Cane v. Com.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1977
• Citation: 556 S.W.2d 902
• Parties: Henry Thomas CANE, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 902

556 S.W.2d 902

Henry Thomas CANE, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 27, 1977.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1977.

Discretionary Review Denied Nov. 14, 1977.

Robert F. Stephens, Atty. Gen., Raymond M. Larson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

Jack Emory Farley, Public Defender, Kevin M. McNally, Asst. Public Defender, Frankfort, for appellant.

Before GANT, LESTER and PARK, JJ.

PARK, Judge.

Henry Thomas Cane appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the Franklin Circuit Court following his jury trial on the charge of first degree robbery. A brief summary of the evidence is necessary for an understanding of the grounds for reversal raised by Cane on this appeal.

On December 19, 1975, three black persons robbed the Brown's Clothing Store in downtown Frankfort. During the course of the robbery, two female store employees and a female customer were threatened with a knife. Money and a substantial quantity of clothing were taken from the store during the course of the robbery. Shortly after the robbery, an automobile driven by Cane was stopped on the outskirts of Frankfort by the city police. The clothing taken from the Brown's Clothing Store during the robbery was found on the backseat of the car. Cane and another occupant of the car, Glenn Duncan, were arrested. A third occupant of the car slipped away in the confusion and was not apprehended.

The robbery in question was unusual because of the attire of the three persons who carried out the robbery of Brown's Clothing Store. All three robbers were attired in women's clothing. At all times during the course of the robbery, the two store employees and the one customer believed the assailants to be women. When the car with the stolen property was stopped by the police, all three occupants were attired in women's clothing. The arresting officer believed both Cane and Duncan to be women, and their true gender was not discovered until they were booked at the police station.

Both Cane and Duncan gave their occupations as "female imitator." Duncan entered a plea of guilty, and at Cane's trial Duncan testified that he and two other "female imitators" robbed the clothing store. Not having an automobile with which to transport the loot from the robbery back to Louisville, Duncan testified that he and the other two robbers telephoned Cane for a ride. According to Cane and Duncan, Cane innocently picked up the three robbers and their loot only to let one of the robbers out of the car shortly before Cane was stopped by the police. Consequently, there were two rather than three persons with Cane in the car.

The primary allegations of error relate to the identification of Cane as one of the three robbers. Other than the fact that Cane was arrested operating the automobile carrying the stolen merchandise, the only evidence linking Cane to the robbery was the testimony of Mrs. Opal Oliver, one of the two clerks at the store. Mrs. Oliver conceded that she had been unable to identify Cane at the examining trial in quarterly court. However, she attributed her inability to identify Cane to her distance from him. According to Mrs. Oliver, as she was preparing to leave court she had a closer view of Cane and was able to identify him as one of the three robbers. She further testified that she picked out Cane's photograph and Duncan's photograph from a book of mug-shots the morning of the trial. She also identified Cane in court during the course of the trial.

The photographs of Cane and Duncan were taken by the Frankfort police immediately following their arrest. Both Cane and Duncan were shown in the women's clothing and wigs in which they were dressed at the time of their arrest. Before the two photographs were introduced at trial, the bottom of the photographs had been cut off so as to delete identification plates which were suspended around the necks of Cane and Duncan. However, the chains which held the identification plates were still visible, and any juror of ordinary intelligence would have recognized that the photographs had been taken by the police.

Cane asserts that it was error to introduce the photograph taken of him at the time of his arrest. Cane claims that the Commonwealth was able to introduce improper evidence of past criminal conduct by means of the mug-shot. This contention is without merit. The photograph in question was not introduced for the purpose of showing past criminality. The photograph was offered solely for identification purposes. As Cane was disguised as a woman at the time of his arrest, the photograph represented the best evidence of his appearance at the time of the commission of the crime. We hold that the photograph was properly admissible for purposes of identification. Urbanski v. Commonwealth, Ky., 526 S.W.2d 7 (1975); Matters v. Commonwealth, Ky.,245 S.W.2d 913 (1952); Annotation 30 A.L.R.3d 908, 911-14 (1970). This is not a situation in which a mug-shot is introduced solely for the purpose of branding the defendant as a criminal. See Roberts v. Commonwealth, Ky., 350 S.W.2d 626 (1961). The circuit court did not err in admitting the photograph of Cane for purposes of identification.

Cane's trial counsel was not present when the mug-shot book containing Cane's photograph was shown to Mrs. Oliver on the morning the trial commenced. Conceding that this procedure did not deny him the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), Cane contends that he was denied right to counsel as guaranteed by Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Kentucky has never specifically considered the application of the decision in the Ash case to the right of counsel guaranteed by Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Nevertheless, in Rolack v. Commonwealth, Ky., 514 S.W.2d 47 (1974) this state's highest court held that the presence of counsel required at a post-indictment lineup by the decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), did not apply to the examination of photographs for the purpose of identification. The decision in the Rolack case is not directly in point because the photographic identification was pre-indictment. Presence of counsel is not required at a pre-indictment lineup. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Ashcraft v. Commonwealth, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 892 (1972). Assuming that the Rolack decision is completely inapplicable, we still conclude that the right of counsel guaranteed by Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution is no greater than the right of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as construed in the Ash case. The right of counsel does not include the right of the defendant's counsel to be present when witnesses are interviewed by attorneys for the Commonwealth, even though the interview takes place on the morning of trial and includes an examination of photographs for purposes of identification. The right of cross-examination of that witness is sufficient protection for the defendant.

The defendant's counsel objected to Mrs. Oliver's identification of Cane, suggesting that the manner in which she was shown Cane's photograph was prejudicially suggestive. The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the objection. However, a conference with attorneys did take place in chambers. The record reflects the following discussion took place in chambers following counsel's objection to the manner in which Mrs. Oliver was shown Cane's photograph:

"MR. PREWITT (Commonwealth's Attorney): Unless I'm mistaken she's never seen any Photographs prior to this morning. Perhaps he intended to show her some photos. That's why I wanted to make it clear she picked it out of a large volume of pictures and picked out these two.

She also, I think, the only other time she had any contact with this defendant or the other one was over at police court. She had not been furnished any pictures.

MR. JUDY (Defendant's Counsel): Without being able to see what the random sampling was, the Court has no basis of knowing or basing a decision on whether or not it was an accepteble (sic) random sampling of twenty white females in which there was one black female. It would be highly suggestable (sic) and focused clearly upon this defendant as being the one she should pick out. Without being able to see how it was done and I think it is highly prejudicial to the defendant to allow this witness to testify.

MR. PREWITT (Commonwealth's Attorney): This portion of the book included nothing but black female pictures.

THE COURT: I heard you make that statement to the witness that there were just black females in it, did I not? Am I not right? Did you not state that in front of the jury?

MR. PREWITT (Commonwealth's Attorney): Yes.

THE COURT: That being the case I will overrule the objection."

In light of Mrs. Oliver's inability to identify Cane at the preliminary hearing, there was a substantial question respecting the photographic identification made by her the morning of the trial. The trial court was required to determine not only the admissibility of the out-of-court photographic identification, but also the validity of Mrs. Oliver's in-court identification of the defendant. If it is claimed that a photographic identification was so suggestive that misidentification was likely, that question should be determined by the trial court in a hearing outside of the presence of the jury following the procedures outlined in Bradley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 61 (1969) and Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 496 (1974). A proper record for appellate review exists only if the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes findings of fact. See Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 547 S.W.2d 792 (1977). If an evidentiary hearing had been requested, the trial court...