Campos v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 13 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0617-16-2 |
| Citation | 67 Va.App. 690,800 S.E.2d 174 |
| Parties | Justo Mazariegos CAMPOS v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Brendan U. Dunning (Law Office of Brendan U. Dunning, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
J. Christian Obenshain, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Petty and Beales
OPINION BY CHIEF JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
Justo Mazariegos Campos ("appellant") appeals his convictions of aggravated sexual battery by a parent, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3(A)(3) ; carnal knowledge of a child, in violation of Code § 18.2-63 ; taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation of Code § 18.2-370 ; and object sexual penetration, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2. Following trial in the Circuit Court of Halifax County ("trial court"), appellant was sentenced to twenty-nine years' imprisonment. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court "abused its discretion by allowing into evidence testimonial statements to a medical provider which were not limited to statements of symptoms or medical history." For the following reasons, this Court affirms appellant's convictions.
On appeal, "we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Williams v. Commonwealth , 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc ) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth , 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004) ). So viewed, the evidence is as follows.
The victim in this case, C.F., was four years old when appellant began dating Stacey Campos, C.F.'s mother, in 2006. From when C.F. first met appellant until after Stacey and appellant married in 2008, appellant acted as a father figure for C.F. and had authority to instruct her and discipline her for disobedience.
In 2012, C.F. reported to Stacey that appellant had sexually abused her, but when Stacey confronted appellant, he denied it. Stacey then told C.F. that she did not believe her report, and C.F. recanted.
One year later, C.F. again reported that appellant had sexually abused her. Stacey took C.F. to Lynchburg General Hospital on August 10, 2013, where Donna Kling, a forensic nurse examiner, examined C.F. At this point, the Department of Social Services became involved and Stacey took out a protective order against appellant. Even after these events, Stacey again told C.F. that she did not believe her, and following a heated argument, C.F. again recanted. The protective order was then dismissed at Stacey's request.
Another incident occurred on October 6, 2014. While Stacey was at work, appellant asked C.F. to enter the bedroom and wait. Appellant entered, and pulled down C.F.'s pants and underwear as well as his own pants. Appellant's penis touched C.F.'s vagina and was "moving up and down." Appellant persisted even after C.F. told him to stop, and she felt his penis enter between her labia. When he finished, appellant instructed C.F. to go to bed.
Stacey took C.F. to Lynchburg General Hospital on October 10, 2014, where C.F. was again examined by Kling. That evening, Stacey received two calls from appellant during which appellant told her, "I'm sorry, I'm sorry for hurting you and your daughter."
A grand jury indicted appellant for eight sexual offenses. At trial, the Commonwealth called Kling, and appellant stipulated to Kling's certification as an expert "in child sexual assaults and forensic evaluations." During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Kling to tell the jury about her interview with C.F., to which counsel for appellant objected on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. Arguing outside the presence of the jury, counsel for appellant contended that Kling's testimony regarding C.F.'s statements constituted testimonial hearsay and violated Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Counsel also argued that C.F.'s hearsay statements would not fall under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:803(4). The trial court overruled appellant's objections, finding that Kling's statements were not testimonial and fell within the hearsay exception because Kling's goal in interviewing C.F. was to diagnose and treat C.F. Additionally, the trial court reasoned that C.F.'s motivation had not been to provide evidence for the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth then had Kling "quote word for word" from her notes of the October 10, 2014 interview with C.F.1 :
Later during direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Kling whether C.F. indicated that appellant had threatened her. Kling testified that C.F. had spontaneously volunteered during the interview that "[a]fter [C.F.'s] mom pawned one of [appellant's] guns, he bought a nine millimeter and said if [C.F.] told anybody, he was going to kill [her]." The Commonwealth ended its direct examination there, and counsel for appellant cross-examined Kling.
The Commonwealth also called C.F. to testify in its case-in-chief. On cross-examination, counsel for appellant read to C.F. a portion of the interview transcript between her and Kling, and C.F. agreed that the transcript accurately reflected what she said. Counsel for appellant impeached C.F. by comparing those statements to other statements C.F. made to an investigator regarding the same events; C.F. agreed that she had made the inconsistent statements to the investigator. C.F. also repeatedly testified that she could not remember certain conversations or events about which counsel for appellant asked her.
Following C.F.'s testimony, appellant moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence and for a mistrial, both of which the trial court denied. After presenting defense evidence, appellant renewed his motions to strike, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
"Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard." Boone v. Commonwealth , 63 Va. App. 383, 388, 758 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2014) (citing Boyce v. Commonwealth , 279 Va. 644, 649, 691 S.E.2d 782, 784 (2010) ). Under this deferential standard, a "trial judge's ruling will not be reversed simply because an appellate court disagrees;" only in those cases where "reasonable jurists could not differ" has an abuse of discretion occurred. Thomas v. Commonwealth , 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743, adopted upon reh'g en banc , 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005). Constitutional arguments, however, "present questions of law that this Court reviews de novo ." Crawford v. Commonwealth , 281 Va. 84, 97, 704 S.E.2d 107, 115 (2011).
Additionally, this Court is "bound by the trial court's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hicks v. Commonwealth
...Coleman and others.9 "Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard." Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702, 800 S.E.2d 174 (2017) (quoting Boone v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 383, 388, 758 S.E.2d 72 (2014) ). This "deferential standard" means that ......
-
Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth
...trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached" even in the absence of the omitted evidence. Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 717, 800 S.E.2d 174 (2017) (quoting Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005-06, 407 S.E.2d 910 (1991) (en banc )). In conducting harml......
-
Bista v. Commonwealth
...to factual questions underlying the admissibility of evidence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Campos v. Commonwealth , 67 Va. App. 690, 702, 800 S.E.2d 174 (2017) (quoting Witt v. Commonwealth , 215 Va. 670, 674, 212 S.E.2d 293 (1975) ). A trial court resolves factual question......
-
Carolino v. Commonwealth
...Br. at 13 fn. 4. [10] A trial court, of course, is given broad discretion with respect to the admission of evidence. Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 690, 702 (2017); Boone v. Commonwealth, 63 Va.App. 383, 388 (2014). "Under this deferential standard, a 'trial judge's ruling will not be r......