Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1924
• Citation: 265 S.W. 674,150 Tenn. 423
• Parties: CAMPBELL v. TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

265 S.W. 674

150 Tenn. 423

CAMPBELL v. TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 1, 1924

Appeal from Chancery Court, Cocke County.

Ejectment by Dr. H. L. Campbell against the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Reversed, and rendered for complainant and cause remanded for accounting.

McKINNEY J.

This is a suit in ejectment to recover a boundary of mountain land containing 8 acres. It consists of a limestone bluff, which is valuable for quarrying and manufacturing into fertilizer.

In 1870, O. C. King, as special commissioner, conveyed a 226-acre tract of land to W. B. Lyle by deed containing the following provision, to wit:

"Reserving from said sale all the mines or minerals contained or imbedded in or on said tract; also the right to enter at any time by self or agents or assignees on said land to explore for mines or mineral, with the right to make excavation, to erect works or machinery for the purpose of manufacturing such minerals as may be found on or contiguous to said land, for manufacturing, etc., and to do any and everything necessary to be done for the successful mining and manufacturing or exporting any minerals that may be discovered on or in said land, but agreeing to pay said Lyle a reasonable compensation for any actual damage that may be done to the surface of the land."

After carefully reading the record, it is evident that when this suit was instituted complainant claimed to own the 8-acre tract, in fee, through a chain of mesne conveyances from Lyle; while the defendant claimed to own, by purchase, the mineral rights reserved in the Lyle deed. Both parties understood that their title papers covered the disputed tract.

The complainant contended, in the first place, that the reservation of "mines and minerals" did not embrace limestone; and, in the second place, that, if wrong in this his predecessors in title had quarried said limestone for more than seven years, under color of title purporting to convey the fee, and had in that way perfected title to the land.

The defendant's position was that the reservation did include limestone, and that complainant's predecessors in title had not perfected title by adverse possession.

Entertaining these views, counsel entered into the following stipulation to wit:

"In this cause it is conceded and stipulated by the parties that the complainant and the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company go back to a common source of title, each claiming under deeds from the special commissioners of the Peck estate, appointed by the chancery court of Jefferson county, Tenn.; and it is agreed that technical deraignment is not required of either party, and such title papers only as are necessary to throw light on the immediate controversy are all that are required to be filed in evidence."

The complainant has not deraigned title back to the special commissioners, and contends that it was not necessary under the above stipulation.

The defendant contends that the object of the stipulation was entered into solely for the purpose of obviating the necessity of producing title papers further back than the conveyances by the special commissioners.

The stipulation says that the parties "go back to a common source of title." In other words, that each has title back to the special commissioners. It does not say that each claims back to a common source, or that it will be unnecessary to deraign title any further back than the special commissioners, but that each goes back to a common source of title. And again:

"It is agreed that technical deraignment is not required of either party."

It is apparent that the main question in controversy was the interpretation of the reservation in the Lyle deed.

Mr. Lanier testified that he had been land agent for defendant for 17 years, during which time he had in his charge its lands in Tennessee; also its title papers, and exhibited same, including title papers under which defendant claimed the disputed tract. He then testified as follows:

"Q. State whether or not the 8 acres of land in controversy in this case are covered and embraced in the papers that you have just exhibited.

A. Yes.

Q. And are a portion of the W. B. Lyle tract of land?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please examine the paper here handed you, purporting to be a certified copy of a deed from W. B. Lyle and others to C. H. Witt for 117 acres, dated 19th of March, 1878, and recorded in Book No. 1, p. 245, in the register's office of Cocke county, Tenn., and state whether or not it covers and embraces the lands in controversy in this case.

A. I have examined the deed referred to, and it covers the land in controversy in this cause and is a deed from W. B. Lyle et al. to C. H. Witt, conveying the tract of land purchased by Lyle from O. C. King, special commissioner, on April 20, 1870, and is referred to in the first exhibit to my deposition, and is a deed from Lyle to Witt, herewith filed as Exhibit No. 4. The mineral interests in said land are reserved.

Q. Do you know how the complainant claims this land? Does he claim through O. C. King?

A. Yes, sir; he claims through the same source of title. I have listened to the depositions given today, and all of the witnesses testify to that effect."

The witness testified on cross-examination as follows:

"Q. Do I understand you to say that Exhibit No. 4 to your deposition covers the quarries in question in this case?

A. Yes, sir; it covers the eight acres of land.

Q. You rely on the reservation of the mineral interests contained in that deed?

A. Yes, sir; we claim to own the mineral.

Q. How do you connect with the mineral interest reserved in this deed by W. B. Lyle?

A. As I explained in my direct examination, it was reserved in the sale from O. C. King, special commissioner, to W. B. Lyle, and that mineral interest was conveyed to the Southern States Coal, Iron & Land Company by my Exhibit No. 2 filed to my direct examination, being the deed from J. P. Rhoton, special commissioner, to Southern States Coal, Iron & Land Company, and in exhibit No. 3 Southern States Coal, Iron & Land Company conveyed that mineral interest to the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company."

Upon the conclusion of Lanier's testimony, said stipulation was entered into, and its meaning is obvious, when considered in the light of what Lanier conceded to be the issue in the cause.

In view of the construction which we have placed upon said stipulation, it follows that complainant cannot question defendant's ownership of said mineral rights.

An effort has been made to prove that complainant's deed does not cover the disputed strip, but we are of the opinion that it does and, further, that, under the admissions and stipulations referred to hereinabove, defendant cannot raise this question.

Upon the question of adverse possession, complainant has not made out his cause.

Prior to 1896, the Brookses, through whom complainant claims, probably owned this land and removed some rock therefrom, D. D. Brooks testified that they probably removed 40 or 45 cars within a period of 10 or 12 years. Most of this was loose rock which they rolled down the bluff; they did little quarrying. When not working in their crops they would, at times, pile rock on the right of way for the railroad, and it would load it on flat cars and transport it to its mill, where it was crushed for ballast. The proof indicates that a large part of this rock came from the right of way of the railroad.

Where parties under color of title place a mill on a tract of land and quarry and crush rock regularly, as is now being done on this tract, and continue same for the statutory period, it will perfect their title.

But the possession here relied upon was fragmentary, irregular, and not done for the purpose of ripening title. At that time such rock was of little value, and it would hardly have occurred to an observer that a person so engaged was exercising adverse ownership over the land.

This brings us to the interesting question of the mineral reservations in the Lyle deed, and its solution necessarily depends upon the intention of the parties.

It appears from the record that in 1869 Judge Jacob Peck died the owner of many thousands of acres of undeveloped mountain lands in East Tennessee. A bill was filed in the chancery court at Dandridge to administer his estate, and O. C. King was appointed special commissioner to sell portions of said lands, and on April 20, 1870, he sold the 226-acre tract for $1.50 per acre, reserving the mineral rights, as hereinbefore stated.

In 1872 said O. C. King's deposition was taken and filed in the cause above referred to; his testimony being as follows:

"I know much of the lands mentioned in the bill. They lie in the mountainous parts of Cocke, Sevier, Blount, Green, Washington, Claiborne, and Campbell counties. They are almost wholly without value for agriculture purposes. They were entered for their supposed deposits of mineral ores. The minors in this cause, as well as most of adults, are in straitened circumstances; the taxes on the lands are burdensome, and in fact many of the lands have been sold for taxes, and those interested in them have not the means to redeem them. The lands are a dead expense to the heirs, and are likely to remain so for a long time, as they have no means to develop their supposed mineral deposits; and in fact many of these lands will soon be lost to the heirs entirely by reason of the expiration of the time for redemption, unless some of them can be soon sold for money with which to redeem the balance. Besides, many of these lands are covered by younger entries and grants, under which they

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