Cannon v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 19 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-334-MW-MJF |
| Parties | CHARLES ANTHONY CANNON, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Charles Anthony Cannon, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Respondent (“the State”) answered providing relevant portions of the state court record. Doc 10. Cannon replied. Doc. 17. The undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, and that Cannon is not entitled to habeas relief.
In early 2014, Cannon repeatedly sexually abused his 13-year-old stepdaughter B.D. The abuse took place on multiple occasions over a 3-month period.
Cannon's abuse included rubbing his penis on B.D.'s vagina, digitally penetrating B.D.'s vagina, kissing B.D.'s vagina, touching B.D.'s breasts and vagina, and lewdly exposing his penis to B.D. Cannon also asked B.D. if she would let him put his penis in her mouth in exchange for money.
Cannon was charged in Wakulla County Circuit Court Case No. 2014-CF-92, with three counts of Sexual Battery on a Child by a Person with Familial or Custodial Authority (Counts I-III), two counts of Lewd or Lascivious Molestation of a Child (Counts IV-V), and one count of Lewd or Lascivious Exhibition in the Presence of a Child (Count VI). Doc. 10-1, Ex. A at 1-2.[2] The defense argued reasonable doubt, emphasizing the lack of physical evidence to corroborate B.D.'s testimony. Cannon testified in his own defense.
The jury found Cannon guilty of all counts as charged. Doc. 10-14, Ex. B. The trial court adjudicated Cannon guilty of the offenses and sentenced him to 30 years of imprisonment followed by 15 years on sex offender probation for each Sexual Battery; 15 years of imprisonment followed by 15 years on sex offender probation for each Lewd or Lascivious Molestation; and 15 years of imprisonment followed by 15 years on sex offender probation for the Lewd Exhibition, all terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently. Doc. 10-3, Ex. D.
Cannon successfully challenged his sentences and was resentenced to the same terms of imprisonment, but no probation. See Cannon v. State, No. 1D15-5710, 225 So.3d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (Mem.) (copy at Doc. 10-6, Ex. H) (affirming Cannon's convictions but remanding for resentencing on all counts); see also Doc. 10-7, Ex. I (Am. J. & Sentence). On February 20, 2019, the Florida First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”) affirmed the sentences per curiam and without written opinion. Cannon v. State, No. 1D17-4947, 264 So.3d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (Table) (copy at Doc. 10-9, Ex. K).
On July 9, 2019, Cannon filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Doc. 10-16, Ex. M. The state circuit court denied relief. Doc. 10-17, Ex. P. The First DCA affirmed, per curiam and without written opinion. Cannon v. State, No. 1D20-2259, 316 So.3d 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (Table). The mandate issued June 17, 2021. Doc. 10-13, Ex. Q. Cannon's motion for rehearing was denied on July 27, 2021. Id.
Cannon filed his pro se federal habeas petition on August 9, 2021. Doc. 1. The petition raises eight claims. Id. at 11-37. The State asserts that each claim fails for one or both of these reasons: (1) the claim is procedurally defaulted; (2) the state court's rejection of the claim was consistent with clearly established federal law. Doc. 10.
“To respect our system of dual sovereignty, the availability of habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S., 142 S.Ct. 1718, 1730 (2022) (citations omitted). One such constraint is the exhaustion requirement and corollary principle of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Shinn, 142 S.Ct. at 1731-32.
Section 2254 “requires state prisoners to ‘exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State' before seeking federal habeas relief.” Shinn, 142 S.Ct. at 1732 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)) (alteration adopted). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have fairly presented the substance of his federal claim” to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) ().
A petitioner “fairly” presents the substance of his federal claim when he describes the claim “such that [the state courts] are permitted the ‘opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.'” Kelley v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 277); French v. Warden, Wilcox State Prison, 790 F.3d 1259, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2015) .
When a petitioner fails to exhaust his federal claim and the state court remedy no longer is available, that failure to exhaust is a procedural default. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839-40; see also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999) ().
Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote federal-state comity. Exhaustion affords States an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, and procedural default protects against the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect state procedural rules. Ultimately, it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without giving an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, and to do so consistent with their own procedures.
A petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural default must “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2012). A petitioner establishes “cause” by showing that an objective factor external to the defense impeded an effort to properly raise the claim in the state court. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003). A petitioner establishes “prejudice” by showing at least a reasonable probability that the proceeding's result would have been different. Id.
To satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception, the petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The Schlup standard is very difficult to meet:
a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that that was not presented at trial.
A federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus petition on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).[3] Justice O'Connor described the appropriate test:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Under the Williams framework, the federal court must first determine the “clearly established Federal law,” namely, “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). After identifying the governing legal principle, the federal court determines whether the state court's...
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