Camron v. State
| Citation | 22 S.W. 682 |
| Parties | CAMRON v. STATE. |
| Decision Date | 20 May 1893 |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Haskell county; C. P. Woodruff, Judge.
Ed Camron was convicted of burglary, and appeals. Reversed.
J. H. Glasgow, (Ed. J. Hamner, of counsel,) for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of burglary, and his punishment assessed at two years' confinement in the state penitentiary, from which he appeals. The cause was carried, by change of venue, from Throckmorton to Haskell county. When placed on trial, appellant pleaded an agreement made by him with the county attorney of Baylor county, and others representing the state, by which he was induced to turn state's evidence against his confederate, J. J. Jones, in Baylor county, at the examining court, at which said Jones was bound over to await the action of the grand jury; that the state was unable, without his evidence, to convict Jones; that he was duly recognized to appear and testify before the district court; and that in all matters he has been ready to carry out his agreement. The state demurred on the ground that such a plea was not authorized by law, and that the agreement was not with parties authorized to act. The court sustained the demurrer, and appellant was convicted, the wife of J. J. Jones being the principal witness against him.
There is but one question that need be considered: Did the court err in striking out the plea? From the earliest times it has been found necessary, for the detection and punishment of crime, for the state to resort to the criminals themselves for testimony with which to convict their confederates in crime. While such a course offers a premium to treachery, and sometimes permits the more guilty to escape, it tends to prevent and break up combinations by making criminals suspicious of each other, and it leads to the punishment of guilty persons who would otherwise escape. 1 Hale, P. C. 305; Rex v. Rudd, Cowp. 334; People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707. Therefore, on the ground of public policy, it has been uniformly held that a state may contract with a criminal for his exemption from prosecution, if he shall honestly and fairly make a full disclosure of the crime, whether the party testified against is convicted or not. If his testimony is corrupt, or his disclosure is only partial, he gains nothing, but forfeits his right under the contract. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 1164. The only difficulty in the matter seems to be as to the method in which the state may extend the promised and earned immunity. The common practice in American courts is to commit the question of receiving or rejecting an accomplice, and the further question of his immunity from punishment, solely to the discretion of the prosecuting officer, who acts by nol. pros. In those states where a nol. pros. can be only entered with the consent of the court, as in Texas, the court must, of course, exercise supervision over the question. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 1161. But there is no question of the right of the prosecuting officer to act under and with the consent of the court in dismissing the cause. In some courts it has been held that, when the agreement has been made, and defendant has testified thereunder, and the attorney for the state refuses to recognize the agreement, the court will continue the cause, to let the defendant obtain a pardon to plead in bar. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 1164. This, however, cannot be done in Texas, as the pardoning power can only be invoked after conviction. Const. art. 4, § 11. In some courts it is held that where the accomplice is convicted after being made a witness by the state, and after having made a full confession, he has a claim for a judicial recommendation for pardon, which cannot be withheld without violating an established rule of practice. State v. Graham, 41 N. J. Law. 15; State v. Lyon, 81 N. C. 600; U. S. v. Ford, 99 U. S. 594; Garside's Case, 2 Lew. Cr. Cas. 38. But it would seem that the power of dealing with such agreements lies primarily with the prosecuting officer, and in Texas he may act with the consent of the court; and we can see no good reason why, when a defendant has in good faith carried out his agreement, the labor and expense to the state of a solemn trial should be incurred for the purpose of remitting the defendant to his remedy of pardon, to which, it is admitted, he is entitled as a matter of right. Hardin's Case, 12 Tex. App. 189. If the state can make a contract with the defendant for immunity from prosecution for his offense, it is due to her own dignity that the contract be carried out in perfect faith. If the...
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