Campbell v. Sandy

Decision Date21 June 1937
Docket Number26656.
Citation69 P.2d 808,190 Wash. 528
PartiesCAMPBELL v. SANDY et al.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; J. M. Phillips Judge.

Action by A. D. Campbell against the W. P. Sandy and Lyle Lancaster. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

P. C. Kibbe, of Tenino, for appellant.

W. J Murphy, of Aberdeen (T. H. McKay, of Aberdeen, of counsel) for respondents.

BLAKE Justice.

August 24, 1934, the defendant W. P. Sandy executed a mortgage on real estate to plaintiff. The mortgage recited that Sandy was 'a single man by divorce.' Sandy being in default plaintiff brought this action to foreclose, joining Lancaster as a defendant, 'who has and claims some interest' in the mortgaged premises. Sandy defaulted. Lancaster answered, alleging that in March, 1935, he instituted a suit against Sandy, and had caused an attachment to be levied on the real estate described in the mortgage; that thereafter he obtained judgment against Sandy; that execution issued on the judgment; that he had become the purchaser of the property at the execution sale, and had received a certificate of sale from the sheriff; that Sandy was married man at the time he executed and delivered the mortgage to plaintiff.

The lower court entered a decree adjudging 'the mortgage of plaintiff * * * void and subordinate to the judgment and certificate of sale of * * * Lancaster because not signed by the wife of W. P. Sandy.' Plaintiff appeals.

The facts alleged in Lancaster's answer are borne out by undisputed evidence. It does appear, however, that Sandy had been living separate and apart from his wife for four years or more at the time he executed and delivered the mortgage to appellant. It also appears that he acquired title to the property only about four months prior to the execution of the mortgage. Despite its recent acquisition, however, it was community property. For there is no suggestion in the record that it was acquired 'by gift, bequest, devise or descent.' Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 6890, 6892. On the other hand, the judgment obtained by respondent was presumptively a community liability and a lien on community property. Calhoun v. Leary, 6 Wash. 17, 32 P. 1070; Mattinson v. Mattinson, 128 Wash. 328, 222 P. 620; Lino v. Hole, 159 Wash. 16, 291 P. 1079. There is no evidence in the record tending to overcome the presumption.

So the sole question is whether the mortgage executed by Sandy effected a valid encumbrance on community property. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6893, provides that the husband shall have the management and control of the community property, 'but he shall not sell, convey, or encumber the community real estate, unless the wife join with him in executing the deed or other instrument.' Notwithstanding this, appellant contends that the mortgage is a valid encumbrance, in view of the provisions of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10578. That section provides that a husband or wife who, by virtue of the marriage relation, claims an interest in real estate, standing in the name of the other, may protect such interest by filing with the county auditor an instrument setting forth the facts. In the absence of such a declaration within ninety days after legal title to property has been made a matter of record, the statute declares: 'Any actual bona fide purchaser of such real estate from the person in whose name the legal title stands of record, receiving a deed of such real estate from the person thus holding the legal title, shall be deemed and held to have received the full legal and equitable title to such real estate free and clear of all claim of the other spouse.'

The court, however, has construed the quoted portion to mean 'such persons as purchase without knowledge of the existence of the marriage relation, or who could not, with reasonable diligence, have obtained such knowledge.' Dane v. Daniel, 23 Wash. 379, 63 P. 268, 272. Applying this rule, the court has held in a number of cases that a wife would not be heard to challenge the validity of a deed or mortgage executed by the husband alone where the marital relation had never been established or maintained in this...

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6 cases
  • Meltzer v. Wendell-West, WENDELL-WEST
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • June 12, 1972
    ...the signature of the wife: 1. Mortgages of community land: Sander v. Wells, 71 Wash.2d 25, 426 P.2d 481 (1967); Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937). 2. Conveyances of or contracts to convey the fee estate: Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash.2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963); Tombari v. Gr......
  • Oil Heat Co. of Port Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 1980
    ...Cochran, 65 Wash.2d 211, 224, 396 P.2d 642 (1964); Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash.2d 176, 180 377 P.2d 414 (1963). See also Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937). The test is whether the parties by their conduct have exhibited a decision to renounce the community, with no intentio......
  • Arizona Central Credit Union v. Holden
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • October 5, 1967
    ...problem, Professor Jack J. Rappeport, citing the Washington Statutes § 26.16.095 and § 26.16.100 (1953) and cases of Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937), and Dane v. Daniel, 23 Wash. 379, 63 P. 268 (1900), states the following which we believe to be the correct 'But this (t......
  • State v. Hanlen
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1937
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