Campbell v. Knight
| Citation | 109 So. 577,92 Fla. 246 |
| Parties | CAMPBELL et al. v. KNIGHT. |
| Decision Date | 13 July 1926 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1926.
Suit by William A. Knight, as administrator with the will annexed of Wheeler Stevens, deceased, against Amanda E. Campbell and another, as executors and trustees of the last will of Lucius J. Campbell, deceased, for discovery and other relief. From a decree for the complainant, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
On Petition for Rehearing.
Syllabus by the Court
Question of nonjoinder of parties defendant must be seasonably and regularly made to be available; in suit for discovery to ascertain what defendants ought to pay on account of taxes on leased land, where defendants did not reply to complainant's demand that they establish that certain lessee corporation had not paid its share of taxes, question of nonjoinder of such corporation subsequently raised was too late. The question of nonjoinder of parties defendant must be seasonably and regularly made to be available on behalf of defendants.
A bill for discovery merely does not have to be sworn to.
If bill is for relief as well as discovery, in some jurisdictions it must be sworn to, but such rule goes to general relief only bill may pray for equitable relief consequent on prayer for discovery without being defective because not sworn to. If the bill is for relief as well as discovery, the rule prevails in some jurisdictions that it must be sworn to. This rule, however, seems to go to general relief only. The bill may pray for equitable relief consequent upon the prayer for discovery without violating the rule as to general relief.
Courts of equity, which have once obtained jurisdiction for purposes of discovery, will dispose of a cause finally, if proper for the consideration of equity, though the remedy at law is fully adequate.
Courts of equity take cognizance of cases in which contract demands between litigants involve extensive, mutual or complicated accounts, when it is not clear from the facts alleged in the particular case that the remedy at law is as full, adequate and expeditious as it is in equity.
Bill for discovery, waiving answer under oath, but not waiving answer under oath in interrogatories seeking discovery propounded by complaint, is not fatally defective.
Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Johns County; George Couper Gibbs, judge.
George M. Powell, of Jacksonville, for appellants.
W. W Dewhurst, of St. Augustine, and Alex St. Clair-Abrams, of Jacksonville, for appellee.
Wheeler Stevens, on April 27, 1900, leased to Freeman S. and Henry A Hodges certain lands in St. Johns county, Fla., aggregating 13,000 acres. This lease was amended February 20, 1902, so as to extend the date of its expiration to April 28, 1918. By the terms of the lease, Freeman S. and Henry A. Hodges were restricted in their use of the lands described therein to sawmill and turpentine privileges, and were required to pay all taxes levied and assessed against said lands after the year 1900 to the date of its expiration.
On May 22, 1902, Freemand S. and Henry A. Hodges assigned to Wilson Cypress Company all their right and interest in and to the cypress timber growing on the lands described in said lease, together with their interest in the lands on which said cypress timber was growing. Wilson Cypress Company is not made a party to this suit. November 19, 1903, Freeman S. and Henry A. Hodges assigned to Lucius J. Campbell under the name of L. J. Compbell, all their right and interest in and to the pine timber growing on the lands described in said lease together with their interest in the lands on which said pine timber was growing. By the grovisions of this assignment, Lucius J. Campbell assumed payment of all taxes levied and assessed against the lands described therein for the remainder of the term of the lease.
On April 10, 1907, Lucius J. Campbell assigned to Frank R. Clark and Erasmus H. Tomlinson certain rights acquired by him under the lease from Freeman S. and Henry A. Hodges and the said Clark and Tomlinson on May 1, 1907, assigned to J. W. Melton the right in said lease so acquired from Lucius J. Campbell. On the 14th day of August, 1908, J. W. Melton assigned to C. E. Melton and J. H. Allison, under the name of the Melton Lumber Company, all the right acquired by him in said lease from Clark and Tomlinson, and the said C. E. Melton and J. H. Allison on the 23d day of February, 1909, assigned the interest in said lease so acquired to the First National Bank of Gainesville, Fla.
Lucius J. Campbell died testate prior to or during the year 1912, and Amanda E. and Benjamin O. Campbell were appointed executors of his will. The assignments mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were several times modified, and, subject to certain of said modifications, on August 25, 1911, the executors of the will of Lucius J. Campbell assigned to C. C. Bettes all the interest held by said executors as such to the lands described therein under the lease from Freeman S. and Henry A. Hodges to Lucius J. Campbell, dated November 19, 1903. C. C. Bettes conveyed to John N. C. Stockton, under the name of Roy Naval Stores Company, an undivided one-half interest in the lease so acquired from the executors of the will of Lucius J. Campbell.
There were subsequent assignments and stipulations of the parties named herein as to their respective rights and interests in and to the lands embraced in the original Wheeler Stevens' lease. It is shown that the lessees Lucius J. Campbell, his predecessors and executors, claiming under said lease, paid all the taxes on the lands described therein from date of execution up to and including the taxes for the year 1915, payable in 1916; that, the said lessees and those claiming under them failed and neglected to pay the said taxes for the years 1916 and 1917, as they were bound by the terms of said lease to do and prevent a sale of said lands for the nonpayment of the state and county taxes for the said years the complainants below were compelled to pay them, the greater portion of which have not been repaid.
On March 23, 1918, William A. Knight as administrator with the will annexed of Wheeler Stevens filed his bill in chancery against the principal and all sublessees, alleging, among other things, that the terms of the several sublessees were obscure and failed to define the interests of the sublessees thereunder with sufficient definiteness to enable him or his counsel to determine the legal obligations of the respective holders thereunder with respect to the covenant in the original lease from Wheeler Stevens to Freeman S. and Henry A. Hodges, which required the lessees to pay the amount of taxes levied and assessed against the lands described therein, although they have diligently sought to determine which of the said defendant or defendants are bound for and are required to repay complainant that part of the 1916 taxes and the 1917 taxes on said lands which complainant was forced to pay in order that said lands would not be sold to satisfy said taxes.
The bill of complaint prays for a full discovery of the right and interest held by each of the sublessees in and to the lands described in said bill, and for the appointment of a master to take testimony for the purpose of ascertaining the specific sum or sums which each of said defendants ought to repay complainant on account of the state and county taxes levied on said lands for the years 1916 and 1917, which were paid by complainant, and that, on final hearing, it be ordered and decreed that such defendant or defendants as may be legally bound do repay complainant the moneys due him in payment of said taxes.
Demurrers to the bill as amended were overruled, pleas were denied, the bill was answered, testimony was taken, and, on final hearing, the chancellor found the equities to be with the complainant and decreed that Amanda E. and Benjamin O Campbell, as executors of the will of Lucius J. Campbell, within 15 days from the date of said decree, do pay to the complainant or his solicitor of record out of the estate of Lucius J. Campbell the sum of $481.10, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from March 27, 1917, to date of such decree, and the sum of $1,588.65, with interest thereon from May 20, 1918, to date of said decree, and...
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