Campbell v. White, 83-1048

• Decision Date: 01 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 83-1048,83-1048
• Citation: 721 F.2d 644
• Parties: Darron K. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. Carl WHITE, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 644

721 F.2d 644

74 A.L.R.Fed. 769

Darron K. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. Carl WHITE, et al., Appellees.

No. 83-1048.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 22, 1983.

Decided Dec. 1, 1983.

Darron Keith Campbell, pro se.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Rosalynn VanHeest, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellees.

Before BRIGHT, ROSS and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Darron Campbell appeals the district court's ¹ dismissal of his civil rights suit, 552 F.Supp. 1243, brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. His notice of appeal was received on the thirty-second day after the entry of judgment. We conclude the notice of appeal was untimely and may not be considered as a motion for extension of time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5), Fed.R.App.P.

In 1979 Rule 4(a)(5), the Fed.R.App.P., was amended to specifically authorize the district court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal "upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)." Notice of the motion "shall be given to the other parties in accordance with Local Rules". ²

The Advisory Committee comments to the 1979 amendment state:

The proposed amendment would make it clear that a motion to extend the time must be filed no later than 30 days after the expiration of the original appeal time, and that if the motion is timely filed the district court may act upon the motion at a later date, and may extend the time not in excess of 10 days measured from the date on which the order granting the motion is entered.

Under the present rule there is a possible implication that prior to the time the initial appeal time has run, the district court may extend the time on the basis of an informal application. The amendment would require that the application must be made by motion, though the motion may be made ex parte. After the expiration of the initial time a motion for the extension of the time must be made in compliance with the F.R.C.P. and local rules of the district court.... (Emphasis added).

The meaning of the amendment to Rule 4(a)(5) is clear and unambiguous and requires the filing of a motion with service of notice.

This meaning is underscored by Rule 4(b), Fed.R.App.P., relating to criminal appeals, which provides as follows:

Upon a showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing of notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision.

We think it clear that the 1979 amendment requires the filing of a motion and that the notice of appeal received after the date for filing notices may not be considered a motion for extension. Our conclusion in this respect is underscored by decisions in four other circuits. ³

In Brooks v. Britton, 669 F.2d 665, 667 (1982), Chief Judge Godbold, speaking for the Eleventh Circuit, examined the change in language of Rule 4(a)(5) and concluded:

If informal or implicit applications are not allowed prior to expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal, a fortiori such applications are not allowed after expiration of the time for filing. Moreover, the import of Sanchez v. Board of Regents, supra, is that the prior practice of recognizing implicit motions for extension of time is not to be followed under the amended Rule 4(a). Therefore, we must conclude that since appellant failed to properly move for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal any implicit finding of excusable neglect by the district court is ineffectual.

As stated in 9 Moore's Federal Practice p 204.13 at 4-104.3 (2d Ed.1982):

Given the repeated holding by the Supreme Court that Rule 4 is "mandatory and jurisdictional," the result of a failure to file a timely notice of appeal, followed by failure to make a timely motion to be permitted to file one out of time, extinguishes the right to appeal beyond revival by either the district court or the court of appeals.

We are aware that before 1979 any kind of filing might be treated as a motion for extension and excusable neglect might be established and an extension granted later. ⁴ We have earlier so considered a notice of appeal filed eight days after the expiration of the time limitation for filing notices, and remanded the case to the district court to accept nunc pro tunc the notice on grounds of excusable neglect. Seshachalam v. Creighton University School of Medicine, 545 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2974, 53 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1977); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kurtenbach, 525 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.1975) (The Eighth Circuit assumed arguendo that it had the power to remand for a determination of excusable neglect but suggested when no motion for extension or showing of excusable neglect was made within the thirty-day extension period normally the court of appeals should not remand). But see United States v. McKnight, 593 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.1979) (A divided panel held the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to remand the cause to allow appellant to move for an extension). The amendment to Rule 4(a)(5) requires that this practice be no longer followed.

This issue has been very capably illuminated in the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit in Shah v. Hutto, 704 F.2d 717 (1983). Senior Judge Haynsworth reached a conclusion contrary to the one we here reach. He stressed a liberal and flexible approach to the rules and concluded that the 1979 amendment of Rule 4(a)(5) did not displace or overrule the earlier Fourth Circuit decision in Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.1977). We are more persuaded by the dissenting opinion of Judge Hall, which essentially follows Brooks v. Britton and the opinions of the other circuits, in looking to the clear language of the amendment and the committee comments concerning the amendment.

The rules and their amendments are prepared with care and submitted to Congress with an opportunity for disapproval. We may not rewrite procedures that have been clearly laid down for us. As Judge Hall commented in his dissent in Shah, "We judges do not sit as legislators." 704 F.2d p. 723.

We are aware that the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Texas Southern University, 625 F.2d 521 (1980), determined that an untimely filed notice be treated as a motion for extension of time although it clearly recognized the import of the amendment in Rule 4(a)(5), Fed.R.App.P. Sanchez dealt with a notice filed March 28, 1980, not quite nine months after the effective date of the amendments to Rule 4(a)(5). Our case involves a notice filed more than three years after the amendment to the rules and after development of a considerable body of case law from the other circuits that make clear the import of the rule. Accordingly, we see no reason to give our ruling prospective effect as did the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez.

We realize that the...