Canabal v. Aramark Corp., Civ. 98-2053(JP).

• Citation: 48 F.Supp.2d 94
• Decision Date: 26 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 98-2053(JP).,Civ. 98-2053(JP).
• Parties: Fernando Rochet CANABAL, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 94

48 F.Supp.2d 94

Fernando Rochet CANABAL, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., Defendant.

No. Civ. 98-2053(JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 26, 1999.

Jose R. Rosello Camacho, Manati, PR, for plaintiff.

Pedro J. Manzano Yates, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Co-Defendant Argemiro Gómez's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Argemiro Gómez's Motion to Dismiss (docket No. 12) and Plaintiff's Opposition to Co-Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (docket No. 25).

Plaintiff Fernando Rochet Canabal ("Rochet") brings this action against Defendants Aramark Corporation, Aramark Services of Puerto Rico, Inc., (collectively, "Aramark") and Argemiro Gómez ("Gómez") invoking sexual harassment and gender-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; "Law 100", P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 146 (Puerto Rico's employment discrimination statute); "Law 17," P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 155 (Puerto Rico's sexual harassment statute); and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Code, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 5141 (Puerto Rico's general tort statute).

II. STANDARD UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 12(B)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is well-settled, however, that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991). The Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual averments contained in the complaint, while at the same time drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in factor of the plaintiff. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990).

In opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Rather, a plaintiff has an affirmative responsibility to put his best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support his claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52; Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989); Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54, 57 (10th Cir.1957)). Plaintiff must set forth in his complaint "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988). Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, the Court assumes that the following allegations are true.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about February of 1996, Rochet started to work for Aramark, a corporation engaged in food services, at its cafeteria in the Warner-Lambert plant in Vega Baja, Puerto Rico. Ever since the start of his time at the cafeteria, Rochet was the target of intentional and malicious sexual harassment by Co-Defendant Gómez, his supervisor and the cafeteria's manager. Rochet's exposure to Gómez's sexually charged behavior began early in their professional relationship. Gómez began to ask Rochet's opinion about other male co-workers, and on one occasion, he commented to Rochet of his desire to perform oral sex on another man. (Compl. at ¶ 7C). At that point Gómez told Rochet, "don't get shocked, you know I am homo-sexual" and added "sex is always the same no matter whether you drink a Heineken or a Budweiser, it's always beer." (Id.). Further, Gómez constantly invited Rochet to his house in Rincón, Puerto Rico and invited him to have sexual relations. (Compl. at ¶ 7d).

Rochet never welcomed Gómez's sexual advances. After realizing that his sexual advances were not being reciprocated, Gómez started to create a hostile and intimidating working environment for Rochet. For instance, Gómez followed Rochet and asked co-employees where Rochet lived and went. At one point, Gómez physically attacked Rochet. (Compl. at ¶ 9k, l).

Faced with Gómez's behavior, Rochet contacted Aramark officials who proceeded to replace Gómez at the Cafeteria. Rochet alleges, however, that this was a "screen" substitution because Gómez actually remained in control of the cafeteria. Rochet alleges that after conducting an investigation, Aramark did not find any evidence of sexual harassment. Thereafter, Aramark discharged Rochet telling him that his services will no longer be needed. Upon receipt of his first unemployment check, Aramark sent a letter to Rochet notifying him that he could be assigned to another of Aramark's cafeterias.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Individual Liability Under Title VII

Gómez argues that Rochet's claims against him should be dismissed because this Court has repeatedly held that Title VII does not provide for the imposition of individual liability. Rochet responds by stating that, although the issue of individual liability is not an undecided issue in this District, there are "plausible and well-founded legal theories and well-reasoned judgments [in other districts and circuits] that sustain that supervisors are subject to individual liability under Title VII...." (Pls.' Opp'n Co-Def's Mot. Dismiss at 3). In the alternative, Rochet argues that Gómez is liable under the "alter ego" exception recently recognized by this Court. See Santiago v. Lloyd, 33 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.Puerto Rico 1998) (Pieras, J.). The Court will address the issue of individual liability under Title VII, and specifically, the decisions rendered by this Court.

Section 703(a) of Title VII states that:

[i]t shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added). Title VII's coverage has been extended to proscribe sexual harassment in the workplace. See Acevedo Vargas v. Colon, 2 F.Supp.2d 203, 205 (D.Puerto Rico 1998) (referring to the EEOC guidelines which establish the criteria for determining when unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment for purposes of Section 703 of Title VII). Therefore, Title VII is the applicable federal cause of action addressing claims for sexual harassment in the workplace.

Because Title VII is directed at "employers," determining the meaning of this term is essential to our discussion. Title VII defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (emphasis added). Therefore, because Gómez is not the employing entity, the Court will focus on whether he can be held liable as an agent of the employing entity. See Rivera Rodriguez v. Police Dept. of Puerto Rico, 968 F.Supp. 783, 785 (D.Puerto Rico 1997) (Pieras, J.); Anonymous v. Legal Services Corporation of Puerto Rico, 932 F.Supp. 49, 50 (D.Puerto Rico 1996) (stating that "resolution of the [individual liability] question depends on how the `and any agent' language is interpreted."). That is to say, the Court must decide whether Title VII, by including in its definition of employer any agent of "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees," intended for such agents to be subject to liability for engaging in the proscribed discriminatory behavior. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Although the First Circuit has yet to decide whether a Title VII plaintiff may maintain a suit against an individual in his personal capacity, most circuits have held that no personal liability can be attached to agents or supervisors under Title VII. See Scarfo v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 54 F.3d 931 (1st Cir.1995) (declining to address the issue of individual liability); but see Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898 (10th Cir.1996) (no individual liability under Title VII); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.1995) (same); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir.1995) (same); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C.Cir.1995) (same); Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir.1995) (same); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1993) (same). Besides the First Circuit, only the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have yet to rule on the issue of individual liability. See Santiago v. Lloyd, 33 F.Supp.2d at 102. Like the majority of the circuit courts, this District has generally held that individual defendants are not liable under Title VII. See Ocasio Berrios v. Bristol Myers Squibb Puerto Rico, No. 22 Civ No. 98-2071 (D.Puerto Rico Mar. 4, 1999) (Pieras, J.); Acevedo Vargas v. Colon, 2 F.Supp.2d at 206; Hernandez v. Wangen, 938 F.Supp. 1052 (D.Puerto Rico 1996); Anonymous v. Legal Services Corporation, 932 F.Supp. at 50-51; but see Santiago v. Lloyd, supra.

The Court is compelled by the reasoning of previous decisions within this District. Title VII's statutory structure suggests that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability over supervisors or agents of employers. See Acevedo Vargas v. Colon, 2 F.Supp.2d at 206. Liability under the statute is triggered when the defendant/employer retains fifteen or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. In establishing this threshold, Congress sought to protect small entities. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d at...