Cannon v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

Decision Date05 January 1978
Docket NumberNo. 32947,32947
PartiesSheila L. CANNON et al. v. GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

J. Patrick Ward, Cairo, for appellants.

Twitty & Twitty, Frank S. Twitty, Camilla, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

Appellants are the surviving relatives of Richard Cannon, Jr., a minor who was killed in an automobile accident while a passenger in a car driven by a named insured of appellee. The deceased was not survived by a wife, nor any children; appellants are his mother (a widow) and his two sisters. This suit involves only the right of these plaintiffs to receive benefits under the minimum no-fault coverage required by Code Ann. § 56-3403b(b)(2, 3) (lost income, expenses incurred due to lost services), and their right to similar benefits under the optional no-fault coverage purchased by the named insured, as set out in Code Ann. § 56-3404b(a)(1)(ii) & (iii). 1

Summary judgment was rendered for the insurer on the ground that only a spouse or child could recover these types of benefits because the insured had died. The court relied on the paragraph of § 56-3403b(b) which states that:

"In the event of the death of the injured person, survived by a spouse or dependent child or children, compensation under paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) above shall be payable after such death as though the deceased were alive but totally disabled, such payment to be made to the spouse, if alive, otherwise to the child or children or the person having legal custody of any child or children, for use of such spouse or children as though awarded as a year's support for the spouse or children, or both. Survivor's benefits shall be payable until exhausted, at least monthly."

A similar paragraph is found in § 56-3404b(a)(1).

1. We first deal with the contention that the Act should be construed to provide for payments to appellants as the sole survivors of the deceased. The loss of income payments of § 56-3403b(b)(2) are expressly limited to income lost "during disability." "Disability" is a defined term, meaning "any period of time . . . during which an insured is unable to either:

(1) Perform substantially all the duties required by his usual occupation; or

(2) Engage in his principal activity if such person is not employed on at least a full-time basis. " Code Ann. § 56-3402b(d). We interpret the phrase " during disability" to refer only to a period of time during the insured's lifetime; "disability" ceases upon death. Each of the types of payments sought in this case is limited to the period of disability, and thus ceases to accrue upon death, except as extended by the paragraphs dealing with survivor's benefits. Unless appellants can claim coverage for "survivor's benefits", their claim must be limited to sums accruing prior to the death of Richard Cannon, Jr.

The provision (quoted above) for survivor's benefits extends beyond death the coverage for lost income, and expenses incurred in replacing lost services. The condition for survivor's benefits is that the decedent be " survived by a spouse or dependent child or children." We do not interpret the reference to surviving spouses or children as a mere appointment of who is entitled to benefits where there is a surviving spouse or child, as urged by appellants.

The last sentence discussing "survivor's benefits" was added to the law in 1975, (1975 Ga.L. 1202, 1204), and we find no indication that the legislature intended to expand coverage to give benefits to all survivors. Rather, we believe this section was added only to specify the frequency of payments otherwise due. Since the deceased was not survived by wife or child, benefits are not due under this paragraph, or the equivalent provisions under the optional coverage.

2. We have examined the terms of the insurance policy, and contrary to appellants argument, we find that no greater liability than that required by law was assumed by the company with respect to the types of payments in dispute in this case.

3. Appellants urge that the statutory provisions relative to survivor's benefits are in violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV; Code Ann. §§ 1-101, 2-203. The gist of the argument is that the statute discriminates against individuals, such as appellants, who are similarly situated to surviving spouses and children, by failing to provide equivalent survivor's benefits.

As we have interpreted the law, the provision for survivor's benefits for a surviving spouse and children is not a limitation on no-fault benefits, but rather an extension. The law creates new benefits for such individuals. Under the Federal Constitution, the underinclusive coverage of a law involving only economic interests does not make it unconstitutional where there is no invidious discrimination, but rather only rational classification. ...

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26 cases
  • Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 27 Diciembre 1988
    ...Bickford v. Nolen, 240 Ga. 255, 256, 240 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1977) (citations omitted)); see also Cannon v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 240 Ga. 479, 482, 241 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1978) ("Under the equal protection guarantee of our State Constitution (Code Ann. Sec. 2-203), classificati......
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 30 Junio 1982
    ...claims, and to provide for certain minimal insurance coverage for automobile accident victims. Cannon v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 240 Ga. 479, 482, 241 S.E.2d 238 (1978). It also intended prompt payment of victims' claims, and ironically, alleviation of collateral litig......
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 1 Octubre 1980
    ...purposes of the Reparations Act, which is to eliminate wasteful litigation over moderate to small claims. Cannon v. Ga. Farm, etc., Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 479, 482, 241 S.E.2d 238 (1978). It is true that, in a given case, a motor vehicle accident involving lighter vehicles might well give rise t......
  • St. John's Melkite Catholic Church v. Commissioner of Revenue, s. 32676
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 31 Enero 1978
    ...law serves a legitimate state purpose, the law does not deny equal protection or due process. Cf. Cannon v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 479, 481(3), 241 S.E.2d 238 (1978). The legislature could rationally determine that the employment of children in bingo operations would pla......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Workers' Compensation - H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen, Katherine D. Dixon, and Marion H. Martin
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 54-1, September 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...S.E.2d at 270-71. 150. O.C.G.A. Sec. 34-9-17(b). 151. 274 Ga. at 210, 553 S.E.2d at 271 (quoting Cannon v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 479, 482, 241 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1978)). 152. Id. 153. Id. 154. Id. 155. Id. at 210-11, 553 S.E.2d at 271. 156. Id. at 211, 553 S.E.2d at 271 (cita......
  • Medical Malpractice as Workers' Comp: Overcoming State Constitutional Barriers to Tort Reform
    • United States
    • Emory University School of Law Emory Law Journal No. 67-5, 2018
    • Invalid date
    ...Reparation Act barring recovery of exemplary damages by accident victims without serious injuries); Cannon v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 241 S.E.2d 238, 240-41 (Ga. 1978) (rejecting a due process and equal protection challenge to the provision of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparatio......

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