Cannonier v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18-cv-8764 (AJN),15-cr-95 (AJN) |
| Parties | Quaysean Cannonier, Petitioner, v. United States of America. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Quaysean Cannonier brings this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the judgment in this and set aside or correct his sentence. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the petition.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Cannonier was charged in Counts One and Four of the S2 Superseding Indictment, which was unsealed on April 27, 2016. See Dkt. Nos. 29, 97 ("Indictment").1 Count One charged Cannonier with participating in a racketeering conspiracy, in violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 1962(d), while Count Four charged him with using a firearm in furtherance of the racketeering conspiracy charged in Count One, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). See Indictment ¶¶ 1-11, 18. Kerry A. Lawrence and Clinton W. Calhoun served as CJA counsel for Cannonier until April 5, 2017, when the Court held a conference and relieved them of their representation and allowed the substitution of Camille Abate as CJA counsel for Cannonier. See Dkt. No. 1207; see also Dkt. Nos. 1103, 1121.
On August 17, 2017, Cannonier pled guilty before Magistrate Judge Barbara C. Moses to Count One of the Indictment. See Dkt. Nos. 1625, 1655. This Court accepted Cannonier's guilty plea after reviewing the transcript of the allocution and determining that Cannonier knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea and that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea. See Dkt. No. 1637. As part of Cannonier's plea agreement, the parties stipulated to an applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment. See Dkt. No. 2550, Ex. 4 ("Plea Agmt.") at 4; see also Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") ¶ 105. Also as part of the plea agreement, the Government agreed to dismiss Count Four of the Indictment. See Plea Agmt. at 1. In entering into the plea agreement, Cannonier agreed to waive his right to file a direct appeal or to bring a collateral challenge, including under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, of any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment. See Plea Agmt. at 5. The plea agreement clarified, however, that the waiver did not extend to "whatever rights the defendant may have to assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether on direct appeal, collateral review, or otherwise," noting instead that "it is expressly agreed that the defendant reserves those rights." Plea Agmt. at 5. At his August 17, 2017 felony plea allocution, Mr. Cannonier confirmed that he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence that was shorter than 78 months. See Dkt. No. 1655, Aug. 17, 2017 Tr., at 14:20-15:2.
On January 18, 2018, the Court sentenced Cannonier to 60 months' imprisonment, to be followed by three years' supervised release. See Dkt. No. 2048 ("Judgment") at 1-3.
On September 21, 2018, Cannonier filed his pro se 18 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. Dkt. No. 2373 ("Pet."). Cannonier based his petition on three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he claimed that his attorney (1) failed to argue that his 2011 robbery convictionshould not count towards his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) failed to argue for a downward departure under the Guidelines on the basis that Cannonier suffered from attention deficit/hyperactive disorder ("ADHD"); and (3) that his attorney failed to seek a mental competency examination for the defendant. See Pet. at 11.
The Court ordered the Government to respond. Dkt. No. 2374. Due to the nature of Cannonier's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Government requested an order allowing Cannonier's prior counsel to submit a statement responding to his allegations of ineffective assistance. See Dkt. No. 2457; see also Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. The Court granted the Government's request on November 27, 2018, Dkt. No. 2463, and Cannonier returned the executed Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver on December 11, 2018, see Dkt. No. 2479. Ms. Abate filed a statement responding to Cannonier's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on April 9, 2019. Dkt. No. 2550 ("Abate Resp."). The Government then filed its response to Cannonier's petition on April 23, 2019. Dkt. No. 2558 ("Gov. Resp.").
Section 2255 permits a prisoner in federal custody to challenge his sentence on the ground that it "was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A § 2255 motion ordinarily requires a hearing unless "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494 (1962); Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2003). A hearing is warranted if the motion sets forth "specific facts supported by competent evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a hearing, would entitle [the defendant] to relief." Gonzales v. UnitedStates, 722 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2013). By contrast, a hearing is not necessary "where the allegations are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible." Id. at 130-31 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, because the petitioner is proceeding pro se, his submissions "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see also Thompson v. United States, No. 16-CV-3468 (AJN), 2018 WL 327249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2018).
As already noted, Cannonier waived his right to file a direct appeal or to bring a collateral challenge, including under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, of any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment. See Plea Agmt. at 5. Because that waiver covers all of Cannonier's arguments, the petition is denied.
In his felony plea allocution, Cannonier confirmed that he understood that the plea agreement would limit his right to appeal, and that "as long as the district judge sentences you to a prison term of no longer than 78 months, any lawful sentence of supervised release, any fine no greater than $250,000, [he was] giving up your right to challenge your sentence, whether by direct appeal, writ of habeas corpus, or otherwise." See Dkt. No. 1655, Aug. 17, 2017 Tr., at 14:20-15:2. This Court accepted Cannonier's guilty plea after reviewing the transcript of the allocution and determining that Cannonier knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea and that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea. See Dkt. No. 1637. Moreover, in her affidavit, Cannonier's counsel contends that she reviewed the plea agreement with Cannonier carefully and more than once. See Abate Resp. ¶¶ 15-16. Cannonier's § 2255 petition does not claim that helacked an understanding of this waiver when he entered into the plea agreement or that he did not enter into the agreement voluntarily, and that issue is not presented to the Court.
"The Second Circuit has repeatedly—and emphatically—held that a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal [or collaterally attack] a sentence is generally valid and enforceable." Fernandez v. United States, No. 12-CR-445 (JMF), 2016 WL 4735370, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016) (collecting cases) (alteration in original). Thus, "[i]n no circumstance . . . may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement," because "[s]uch a remedy would render the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement meaningless." United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1998) (). Only "when the claim relates to the negotiation and entry of a plea or sentencing agreement" may "[c]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . survive § 2255 waivers." United States v. Cano, 494 F. Supp. 2d 243, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Chin, J.). But "[i]f the constitutionality of [the plea agreement] process passes muster, the plea agreement's waiver would bar any consideration by the appellate court of issues that fall within the scope of that waiver." United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2001).
Crucially, the Second Circuit has admonished that efforts to "dress up" claims challenging the correctness of a sentence as "violation[s] of the Sixth Amendment" are impermissible to the extent that they seek to circumvent the plain language of waiver provisions. See United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998). When confronted with a Sixth Amendment claim after a criminal defendant has pleaded guilty and waived his right to appeal orcollaterally attack his sentence, therefore, a court must not go merely by the invocation of the Sixth Amendment and must instead assess whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is being used to advance otherwise-barred challenges to the sentence at issue. See id. ().
The Court concludes that Cannonier waived the claims he advances in his § 2255 motion. See Plea Agmt. at 5. As an initial matter, the Petition raises a number...
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