Campbell v. LoPucki
| Decision Date | 11 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. BB--498,BB--498 |
| Citation | 345 So.2d 860 |
| Parties | Earl CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. Lynn M. LoPUCKI, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Peter Langley, III, Yankeetown, for appellant.
John M. Green, Jr., Green, Simmons, Green & Hightower, Ocala, for appellee.
Appellant filed this appeal after his libel complaint was dismissed with prejudice by the trial judge. The issue is whether the allegations contained in a complaint drafted and signed by appellee, an attorney, are privileged.
After James Lee Donaldson was killed, apparently as a result of an automobile accident in Levy County, appellee filed suit for wrongful death in behalf of Donaldson's parents against James Owen McMullen and appellant. In the second count of the complaint and a subsequently filed amended complaint, it was alleged that Donaldson was murdered by McMullen and appellant who (it was alleged) either struck or pushed Donaldson from the vehicle. Count III alleged that McMullen and appellant conspired with a third party to buy large amounts of insurance on Donaldson's life with the intention of staging his death and collecting the insurance proceeds. In a newspaper article appearing in the Gainesville Sun, it was reported that appellee agreed that the wording of the suit was intended to accuse McMullen and appellant of murder. By deposition, Donaldson's parents stated, and appellee agreed, that Mr. and Mrs. Donaldson did not draft the complaint and did not themselves make the statements found in the complaint. Appellee took sole responsibility for all of the allegations contained in the complaint and amended complaint.
In dismissing appellant's libel complaint, the trial court ruled that the allegations of murder, homicide, conspiracy, and other wrongdoings were material, relevant, and pertinent to the wrongful death action filed by appellee and that consequently such allegations were absolutely privileged.
The rule in Florida regarding defamatory words published in the course of a judicial proceeding was announced in Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (Fla.1907). From that case, we learn that defamatory words, published by parties, counsel, or witnesses in the due course of a judicial proceeding, are absolutely privileged when they are connected with or relevant or material to the cause at hand. If the defamatory words are not relevant, then to be actionable, they must not only be irrelevant, but also malicious and spoken or written without a belief in their relevance or without reasonable or probable cause so to believe. (Myers v. Hodges, supra, at 362).
Appellant seeks to distinguish the Myers case...
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Fuoco v. O&neill
...due course of a judicial procedure is absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis of liability for defamation.") (citing Campbell v. LoPucki, 345 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1977), Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and Ponzoli & Wassenberg, PA. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d......
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Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman
...or malicious said statements may in fact be." Sussman v. Damian, 355 So.2d 809, 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); see also Campbell v. LoPucki, 345 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (allegation that defendant had committed murder held privileged). 3 The policy reasons for the privilege have often been re......
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Anderson v. Shands
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