Campbell v. Moore

Decision Date08 March 1939
Docket Number14834.
Citation1 S.E.2d 784,189 S.C. 497
PartiesCAMPBELL v. MOORE.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

The report of C. W. F Spencer, special referee, and the order of the circuit court referred to in the opinion follow Report of Special Referee

The above entitled action was commenced by the service of the summons and verified complaint bearing date May 1, 1935 followed by the verified answer of the defendant bearing date July 24, 1935. The plaintiff was only nineteen years of age at the time of the commencement of the action, and so he appeared by and through his mother, Mrs. Lillie B. Campbell duly appointed guardian ad litem, by Order of T. E. McMakin Clerk of the aforesaid Court; and the defendant, Elizabeth B Moore, being likewise a minor, appeared in the action through her duly appointed guardian ad litem, H. E. Moore.

The complaint alleges that on the 7th day of September, 1934, the plaintiff and defendant, both of whom were residents of Clover, County and State aforesaid, went through the form of a marriage ceremony performed by E. Gettys Nunn, Esquire, Probate Judge, of York County, South Carolina, and that immediately after said ceremony the said plaintiff and defendant separated and have never at any time been in company with each other since said ceremony; and the plaintiff says that the alleged marriage contract was never consummated by cohabitation of the parties. The plaintiff further says that he entered into the marriage ceremony against his consent and only under duress and upon certain threats made against him and representations made by the defendant and her parents, in consequence of all of which it is averred that the marriage contract was void for want of consent and because of duress and representations made; and furthermore, that the supposed marriage contract was not in truth and fact a contract of marriage, never having been consummated by cohabitation; and in existing circumstances the said alleged contract of marriage was and is utterly void.

The defendant comes into Court through her answer, admits the residence and age of the plaintiff; and goes on to say that the parties to the action entered into a marriage contract on the 7th day of September, 1934, at which time they were duly and legally married before the Probate Judge of York County in accordance with and in strict compliance with the laws of this State. Furthermore, she denies the allegations that the parties have never at any time since the marriage ceremony been in company with each other. She denies that the marriage ceremony was entered into against plaintiff's consent and that duress or representations made by her and her parents affected the plaintiff in any measure; and she further denies that the marriage contract is void for want of consent of the plaintiff, and she avers on the contrary that no threats were made against the plaintiff, no duress was exercised over him by the defendant or anyone in her behalf; and she says that the plaintiff was ready and willing to enter into the marriage and did enter into it freely and voluntarily.

Further answering the complaint, the defendant says that she is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. H. E. Moore, long-lived citizens and residents of Clover, South Carolina, where she was born and reared, and that defendant and her family are people of highest reputation and standing; that she is now eighteen, and that she and plaintiff have been life-long friends and sweethearts; that the plaintiff for several years prior to the marriage ceremony had showed the defendant a great deal of attention, calling upon her at her home frequently; that he gave her many presents, wrote to her when he was in college, expressing in those communications professions of love and affection for her; that the plaintiff through said professions of love and attentions won the affection, love and confidence of the defendant, who trusted him implicitly. On many occasions prior to the marriage ceremony plaintiff and defendant had discussed matters, that the plaintiff had expressed his desire to marry the defendant and proposed marriage to her; that in fact they were engaged to be married for some time prior to the date of the ceremony; and that thereafter there was born in lawful wedlock a child of the plaintiff and defendant, to wit, Lillian Johnson Campbell, a girl baby, born in February, 1935. The defendant further says that the plaintiff married her freely, voluntarily, and of his own will and accord, and that the members of his family came between the defendant and her husband and persuaded her husband to leave, desert and refuse to live with her; and she asks that the marriage contract be declared legal and valid, for a decree of separation from bed and board; that the custody of the infant child of the plaintiff and the defendant be awarded to the defendant; that a reasonable provision be made out of the property and income of the plaintiff for the support and maintenance of this defendant and that provision also be made for a reasonable attorneys' fee in order that the defendant's interest in this action may be properly represented; and for other appropriate relief.

A number of references were held in the case and full minutes thereof made, which said minutes have been carefully identified and are filed in this proceeding along with this report. In addition to the written evidence will be found five letters written by the plaintiff to the defendant contained in original envelopes which show that the letters were posted from Clemson College during the months of September, October and November, 1933, and January, 1934. In seeking the annulment of the marriage, the plaintiff contends that when the defendant's unfortunate condition was made public her brother, Robert Moore, went to Dr. Sam P. Brison, the uncle of plaintiff, and reported to him the defendant's condition and accused plaintiff of being responsible for it, and asked Dr. Brison to talk with the plaintiff about the matter. Mrs. I. J. Campbell, Sr., the plaintiff's mother, was not at home at the time. Upon her return a short while later, Dr. Brison talked with Mrs. Campbell and with the plaintiff, and shortly thereafter reported to Robert Moore that "the plaintiff would not marry Elizabeth." When Robert Moore was asked by Dr. Brison what he expected to do about the matter, Moore's reply was "he could not say at that time, but that they (the Moores) would take care of him and handle the matter." Dr. Brison then called on the magistrate of Clover and asked him to see Mr. Moore and see if the matter could be settled without any trouble. The Moores told the magistrate that they wished to talk to the plaintiff personally. W. B. Moore, another brother of the defendant, had also talked with the magistrate. Dr. Brison said that after the morning conference with Robert Moore he felt it would be unwise for him to allow the plaintiff to meet the Moores, as he anticipated violence in the event the plaintiff refused to marry the defendant, forming this opinion, he said, "from the tone and manner in which Robert Moore had spoken and acted." These so-called threats were communicated to the plaintiff and his mother.

At this stage it might be well to relate that two contracts were entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, both offered in evidence, one dated September 7, 1934, and the other on the following day. The substance of the first contract relates that the parties to the action agree "that they would this day have a marriage ceremony performed by E. Gettys Nunn, Esquire, Judge of Probate"; that immediately after said ceremony plaintiff and defendant would separate and no effort would be made to require either to live with the other as husband or wife; that on the following day the plaintiff would pay to the defendant $300, and thereupon the defendant and her father, Ellie Moore, would enter into a formal instrument whereby the defendant would release and acquit the plaintiff from any liability or responsibility for the support and maintenance of any child "that may be born within the year to the said Elizabeth Moore"; that at the same time the defendant would execute a formal instrument in writing releasing the said I. J. Campbell, Jr., from any claim of dower or any dower rights in any property that he may now have or acquire in the future, from any distributive interest in his estate, and from any and all claim of any and every nature arising now or in the future by way of dower, interest in the estate or otherwise; that at the proper time and at an early date should either party bring an action for the annulment of said marriage ceremony as entered into, neither would object directly or otherwise to the marriage ceremony being annulled and the marriage being declared null and void; and that the defendant, in consideration of $300, released and acquitted the plaintiff from any charge or claim for her support or maintenance in any suit money, alimony or any other charge or claim of any nature.

On the following day, September 8, 1934, the defendant signed an instrument acknowledging the payment of the $300, which stipulated that she would live separate and apart from the plaintiff and make no demands or requirements of him that he live with her as husband. By said instrument she further renounced, released and acquitted the plaintiff from any and all liability for support and maintenance of herself or any child born to the parties, specifically assuming all the expenses of rearing, caring for and educating the child; and she further released, renounced and acquitted the plaintiff and all other persons from any right, title or claim of dower or distributive interest in any lands or property of any nature owned or afterwards acquired by plaintiff; by...

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