Campbell v. Griffith, No. 2D07-2493.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | Stringer |
| Citation | 971 So.2d 232 |
| Decision Date | 04 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D07-2493. |
| Parties | Lucille T. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. Darlene L. GRIFFITH, as Representative of the Estate of Stoner A. Griffith, Appellee. |
v.
Darlene L. GRIFFITH, as Representative of the Estate of Stoner A. Griffith, Appellee.
[971 So.2d 233]
Steven George Lavely of Lavely, Whyte & Fischer, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant.
Daniel P. Mitchell of Barr, Murman & Tonelli, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
STRINGER, Judge.
Lucille T. Campbell appeals from the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict in this personal injury action. We agree with Campbell that the jury's verdict on all issues other than future lost earning ability was against the manifest weight of the evidence; therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages other than future lost earning ability. This holding renders Campbell's other two issues moot.
On February 15, 2004, Campbell was driving in Bradenton when she was hit broadside on the passenger side of her vehicle by a vehicle driven by the defendant's decedent. Campbell immediately suffered pain in her left elbow. She was not treated at the scene, but she went to the emergency room later that day, where various diagnostic tests were performed. Ultimately, Campbell was given pain medication and a sling. She wore the sling for approximately two weeks before her elbow pain resolved.
Within several weeks of the accident, Campbell noticed that her left arm occasionally felt tingly, numb, and cold. These feelings were intermittent, and Campbell did not initially seek treatment for this problem or attribute it to the accident. However, on October 2, 2004, Campbell was rushed to the emergency room when her left arm became cold and hard. She was found to have a blood clot blocking the flow of blood to her left arm. After several diagnostic procedures, doctors determined that the clot was the result of an aneurysm in Campbell's subclavian artery near her left shoulder. Campbell underwent a surgical procedure to place a stent in the subclavian artery as a result. In August 2005, the stent failed, and Campbell required a second surgical procedure because of the aneurysm. Both Campbell's treating doctor and the defense's medical expert testified that Campbell would likely need future surgery on the subclavian artery as a result of the aneurysm.
At trial, both Campbell's treating doctor and the defense's medical expert, who had
performed a compulsory medical examination on Campbell, testified that while subclavian aneurysms can result from various medical conditions, Campbell suffered from none of those conditions. Because of this, both doctors testified that Campbell's aneurysm was caused by the auto accident within a reasonable degree of medical probability.1 Both doctors also testified that the delay of seven months between the accident and the onset of severe symptoms was not unusual with a vascular injury of this nature. Both doctors further testified that the injury was permanent. Griffith did not significantly impeach the testimony of either of these medical witnesses, nor did Griffith present any contradictory medical evidence.
At the time of the accident and through the time of trial, Campbell was employed by WalMart. Campbell testified that while she had lost time from work due to the treatment for her aneurysm, she had used her sick time and thus had no claim for past lost wages. However, Campbell testified that after the accident, she was no longer able to work as a stocker and she had been moved to a different position with a concomitant reduction in pay. Because of this, Campbell sought damages for lost future earning ability. However, at trial, Campbell admitted that she had continued to work as a stocker from the time of the accident in February 2004 until November 2005, when she had suffered a stroke. Only after the stroke was her employment changed and her pay reduced.
After the close of the evidence, the trial court granted Campbell's motion for directed verdict on the issue of permanence. However, the trial court denied Campbell's motion on the issue of causation. Despite this ruling, however, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The parties have agreed and the Court now instructs you as a matter of law that at the time of the February 15, 2004, accident, Stoner A. Griffith was negligent and that such negligence was a legal cause of injury sustained by Plaintiff Lucille T. Campbell.
The issue for your determination on the claim of Lucille T. Campbell is what damages were suffered by Lucille T. Campbell as a result of the February 15th, 2004 accident.
Moreover, the verdict form did not ask the jurors to determine whether Griffith's negligence had caused Campbell's injuries. Instead, the verdict form simply asked the jurors to determine "the amount of any damages sustained by Plaintiff, LUCILLE T. CAMPBELL" for past medical expenses, the present value of any damages sustained for future medical expenses, the present value of any damages for future lost...
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Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Newlin, Case No. 2D17-2519
...256, 260 (Fla. 2018) ("A trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."); Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("The appropriate standard of review applied to a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is whether t......
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Daskalopoulos v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., Case No. 2D17–371
...review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial or motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. See Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ; Manhardt v. Tamton, 832 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Ledoux, 230 So.3d 530, 537–38 (Fla......
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Ring Power Corp. v. Rosier, CASE NO. 1D10-5083
...obvious, and not conflicting." Pena v. Vectour of Fla., Inc., 30 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)); see also Jordan v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 231, 233-34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing grant of new trial where issue of......
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Boyles v. A&G Concrete Pools, Inc., No. 4D12–3334.
...jury is not free to simply ignore or arbitrarily reject that evidence and render a verdict in conflict with it.” Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So.2d 232, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). The jury's ability to reject expert testimony must be founded on some reasonable basis in the evidence. Wald v. Grain......
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Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Newlin, Case No. 2D17-2519
...256, 260 (Fla. 2018) ("A trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."); Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("The appropriate standard of review applied to a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is whether t......
-
Daskalopoulos v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., Case No. 2D17–371
...review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial or motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. See Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ; Manhardt v. Tamton, 832 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Ledoux, 230 So.3d 530, 537–38 (Fla......
-
Boyles v. A&G Concrete Pools, Inc., No. 4D12–3334.
...jury is not free to simply ignore or arbitrarily reject that evidence and render a verdict in conflict with it.” Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So.2d 232, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). The jury's ability to reject expert testimony must be founded on some reasonable basis in the evidence. Wald v. Grain......
-
Ring Power Corp. v. Rosier, CASE NO. 1D10-5083
...obvious, and not conflicting." Pena v. Vectour of Fla., Inc., 30 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)); see also Jordan v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 231, 233-34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing grant of new trial where issue of......