rather, the only reasonable interpretation is that the purpose of such paragraph is to insure that part-time employment (defined as less than the minimum school day) is not outlawed by inference.

Third. Have plaintiffs established that they were full-time employees by showing that they taught for the minimum school day as prescribed by the Education Code?

Yes. The matter of the classification of a teacher is determined by state law (Fry v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.2d 753, 112 P.2d 229); and under section 13503 a teacher who is assigned to teach at least the minimum school day is considered to be a full-time employee. As hereinabove pointed out, the minimum school day for pupils of kindergartens is 180 minutes; and plaintiffs taught for that length of time each day.

Defendants point out that the minimum prescribed by section 11003 is the school day for pupils and that in order to be regarded as full-time employees, plaintiffs are required to show that they served for the length of the full day established by the governing board for full-time teachers to be on duty at the school. The governing board is authorized by section 10952, subject to statutory provisions, to fix the length of the school day; and defendants point out that two-session kindergarten teachers are required to be on duty from 8:30 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. under rules laid down by the governing board, arguing that a kindergarten teacher who is not required to be on duty that long is not a full-time employee. The same rules, however, require that one-session kindergarten teachers arrive at the school at 8:30 a.m.; that they teach from 9 a.m. to 12 noon (180 minutes); that the departure time for such teachers shall be at the option of the principal after ample planning has been completed for future sessions; and that such teachers 'are expected to attend rre-school orientations, attend monthly workshops, and participate in PTA or other parent organizations just as though they were full-time personnel.' Plaintiffs observed such requirements.

As hereinabove indicated, the fact that plaintiffs were required to teach for the minimum school day prescribed by the code constituted them full-time employees. In any event, they were on duty for the additional time required of them under the rules laid down by the governing board and, accordingly, unquestionably qualify as full-time employees.

In Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 195 Cal.App.2d 420, 15 Cal.Rptr. 717, the plaintiff, a teacher, sought to establish that he had acquired tenure. Under the code, he was entitled to tenure if he had taught for three complete consecutive school years in a district having an average daily attendance of 850 or more. The district in which he taught maintained a senior high school and junior high schools, including classes in the seventh and eighth grades. The code sections defining 'average daily attendance' differentiated in the number of units given for average daily attendance by pupils in elementary schools and the number of units given for average daily attendance by pupils in high schools, thus affecting the support given by the state...