Caneyville v. Green's Motorcycle

• Decision Date: 25 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2007-SC-000517-DG.,2007-SC-000517-DG.
• Citation: 286 S.W.3d 790
• Parties: CANEYVILLE VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al., Appellants, v. GREEN'S MOTORCYCLE SALVAGE, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

286 S.W.3d 790

CANEYVILLE VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al., Appellants, v. GREEN'S MOTORCYCLE SALVAGE, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 2007-SC-000517-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

June 25, 2009.

Gregory N. Stivers, Scott Donald Laufenberg, Kerrick, Stivers, Coyle & Van Zant, P.L.C., Bowling Green, KY, Jason B. Bell, Kerrick, Stivers, Coyle & Van Zant, P.L.C., Elizabethtown, KY, for Appellant.

Alton L. Cannon, Leitchfield, KY, for Appellee.

Christopher Gadansky, David Paul Bowles, Landrum & Shouse LLP, Louisville, KY, for Kentucky League of Cities.

Opinion of the Court by Justice SCOTT.

The present appeal comes to this Court by way of discretionary review from an action asserting negligence brought by Appellees, Orville Green, Catherine Green and Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., against Appellants, Caneyville Volunteer Fire Department (hereinafter CVFD), the City of Caneyville and CVFD Fire Chief, Anthony Clark.

At the outset, we note that the City of Caneyville was entitled to dismissal. CVFD is an agent of the Commonwealth, having been recognized as such by the General Assembly by KRS 75.070 and declared immune from suit in tort. Because fire departments are thus immune from suit in tort, and are agents of the Commonwealth, albeit operating on a local basis, there can be no attendant municipality liability for CVFD's firefighting actions. Therefore, it is not within our authority to impose civil liability on an arm of the government carrying out such a government function. This is also consistent with KRS 95.830(2) in this instance.

Additionally, Chief Clark is immune in his official capacity as Fire Chief of CVFD. In his individual capacity, Chief Clark is entitled to qualified official immunity for his discretionary acts. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it conflicts with these holdings and the rationale articulated herein.

I. INTRODUCTION

Unquestionably, the prudent path between sovereign immunity and jural rights is a formidable legal quagmire to traverse. As a number of my esteemed colleagues on the bench have observed through the years, immunity is an area fraught with complexities which have divided the courts and confounded jurists. However, the complexity in immunity analysis has much to do with the courts' genuine attempt, over time, to eliminate the guesswork from determining when immunity has been properly and constitutionally recognized. Naturally, striking the appropriate balance has been no small task.

At times during this endeavor, proponents and recipients of immunity have bumped against Kentucky's jural rights or open courts doctrine. While the doctrine is not without its critics, it is a deep-rooted aspect of the Commonwealth's legal canon. And, although some would liken it to legal fiction, we are disinclined to reach such a conclusion. Indeed, thirty-nine (39) other states contain similar such provisions in their state constitutions. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L.Rev. 1279 (1995). In fact, the doctrine traces its genesis back to the Magna Carta and was espoused by no less venerated a jurist than Sir Edward Coke who, in his historically significant Second Institute, envisioned it as a vehicle to "ensure the integrity of the judicial process by stating that justice was not for sale," and to avoid undue interference with the judiciary in the courts of law by outside forces.¹ Id. at 1281, 1317. Over a century after Coke penned his Second Institute, the doctrine rang true with the American Colonies who feared that the British Crown was meddling in the colonial courts. Id. at 1288. Thus, the doctrine found its way into early state constitutions.

Nonetheless, we have been called upon, here, to examine the General Assembly's recognition of immunity in this state's fire departments, which inherently dredges up considerations of sovereign immunity and jural rights. Thus, the matter is one of constitutional interpretation and common law application. As such, this Court is bound, as it has oft been in the past, to articulate a plausible and constitutionally sound solution to an immunity problem while respecting the doctrine of jural rights. That this area of the law is complex in undeniable; however, this does not mean, as the minority suggests, that the remedy is to wipe the slate clean with regards to the evolution and history of the common law in this arena.

As always, the doctrine of stare decisis remains an ever-present guidepost in our undertaking. Stare Decisis compels us to decide every case with deference to precedent. "Thus, it is with anything but a cavalier attitude that we broach the subject of changing the ebb and flow of settled law [and while], we do not feel that the doctrine compels us to unquestioningly follow prior decisions when this Court finds itself otherwise compelled," we recognize that "`stare decisis [is] the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.'" Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Ky.2008) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-265, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, (1986)).

The open courts provision appears in our constitution, Ky. Const. § 14, which was ratified in 1891, and was linked with §§ 54 and 241 and ascribed the moniker of jural rights doctrine in 1932 in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932). This is a longstanding common law principle of nearly fourscore years, to which this Court should defer — unless we are strongly compelled otherwise, which we are not.

II. BACKGROUND

The Greens own a motorcycle salvage business in Grayson County outside the city of Caneyville. Their business caught fire on December 3, 2003, and CVFD responded to the call to extinguish the fire. CVFD is a volunteer fire department which provides fire protection services to Caneyville and the surrounding areas. Despite the fire department's attempt to contain the fire, the business along with much of its inventory was destroyed. Appellees subsequently brought suit alleging that CVFD, its Chief, and thus the City of Caneyville were negligent in failing to timely extinguish the fire and that, as a result of this alleged negligence, they suffered more severe property damage than they otherwise would have if additional measures had been taken to extinguish the fire.² Appellees also argued that KRS 75.070 and KRS 95.830(2) were unconstitutional.

KRS 75.070, which purports to provide fire departments and firefighters with immunity from civil liability, states as follows:

(1) A municipal fire department, fire protection district fire department, and volunteer fire department and the personnel of each, answering any fire alarms, performing fire prevention services, or other duly authorized emergency services inside and outside of the corporate limits of its municipality, fire protection district, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, shall be considered an agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity, and such municipality, fire protection district, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, shall not be liable in damages for any omission or act of commission or negligence while answering an alarm, performing fire prevention services, or other duly authorized emergency services.

(2) No municipal fire department, fire protection district fire department or volunteer fire department answering any fire alarms, performing fire prevention services or volunteer fire department services inside the corporate limits of the district shall be liable in damages for any omission or act of commission or negligence while answering or returning from any fire or reported fire, or doing or performing any fire prevention work under and by virtue of this chapter and said fire departments shall be considered agents of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity.

(emphasis added). KRS 95.830(2) is a companion statute dealing with use of fire apparatus, which purports to mandate that "[t]he city shall not be liable in any manner on account of the use of the apparatus at any point outside of the corporate limits of the city. The apparatus shall be deemed to be employed in the exercise of a governmental function of the city."

The Grayson Circuit Court found KRS 75.070 constitutional and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding both KRS 75.070 and KRS 95.830(2) unconstitutional for reasons that they violated Ky. Const. §§ 14, 54, commonly known as the jural rights or open courts doctrine.³ In its reasoning, the Court of Appeals found that KRS 75.070's attempt to confer sovereign immunity on fire departments and firefighters was an impermissible extension of immunity by the General Assembly akin to the type previously struck down by our predecessor Court in Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky.1959) and Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky.1964). The Court of Appeals held KRS 95.830(2) was unconstitutional because Haney had previously determined cities could only enjoy immunity for real or quasi-legislative or judicial functions.

As to the Fire Chief, the Court of Appeals found he was entitled to qualified official immunity, but the record was insufficient to determine whether his acts were discretionary or ministerial in nature, and thus remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. This Court granted discretionary review.

The impetus of the foregoing is that once again this Court is faced with the prospect of defining the permissible boundaries of sovereign immunity within this Commonwealth and the lengths to which such immunity may extend without improperly impinging upon the citizenry's constitutional right to have access...