Candler v. City of Asheville
Decision Date | 10 January 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 93,93 |
Citation | 101 S.E.2d 470,247 N.C. 398 |
Parties | Coke CANDLER, Harry P. Mitchell and John C. Vance, Members of the Board of County Commissioners of Buncombe County and ex officio trustees of South Buncombe Water and Watershed District, of Swannanoa Sanitary Sewer District, of Beaverdam Water and Sewer District, of Caney Valley Sanitary Sewer District, of Hazel Ward Water and Watershed District, of Venable Sanitary District, in behalfoof all water consumers of Buncombe County whose property is connected to any of the water mains of any of said Districts; P. Morton Keary, Tom Cole, Frank Lowe, Mrs. Nell Busch, Hoyt Spivey and W. E. Creasman, Water Consumers in the abovenamed Districts whose properties are connected to water mains of said Districts, in their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Buncombe County whose properties are connected to any of the water mains of the aforementioned Districts, v. CITY OF ASHEVILLE, a Municipal Corporation. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Ward & Bennett, Roy A. Taylor, William M. Styles, Ssheville, for plaintiffappellants.
Robert W. Wells, Charles N. Malone, Frank M. Parker, Asheville, for defendant-appellee.
The numerous exceptions and assignments of error preserved and brought forward on this appeal, in our opinion, present only three questions which require our consideration and determination. (1) Did the trial court err in holding that Chapter 399 of the 1933 Public-Local Laws of North Carolina is unconstitutional and contrary to Section 17, Article I, of the Constitution of North Carolina, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? (2) Did the trial court err in holding that the defendant City of Asheville is not estopped to assert the invalidity or unconstitutionality of the above Act? (3) Did the trial court err in holding that Ordinance No. 383, enacted by the City Council of the City of Asheville, on 11 August 1955, is lawful and valid and in full force and effect?
The correctness of the ruling of the court below on the first question posed, turns on whether or not the General Assembly has the power to prohibit a municipality from selling water to consumers residing outside its corporate limits at a higher rate than the rate fixed for consumers of water who reside within its corporate limits, where such outside consumers reside in a water or water and sewer district in which the taxpayers of the district have constructed the water or water and sewer facilities and are maintaining them out of ad valorem taxes levied on the real and personal property in the district.
A municipal corporation in this State has a dual capacity. One is governmental or political, and the other is proprietary or quasi-private. Asbury v. Town of Albemarle, 162 N.C. 247, 78 S.E. 146, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Holmes v. City of Fayetteville, 197 N.C. 740, 150 S.E. 624; Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 23 S.E.2d 42; Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E.2d 209; Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371.
A municipality acting in its governmental capacity is an agency of the State for the better government of those residing within its corporate limits, and while public utilities, like water and lights, are now held to be a necessary minicipal expense, Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029, 63 L.R.A. 870, even so, they are not provided by a municipality in its political or governmental capacity, except insofar as they may furnish water for extinguishing fires and for other municipal purposes, Harrington v. Town of Greenville, 159 N.C. 632, 75 S.E. 849; Howland v. City of Asheville, 174 N.C. 749, 94 S.E. 524, L.R.A.1918B, 728; Klassette v. Liggett Drug Co., 227 N.C. 353, 42 S.E.2d 411; and provide electric energy for lighting streets, Baker v. City of Lumberton, 239 N.C. 401, 79 S.E.2d 886; or for the operation of traffic light signals, Hamilton v. Town of Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770, or other municipal purposes, but, in its proprietary capacity it acts exclusively in a private or quasi-private capacity for its own benefit.
'In matters purely governmental in character, it is conceded that the municipality is under the absolute control of the legislative power; but, as to its private or proprierary functions, the Legislature is under the same constitutional restraints that are placed upon it in respect of private corporations.' Asbury v. Town of Albemarle, supra [162 N.C. 247, 78 S.E. 149]. No one challenges the power of the State to fix rates for private utilities or for utilities operated in a proprietary capacity by a municipality.
In this State, the power to regulate and to establish the rates to be charged by intrastate railroads, motor vehicle carriers of passengers and freight, power companies, etc., has been delegated to the North Carolina Utilities Commission. However, the right to establish rates for municipally owned electric light plants, water, or water and sewer systems, has never been given to the Utilities Commission.
In State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. State, 239 N.C. 333, 80 S.E.2d 133, 140, this Court, speaking through Barnhill, J., later C. J., said:
In 43 Am.Jur., Public Utilities and Services, section 83, page 624, et seq., it is said:
In the last cited authority, section 94, page 636, we find this statement: 'The well recognized general rule is that when a governmental body has the power to regulate the rates for charges for services by public utilities to consumers, that power includes the power to fix any maximum rate which is fair and just to the consumer if it will also produce a proper return to the public utility.'
It is clear that the power to establish rates is a governmental function and not a proprietary one. It is likewise clearly established in this jurisdiction that municipalities Holmes v. City of Fayetteville, supra [197 N.C. 740, 150 S.E. 628].
In the case of St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 725, 80 L.Ed. 1033, in speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes said:
Likewise, in City of Seymour v. Texas Electric Service Co., 5 Cir., 66 F.2d 814, 817 (certiorari denied 290 U.S. 685, 54 S.Ct. 121, 78 L.Ed. 590), it is said: See also Shirk v. Lancaster City, 313 Pa. 158, 169 A. 577, 90 A.L.R. 688.
The legislature has authorized a municipal corporation that owns a waterworks system to furnish water to any person, firm, or...
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