Campbell v. Patterson, 81-1116

Decision Date19 March 1984
Docket NumberNos. 81-1116,81-1421,No. 81-1116,No. 81-1421,81-1116,s. 81-1116
Citation724 F.2d 41
PartiesChester Wheeler CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. L. Brooks PATTERSON, et al., () Frank J. Kelley, et al., () Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Vito C. Peraino, argued, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

John F. Allen, argued, Troy, Mich., for defendants-appellees in No. 81-1116.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen. of Mich., Thomas L. Casey, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Lansing, Mich., for defendants-appellees in No. 81-1421.

Before JONES and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is a consolidated appeal by Chester Wheeler Campbell (Campbell) from two separate decisions below which found that no violation of Campbell's civil rights were committed by the Michigan Attorney General, state prison officials and county prosecutors who cancelled Campbell's scheduled parole release for reasons later shown to be erroneous. The trial court in No. 81-1116 (hereinafter Patterson ) granted summary judgment in favor of the Oakland County Prosecutor and two assistants concluding that they correctly applied Michigan law as to Campbell's eligibility for parole and so deprived Campbell of no rights. In No. 81-1421 (hereinafter Kelley ), the court dismissed an action against the Attorney General and prison officials for reasons of immunity.

The salient facts of the matter are not disputed. Campbell was informed on January 22, 1980 that he was eligible for parole from the Southern Michigan Prison on February 1, 1980 as the result of "good time" and "special good time" credits. Campbell was then serving concurrent sentences for firearms and drug violations which sentences had been enhanced under Michigan's Habitual Offender Statute because Campbell had a previous felony conviction. M.C.L.A. Sec. 769.12.

In January of 1980, news of Campbell's impending parole was unofficially communicated to an assistant Oakland County prosecutor. The assistant, together with another assistant, discussed the parole as it related to M.C.L.A. Sec. 769.12(3) which states, in part, that habitual offenders may not be paroled "before the minimum term fixed by the sentencing judge," which term in Campbell's case, absent good time credits, would not expire until January 23, 1982. At the time of the assistant prosecutors' discussions, Michigan appellate authority existed which held that good time credits could not reduce the minimum term of habitual offenders. People ex rel. Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bureau of Pardons and Paroles, and Trudeau v. Oakland Circuit Judge, 78 Mich.App. 111, 259 N.W.2d 385 (1977).

Accordingly, the assistant prosecutors contacted both the prison officials and the Michigan Attorney General seeking information as to Campbell's status in light of the aforementioned precedent. The prison officials thereupon formally requested an opinion from the Attorney General, who responded in an opinion unfavorable to Campbell on the day before this scheduled release. This parole was cancelled and, in May, 1980, Campbell filed the actions presently at bar asserting that the various state officials here involved had conspired to deprive him of his right to a parole.

Initially, the suit against the prosecutor and his assistants was terminated by a grant of summary judgment in favor of the officials. As noted, the district court, in accepting a magistrate's report, found that Campbell was not entitled to credits in reduction of his minimum sentence as a matter of Michigan law and therefore the prosecutors deprived Campbell of no right. However, subsequent to this decision, but prior to consideration of the suit against the Attorney General and the prison authorities, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the prohibition of sentence reduction in cases of habitual offenders applied only to those offenders whose crime was committed subsequent to the date of the original appellate pronouncement in Trudeau, supra. Lamb v. Bureau of Pardons and Paroles, 106 Mich.App. 175, 307 N.W.2d 754 (1981). Thus, Campbell had been entitled to parole in February, 1981.

Subsequent to Lamb, the action against the Attorney General and the prison administrators came before the district court. In that proceeding, the trial judge acknowledged that the construction of Michigan law...

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9 cases
  • Doe v. McFaul
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • December 26, 1984
    ...F.2d 449 (6th Cir.1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 102 S.Ct. 2933, 73 L.Ed.2d 1332 ... (1982). Campbell v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 41, 43 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 1613, 80 L.Ed.2d 142 (1984). In Campbell, the court extended immunity to th......
  • Joseph v. Patterson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 19, 1986
    ...919 (1986) (Indiana Attorney General required by state law to review state contracts is absolutely immune); Campbell v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 41, 43 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (Michigan Attorney General obligated by statute to render opinions interpreting law at the request of state agencies......
  • Schieb v. Humane Soc. of Huron Valley
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • March 19, 1984
    ...U.S. at 430 96 S.Ct. at 995, obviate the supporting rationale for absolute immunity in favor of qualified immunity. Campbell v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 41 at 43 (6th Cir.1983).2 The earlier opinion of Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1647, 52 ......
  • Harris v. Muchnicki
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • February 29, 1996
    ...criminal prosecution" in disclosing the transcripts to the Department of Justice. Id. at 409, 96 S.Ct. at 985, accord Campbell v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 41, 43 (6th Cir.1983). Accordingly, Defendant is absolutely immune from civil liability for disclosing the state grand jury Conclusion For th......
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