Campbell v. Walker

• Decision Date: 02 June 1910
• Citation: 76 A. 475,24 Del. 580
• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Parties: MARY E. CAMPBELL v. ALFRED W. WALKER

76 A. 475

24 Del. 580

MARY E. CAMPBELL v. ALFRED W. WALKER

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

June 2, 1910

Superior Court, New Castle County, May Term, 1910.

DEMURRER. ACTION ON THE CASE (No. 65, January Term, 1910.) Pleading and questions of law appear in the opinion of the Court.

(See report of same case, 2 Boyce.)

Demurrer overruled.

Levin Irving Handy for plaintiff.

J Harvey Whiteman for defendant.

Judges CONRAD and WOOLLEY sitting.

OPINION

WOOLLEY, J.

The first count of the declaration charges that "the defendant, so negligently and carelessly operated and ran his automobile over and along one of the public roads of New Castle County * * * while the said plaintiff was then and there traveling along the said public road, riding in a vehicle drawn by a horse which was drawn then and there with due care and caution, * * * and that by reason of the said negligent and careless running of the said automobile the said vehicle was struck from the rear by the said automobile and by means of the said collision the said plaintiff was thrown out of the said vehicle," and injured. To this count, the defendant demurred specially, stating several causes of demurrer.

The substance of the count is, that the defendant so negligently and carelessly operated his automobile that it struck the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle, and by reason of the collision she was injured. The substance of the demurrer is that the count does not show the facts and circumstances of the collision with a particularity sufficient to enable the defendant to know what the plaintiff proposes to prove, and that the count does not contain an allegation of negligence sufficient to apprise him of the acts of negligence that it calls upon him to defend. The issue of law raised by the demurrer, therefore, is whether the first count of the declaration is such a specification of the facts and circumstances which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action as requires an answer by the defendant.

It has been long and firmly established in Delaware, that the rules and principles of common law pleading as they existed at the time of our independence, excepting so far as they may have been changed or modified by constitution, or statutory provision, constitute the system of pleading employed by the courts of this State. (Donahoe vs. Star Pub. Co., 19 Del. 545, 3 Penne. 545, 53 A. 1028). As elementary principles of that system, it was announced in the very first of our State reports, that "The object of pleading is to reduce the controversy to certain and precise issues of law and fact, on which, as containing the pretensions or claims of the parties, the opinion of the court and jury may be taken, and a decision had in accordance with the principles of justice" ( State vs. Collins, 1 Del. 216, 1 Harr. 216), and further, that "Pleadings are designed not only to put in issue single points, but to apprise the parties of what they are to come prepared to try." ( Reading's Heirs vs. State, 1 Del. 190, 1 Harr. 190, 192). Pleadings, therefore, possess a double function and are designed, first, to ascertain and present the real points in controversy, so that the minds of the Court and jury may not be drawn off upon matters immaterial, irrelevant and unimportant to the true issue (Easton vs. Jones, 1 Harr. 433, note A, 436), and second, to acquaint the opposing party with the facts that are intended to be proved in support of the issue tendered. With respect to the latter function of pleading, it has uniformly been held from the cases in 1 Harrington to Hunter vs. P., B. & W. R. R. Co., in 1 Boyce, that while the plaintiff is not required to make a detailed and minute statement of the circumstances of the cause of action, he must nevertheless set forth in his declaration the facts upon which he bases his action, with a particularity and certainty that will reasonably inform the defendant what he proposes to prove at the trial, in order that the defendant may have a fair opportunity to meet and controvert those facts in defense. Any other rule would defeat rather than promote this object of pleading, and would make a declaration an instrument to conceal rather than to disclose facts.

The principles of pleading, consisting, as it is said, of rules founded upon good sense and formed for the furtherance of justice (State vs. Short, 2 Del. 152, 2 Harr. 152, 156; Easton vs. Jones, 1 Harr. 433, note A, 436), work no hardship in requiring a plaintiff to disclose the acts for which he calls upon another to respond in damages, nor are they unfair to a plaintiff, who complains of the acts of another, and who therefore should know of what acts he complains, in requiring that those acts should not be concealed by language that is vague or by terms that are general. On the contrary, the rules of pleading require, that the time, place and circumstances of the matter in action, so far as relied on and within the knowledge of the party, must be specified with a fullness and fairness that will reasonably apprise the opposing party of what he is required to meet.

A declaration is defined to be "the specification in methodical and legal form of the circumstances which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action." (Chitty's Pl. 240, 231). In making the specification of circumstances contemplated by the definition, it is held, as general rules, that (1) it is not sufficient to state a mere conclusion of law, nor (2) is it sufficient to state the result or conclusion of fact, arising from circumstances not set forth in the declaration, and (3) that it is not sufficient to make a general statement of facts, which admits of almost any proof to sustain it. ( King vs. W. & N. C. E. Ry. Co., 17 Del. 452, 1 Penne. 452, 41 A. 975; Jones vs. Peoples Ry. Co., 20 Del. 201, 4 Penne. 201, 53 A. 1065; Riedel vs. W. C. Ry. Co., 21 Del. 572, 5 Penne. 572, 64 A. 257.)

When stripped of its formal language, the one fact stated, in the first count of the declaration is, that the defendant's automobile struck or came into collision with the plaintiff's vehicle and the one thing charged to the defendant is, that the collision occurred by reason of the defendant's negligent and careless running of the automobile. The one thing of which the defendant is certainly informed by this averment is the fact of collision, and the one thing for which he is held accountable is the cause of the collision.

While an averment of the fact of a collision,...