Canales v. Gatzunis

• Citation: 979 F.Supp.2d 164
• Decision Date: 28 October 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–11766–JLT.
• Parties: Julio CANALES, Plaintiff, v. Thomas GATZUNIS, Commissioner, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

979 F.Supp.2d 164

Julio CANALES, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas GATZUNIS, Commissioner, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–11766–JLT.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Oct. 28, 2013.

Erin C. Birmingham, Law Office of EC Birmingham Anadu, West Roxbury, MA, for Plaintiff.

Melissa J. Garand, Koufman & Frederick, LLP, Salem, MA, Allen H. Forbes, Christopher G. Perillo, Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, Gwen A. Werner, Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

TAURO, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff files this suit sounding in tort and civil rights violations against various defendants for events occurring at the Suffolk County House of Correction (“SCHOC”) in late 2010. Presently before this court are Defendants Andrea J. Cabral, Gerard Horgan,¹ and the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [# 14] and Defendant Thomas Gatzunis's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [# 16]. For the following reasons, Defendant Gatzunis's Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED in its entirety and Defendants Cabral, Horgan, and the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department's Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. BackgroundA. Facts²

Plaintiff brings this action against the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, Andrea J. Cabral in her official capacity as the Suffolk County Sherriff, and Gerard Horgan in his individual capacity and his official capacity as Superintendent of the SCHOC (collectively: “County Defendants”), Thomas Gatzunis in his official capacity as the Public Safety Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Prison Health Services, NaphCare, Inc., Elnora Harris in her individual and official capacities, Jennifer Foley in her individual and official capacities, Nathaniel Stillman in his individual and official capacities, Irina Natapov in her individual and official capacities, and Colleen Collins in her individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff was in the custody and control of Defendants at the SCHOC during 2010 and 2011.³ During Plaintiff's incarceration at the SCHOC, he alleges that Defendants “subject[ed] him to reckless, negligent and cruel medical treatment.” ⁴ On November 18, 2010, Plaintiff requested his seizure medication from Defendant Harris.⁵ Rather than give Plaintiff his seizure medication, Harris erroneously informed Plaintiff that he had HIV. ⁶ Although Plaintiff protested that he was not HIV positive, Harris insisted that he had HIV and was required to take antiviral medication. ⁷

Despite Plaintiff's repeated assertions that he did not have HIV, Defendants nonetheless continued to administer antiviral HIV medications to Plaintiff. ⁸ Plaintiff was required to take such medications multiple times each day.⁹ Plaintiff requested that he be allowed to see his medical paperwork and demanded that he be tested for HIV, all to no avail.¹⁰ Plaintiff also requested mental health assistance.¹¹ On or about December 10, 2010, Plaintiff was contacted by the SCHOC infirmary.¹² A female employee informed Plaintiff that SCHOC was making a mistake and had been giving Plaintiff another inmate's medication.¹³ On or about December 16, 2010, SCHOC provided Plaintiff blood test results showing that he did not have HIV. While Plaintiff was under the custody of Defendants, they also failed to provide Plaintiff with the medications he was actually prescribed.

Because Defendants had informed Plaintiff that he had HIV and continued to administer HIV medications to him, Plaintiffinformed his friends and family that he was HIV positive. Plaintiff continues to suffer from the stigma associated with being HIV positive. He also continues to suffer great emotional and physical harms. Plaintiff has also developed a deep mistrust and fear of doctors and other members of the medical profession, as well as extreme anxiety regarding communicable diseases.¹⁴ Plaintiff suffers from a number of medical problems including, but not limited to: nausea, vomiting, spitting up blood, diarrhea, bloody stool, headaches, stomach pain, rectal bleeding, dizziness, rashes, problems sleeping, nightmares, muscle and joint pain, weight loss, loss of appetite, anorexia, racing heartbeat, weakness, shaky hands, extreme nervousness, loneliness, depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts.

B. Procedural History

On June 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Suffolk County Superior Court. On July 24, 2013, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal [# 1] in this court. On August 29, 2013, Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc. filed its Answer [# 12]. On August 30, 2013, County Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [# 14] and Defendant Gatzunis filed his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [# 16]. On September 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [# 30]. On September 24, 2013, the medical professional Defendants filed an Assented to Motion for Referral to a Medical Malpractice Tribunal [# 30], which this court ALLOWED.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff's Complaint raises a variety of claims contained in six counts. Count I raises claims under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), M.G.L. c. 258, § 4. Count II raises claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”), M.G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H and I. Count III asserts tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count IV asserts common-law negligence claims. Count V raises claims for violation of Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, Count VI raises claims for common-law assault and battery.

A. Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a “court must ‘take all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” ¹⁵ In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include factual allegations that, taken as true, demonstrate a plausible claim for relief. ¹⁶ “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” ¹⁷ In order to satisfy the minimal requirements of notice pleading, a plaintiff cannot “lump” multiple defendants together and must “state clearly which defendant or defendants committed each of the alleged wrongful acts.” ¹⁸ This court may consider the “facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” ¹⁹

B. Section 1983 Claims

Count V asserts § 1983 claims against all Defendants based on a violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.²⁰ Plaintiff seeks an award of damages to compensate him for his injuries. It is well established, however, that neither states nor state officials sued in their official capacities for damages are “persons” for purposes of § 1983. ²¹ On January 1, 2010, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assumed control of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department.²² The Sheriff's Department and its employees, acting in their official capacities, are therefore to be treated as the Commonwealth itself for purposes of this suit. Consequently, the claims in Count V must be dismissed against the Sheriff's Department and Defendants Cabral and Horgan to the extent they were acting in their official capacities and against Defendant Gatzunis.

This leaves only the § 1983 claim against Defendant Horgan in his individual capacity. Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege any facts indicating that Horgan was personally involved in administering his medical care at SCHOC. Rather, his claim against Horgan appears to be premised on supervisory liability.²³ State officials sued in their individual capacities may be held liable only “on the basis of their own acts or omissions,” and not “ ‘for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.’ ” ²⁴ Additionally, a supervisor “cannot be liable for merely negligent acts.” ²⁵ Instead, the “supervisor's acts or omissions must amount to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.” ²⁶ A supervisor displays such reckless indifference “when it would be manifest to any reasonable official that his conduct was very likely to violate an individual's constitutional rights.” ²⁷ Deliberate indifference is akin to willful blindness.²⁸ Even where a supervisor does not know of the specific actions of a subordinate that violate a person's constitutional rights, a supervisor may be held liable if he is aware of a general “pattern or practice” that threatens persons' constitutional rights and is deliberately indifferent to the danger.²⁹ “[I]solated instances of unconstitutional activity ordinarily are insufficient to establish a supervisor's policy or custom, or otherwise to show deliberate indifference.” ³⁰

Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to make out a plausible claim for supervisory liability against Defendant Horgan. First, the Complaint is devoid of any suggestion that Horgan personally knew Plaintiff was being administered HIV medications or was aware of Plaintiff's protests. Second, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts to suggest that Horgan was aware of similar medication errors or other practices by the medical staff that posed a risk to inmates' constitutional rights. Plaintiff merely states that “Defendants have a disorganized medical program and failed to maintain a quality assurance program.” ³¹ Plaintiff also states that SCHOC failed “to maintain adequate and accurate medical records.” ³² Even taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff does not allege that Horgan himself was aware of a threat to inmates' constitutional rights. This is due in part to Plaintiff's failure to allege anything more specific than general factual allegations purportedly applicable to all Defendants. Such pleading fails to...