Camper v. State
| Decision Date | 11 December 1948 |
| Citation | 216 S.W.2d 18,187 Tenn. 511 |
| Parties | CAMPER v. STATE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Error to Criminal Court, Blount County; Sue K. Hicks, Judge.
Charles Camper was convicted of rape and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
John C. Crawford, Jr. and Wm. McTeer, both of Maryville, and Ray H. Jenkins, of Knoxville, for plaintiff in error.
Nat Tipton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error, defendant in the lower court, has appealed from a conviction of rape, his punishment being fixed at ten years in the State Penitentiary. Numerous errors have been assigned by counsel to the action of the trial court in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. In our view of the case it is not necessary that we discuss the issue as to whether or not the evidence preponderates against the verdict. The evidence is in sharp conflict, the State contending that the act of intercourse was accomplished with force and violence while the defendant testified throughout that it was with the consent of the prosecutrix.
The defendant is a young white man about twenty years of age. The prosecutrix was eighteen years of age at the time the crime is alleged to have been committed. They had not known each other prior to the night when they met on the streets of Maryville. The defendant and a companion, while riding in an automobile, passed her on the street and asked her if she did not want a ride. After some hesitation she consented. Later the defendant's companion left the car and the defendant and the prosecutrix rode out in the country. This, we think, was over her protest. It was while on this trip that the crime was committed. They returned to Maryville and the prosecutrix was driven to the home of her employer, Dr. Max McCulloch. Soon after her arrival she complained to Mrs. McCulloch that the defendant had committed the crime of rape upon her person. We decline to express an opinion as to the merits of the case since it must be reversed for error committed by the trial judge in charging a special request which was offered by counsel who was employed to aid the prosecution. The ground for the request was based upon the following incident, to-wit: following the defendant's arrest and while he was in jail he and two other prisoners were brought out in the jail corridor in the presence of the prosecutrix. She was asked to identify her assailant. She pointed to the defendant and stated that he had raped her. To this accusation he was mute, making no denial whatever. At the conclusion of the court's general charge the following special request was offered:
'Where one is accused of a crime and makes no denial thereof, when he has opportunity to do so, a presumption of guilt arises from his failure to make a denial of the charge.' The foregoing is assigned as reversible error.
We think the law is settled in most jurisdictions that when a statement is made in the presence and hearing of one accused of an offense and the statement tends to incriminate him, or is of an incriminating character, and such statement is not denied, or in any way objected to by him, both the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it or make any response to it, is admissible against him as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth. Phelan v State, 114 Tenn. 483, 505, 88 S.W. 1040; Winfree v State, 174 Tenn. 72-75, 123 S.W.2d 827.
But in none of our cases have we gone so far as to hold that the mere silence of one who is thus accused of a crime raises a presumption of guilt. The silence of the accused when charged with a particular offense, or any connection therewith, is only a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn by the jury. Thus in Deathridge v. State, 33 Tenn. 75-80 it was said:
'If the prisoner had remained silent under the charge, it was competent to go to the jury as a circumstance, for such inference as the facts attending it might reasonably warrant.'
Also in Green v. State, 97 Tenn. 50, 63, 36 S.W. 700, 704, the Court expressed the view 'That such evidence should always be received with great caution'. Statements directed against the accused and in his presence and charging a criminal offense may be, in the absence of any denial or explanation entitled to great weight. On the contrary it might be more or less equivocal and of little probative value. It was for this reason that the court held that 'Its value, of necessity, must be estimated by the jury'. In Phelan v. State, supra [114 Tenn. 483, 88 S.W. 1045], it was held:
'Mr. Wharton in his work on Criminal Law, § 696, says:
"Where a man had full liberty to speak, and not in the course of a judicial inquiry is charged with a crime, and remains silent--that is, makes no denial of the accusation by word or gesture--his silence is a circumstance which may be left to the jury.'
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'An analysis of these cases will show (1) that when the accusation is denied, it is not admissible at all as an evidential fact and...
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Luallen v. Neil, 71-1140.
...to consider under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Harless v. State, 189 Tenn. 419, 225 S.W.2d 258 (1950); Camper v. State, 187 Tenn. 511, 216 S.W.2d 18 (1949); Watson v. State, 184 Tenn. 177, 197 S.W.2d 802 (1947). The use of such tacit admissions in Federal criminal cases has long been......
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...showed an awareness, a consciousness of guilt. Barber v. State, supra; People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 172 P.2d 18; Camper v. State, 187 Tenn. 511, 216 S.W.2d 18. See also Annotations, 115 A.L.R. 1510, 80 A.L.R. In the case before us the statement that 'we just yoked a man' could have bee......
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Lanier v. State
...under our authorities his failure to deny is admissible as evidence of his acquiescence in the truth of the statement. Camper v. State, 187 Tenn. 511, 216 S.W.2d 18. But the Camper case and such authority is not controlling on the point when one's constitutional rights have been Under this ......