Campbell v. Gruttemeyer

• Decision Date: 11 October 1968
• Citation: 26 McCanless 133,432 S.W.2d 894,222 Tenn. 133
• Parties: , 222 Tenn. 133 Leona CAMPBELL, James C. Campbell, Rachel Maxine Campbell and Deborah Iona Campbell, b/n/f Frank B. Dodson, (four separate cases), Petitioners, v. Joan C. GRUTTEMEYER, Administratrix of the Estate of Maurice Edward Campbell, Deceased, Respondent.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 894

432 S.W.2d 894

26 McCanless 133, 222 Tenn. 133

Leona CAMPBELL, James C. Campbell, Rachel Maxine Campbell and Deborah Iona Campbell, b/n/f Frank B. Dodson (four separate cases), Petitioners, v. Joan C. GRUTTEMEYER, Administratrix of the Estate of Maurice Edward Campbell, Deceased, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Oct. 11, 1968.

William T. Gamble, Kingsport, Wilson, Worley & Gamble, Kingsport, of counsel, and J. D. Lee, Knoxville, Lee, McGee & Garrett, Knoxville, of counsel, for petitioners.

James A. Weller, Johnson City. Epps, Powell, Weller, Taylor & Miller, Johnson City, of counsel, for respondent.

OPINION

HUMPHREYS, Justice.

This case was brought to this Court by certiorari to the Court of Appeals in order that we might examine the question, whether a cause of action can be maintained by an unemancipated minor child against the estate of a deceased parent for personal injuries allegedly occurring in the negligent operation of an automobile in the course of a family relationship. The trial judge held that such an action could be maintained. On appeal, the Western Division of the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Bejach, Jr., reversed, holding that an unemancipated child has no such cause of action.

There were certain other questions considered by that Court in its opinion. But our only comment on these, since they are by no means novel, is that we concur in their disposition by the Court of Appeals, and affirm its judgment in regard thereto.

After the fullest consideration, we have concluded the Court of Appeals has correctly decided the case, and finding the part of its opinion on the question under consideration to be both adequate and lawful, we adopt that part of the opinion, as follows:

,'We have before us appeals in error by Roadway Express, Inc. and by Joan C. Gruttemeyer, Administratrix of the estate of Maurice Edward Campbell, deceased, from judgments against both of them entered on jury verdicts against them in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Tennessee, and by Roadway Express, Inc. from a judgment against it in favor of James Fletcher, Administrator of the estate of Maxine Cash Campbell. The judgment in favor of the estate of Maxine Cash Campbell is in the amount of $100,000, and those in favor of Leona Campbell are in the amount of $75,000, those in favor of Rachel Maxine Campbell are in the amount of $15,000, those in favor of Deborah Campbell are in the amount of $15,000, and those in favor of James Maurice Campbell are in the amount of $5,000. Suit was also brought by the Estate of Maxine Cash Campbell against the Estate of Maurice Edward Campbell, but a demurrer to the declaration in that action was sustained and no appeal was taken from that ruling. In this opinion the parties will be referred to as plaintiff or plaintiffs, as the case may be, and as defendant or defendants, or called by their respective names, the defendant Roadway Express, Inc., being designated as Roadway, and John W. Fletcher, Administrator, as the estate of Mrs. Campbell.

'The judgments referred to were recovered as the result of a collision which occurred August 8, 1964 between a Falcon automobile owned and driven by Maurice Edward Campbell and a tractor-trailer combination owned by Roadway Express, Inc., driven by one of its employees, Thomas Page. The collision occurred at about 3:15 A.M. on U.S. Highway 11E, just outside of the town of Tusculum. Mr. and Mrs. Campbell were killed and four of their children, James Maurice, age 17; Deborah, age 9, Rachel, age 8; and Leona, age 5, were injured. The Campbell family had left their home in Amherst, Virginia in the late afternoon of August 7, 1964 for a weekend outing in the Great Smoky Mountains. They were accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Phillipi, who were riding in another car with another son of Mr. and Mrs. Campbell and a visitor of the Phillipi family. The Phillipi car had passed Roadway's tractor-trailer when the Campbell car, which was traveling west on Highway 11E, crossed over onto the wrong side of the highway and collided head-on with the Roadway tractor-trailer which was headed east. The four injured children and Mrs. Campbell's Estate brought suits against both Roadway Express, Inc. and the estate of Maurice Edward Campbell, which suits resulted in the verdicts and judgments referred to above.'

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'We must next take up the assignments of error filed by plaintiff in error Joan C. Gruttemeyer, administratrix of the estate of Maurice Edward Campbell. In her capacity as administratrix, Mrs. Gruttemeyer has filed three assignments of error.

'By Assignment of Error I, it is contended for the Estate of Maurice Edward Campbell that the trial court erred in overruling and denying the deceased parent's pleas and motions for directed verdicts on the ground that a cause of action by an unemancipated minor child cannot be maintained against the estate of a deceased parent for personal injuries allegedly occurring in the negligent operation of an automobile in the course of a family relationship.

'Tennessee courts have consistently followed the rule that an unemancipated minor child cannot sue its parent for personal injuries. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 (77 S.W. 664), 64 L.R.A. 991; Turner v. Carter (1936), 169 Tenn. 553 (89 S.W.2d 751); Graham v. Miller (1945), 182 Tenn. 434 (187 S.W.2d 622), 162 A.L.R. 571; Mahaffey v. Mahaffey (1932), 15 Tenn.App. 570; Ownby v. Cleyhammer (Kleyhammer) (1951), 194 Tenn. 109 (250 S.W.2d 37). Counsel for the minor children in the instant cases undertake to distinguish the facts of these cases on the ground that they are here brought not against a living parent but against the estate of a deceased parent. This presents a case of first impression in Tennessee. Counsel for the minor appellees, in support of this distinction, rely on the case of Logan v. Reaves (1961), 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 729 (789). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an action for wrongful death of a parent, caused by negligent operation of an automobile by her minor child, could be maintained against the child after the child had been emancipated by marriage and also by court decree. Our Supreme Court held that the reason for the family unity rule providing immunity from suit was the public policy of protecting the family relationship, and when the reason ceases, the rule ceases. In the Logan case, the defendant, who was the daughter of the deceased for whose estate the recovery was allowed, had, after the fatal accident, married, and had also had her disabilities of minority removed by a court decree. Holding to the contrary, counsel for Joan C. Gruttemeyer, Administratrix, cite and rely on Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751, in which case the Supreme Court denied a recovery against a son who had not been completely emancipated. In that case, the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice DeHaven, said:

'We do not have in our reports any case where a parent sued a minor child for damages based upon negligence. However, we think the principle which controls a disposition of this question is to be found in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991, 102 Am.St.Rep. 787, 1 Ann.Cas. 130, where the question under consideration was whether a minor child had a court remedy against his father for personal injuries.

In denying a remedy in such case, the court quoted with approval from the case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682, as follows:

'So long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and of a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.' Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 555--556 (89 S.W.2d 751).

'Turner v. Carter was not overruled in Logan v. Reaves, but was distinguished on the ground that the son 'had not been completely emancipated'. Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 634--635 (354 S.W.2d 789). In commenting on the Supreme Court's opinion in Logan v. Reaves, both the Vanderbilt Law Review and the Tennessee Law Review justify the Supreme Court's opinion in that case solely on the ground that it was based on the complete emancipation of the minor defendant involved. 16 Vanderbilt Law Review, page 902, says:

'The opinion seems to emphasize the termination of the relationship of the complete emancipation of the child somewhat more than the severance of the relationship by death. This suggests that even if the mother had not filed, she could have maintained the action upon the emancipation of the child.'

'29 Tennessee Law Review, page 595, says:

'Since the court did not rely primarily upon the termination of the relationship by death, no other conclusion can be drawn but that the holding is based mainly upon the subsequent emancipation.'

'In any event, the facts of the case of Logan v. Reaves were the converse of those of the instant case, and even if the rule of family immunity should be completely abolished in the case of suits of parent against child, or against the estate of a child, there are many reasons why such immunity should not be abolished in the case of suits by an unemancipated child against the estates of a deceased parent. Among these are the following: 1st. To allow such action would be to discriminate in favor of an injured child whose parent died, as distinguished from another child equally injured whose parent survived the accident. 2nd. The statute of limitations does not run against the cause of action of a minor, if one exists, and a child might bring such action later when the parent dies or the child reaches its majority. ...