Campbell v. State, 1170S271

• Decision Date: 19 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 1170S271,1170S271
• Citation: 256 Ind. 630,26 Ind.Dec. 363,271 N.E.2d 463
• Parties: Martin C. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 463

271 N.E.2d 463

256 Ind. 630

Martin C. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1170S271.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 19, 1971.

Henry J. Price, Jon D. Noland, Barnes, Hickam, Pantzer & Boyd, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David H. Kreider, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indiana, for appellee.

ARTERBURN, Chief Justice.

On March 19, 1970, the appellant was arrested in the Marion County Selective Service Office. On March 20, 1970, he was charged by affidavit with violation of Burns' (1970 Supp.) § 10--4534, I.C.1971, 35--19--4--4. On April 22, 1970, trial was held before the Marion County Municipal Court, Room Number 9. The Court found the defendant guilty as charged and, on April 24, 1970, entered judgment thereon. The Court sentenced the appellant to one hundred and eighty (180) days on the Indiana State Farm and fined him in the sum of one hundred ($100) dollars plus the cost of the prosecution, assessed to be fifteen ($15) dollars. On July 1, 1970, the record of the Municipal Court proceeding was received by Marion Criminal Court, Division 2, for review pursuant to Burns' (1970 Supp.) § 4--5811, I.C.1971, 33--6--1--9. On August 20, 1970, a hearing on the appeal was held in Marion Criminal Court, Division 2, before Judge Saul I. Rabb. The judgment of the Marion County Municipal Court, Room 9, was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment reads as follows:

'IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the jugment will be affirmed insofar as the 180 days on Indiana State Farm. Reversed as to the Fine.'

The statement of the facts, as set forth by the appellee in its brief are as follows:

'During the week of March 16, 1970, the Indianapolis Stop the Draft Project undertook an intensive effort to demonstrate their opposition to the draft. * * * Realizing the unusual problems which might attend this kind of protest, the Director of the Indiana State Headquarters--Selective Service System assigned members of the State Headquarters staff to the office of the Marion County Local Board. * * * The Local Board leases and occupies all of the third floor of the Wulsin Building which is located at 222 E. Ohio.

'Early Thursday of the week of protest by the Stop the Draft Project, the defendant, Martin Campbell, entered the local office and sat in one of the chairs in the reception area. * * * He had no business to conduct with the office staff. * * * He was wearing a placard which read 'Draft Counselor.' As a result of the week of protest, there was a great deal of unrest among the employees in the office. Many demonstrators had earlier come into the office causing much disturbance. * * * The employees were very apprehensive about what would happen next. * * * When the defendant appeared at this time during this hectic week, everyone in the office was very nervous and found it difficult to perform normally in spite of requests from their supervisor, Mary King. * * *

'About 9 A.M., Colonel Ralph Herrold, of the State Headquarters staff, arrived at the local office. He had been sent there this week that had been announced as a 'whole week of harassment of the Selective Service System * * * to make sure there were no problems the girls couldn't handle. * * *' Colonel Herrold read to him Burns' Ann.Stat. (1970 Supp.) § 10--4534 which makes it a misdemeanor 'to go upon or remain within a public building for the purpose of interfering with the lawful use of such building by other persons or in such manner as to have the effect of denying to others the lawful use of such building.' After warning the defendant that he would be arrested if he failed to leave in five minutes, he read again the statute to him. When he still refused to leave. Sergeant Wilkinson, of the Indianapolis Police Department, who had arrived with another officer in response to a call from Colonel Herrold, arrested him.'

Appellant contends that the statute under which he was charged and convicted is unconstitutional. We cannot agree with appellant's contention that the statute is unconstitutional but are compelled to reverse the appellant's conviction simply because the facts presented are insufficient to justify the...