Canter Sample Furniture House, Inc. v. Retail Furniture Employees Local No. 109

Citation122 N.J.Eq. 575,196 A. 210
PartiesCANTER SAMPLE FURNITURE HOUSE, Inc., v. RETAIL FURNITURE EMPLOYEES LOCAL NO. 109 et al.
Decision Date17 December 1937
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A strike which has for its primary object the enforcement of the closed shop upon an employer and the creation of a monopoly of the employment in a particular trade in a given locality is unlawful.

2. Each individual strike to enforce a closed shop must be considered with relation to general industrial and economic conditions, of which the court will take judicial notice, in order to determine whether it is an attempt to create a monopoly of labor in a particular industry.

3. A labor union will not be permitted by forcing a closed shop on an unwilling employer, to interfere with the right of non-members of the union to continue in their employment.

4. The right of men to refrain from being privately employed does not extend to preventing the employment of others who are willing to work.

Suit by the Canter Sample Furniture House, Incorporated, against the Retail Furniture Employees Local No. 109 and others, to enjoin them from unlawful interference with complainant's business and property rights, wherein an order to show cause with limited restraint was entered.

Restraint imposed broadened to enjoin all picketing until final hearing.

Samuel Roessler, of Newark, (Leonard J. Emmerglick, of Newark, of counsel), for complainant. Samuel Rothbard, of Newark, for defendants.

BERRY, Vice Chancellor.

By this bill the complainant seeks to enjoin several trade union organizations and certain individuals acting in concert with them from what is alleged to be an unlawful interference with complainant's business and property rights.

The complainant is engaged in the retail furniture business at 113 Springfield avenue, Newark, N.J., and has been so engaged for the past four years. It and its predecessors have been engaged in this business for approximately twenty-one years. The defendants are Retail Furniture Employees Local No. 109, United Retail Employees of America, the Committee for Industrial Organization, Edward Quinn, Morris Green, Jack Kaufman and Sam Rous. The defendant Quinn is president of the defendant local which is affiliated with the parent union and the C.I.O. The defendant Green is the secretary of the defendant local. The defendants Kaufman and Rous are members of the defendant local and former employees of the complainant. The defendant Rous is also a member of the bar of this state. Prior to the events which resulted in this controversy, the complainant had eight persons in its employ other than Mr. Canter, the president, and his son-in-law, Mr. Hollander. The bill alleges that immediately prior to August 26th, 1937, the defendants began a campaign to unionize complainant's business and succeed in inducing seven of complainant's employees to join the defendant local. On August 26th the defendant Quinn presented to the complainant a form of contract with the union and demanded its execution forthwith on pain of a strike of complainant's employees. Complainant was given thirty-six hours within which to sign the contract, and upon its refusal seven of complainant's employees went out on strike, and since that time the striking employees, together with other members of the defendant unions, sympathizers, and persons employed by the defendants for that particular purpose, have been engaged in the usual picketing and other activities attending controversies of this kind. Apparently, little actual violence in connection with this strike has occurred, although it is in evidence that a large rock or cobblestone was thrown through one of the show windows of complainant's store and there was a sidewalk brawl in front of it engaged in by the pickets and others, and resulting in injury to some of the pickets. The complainant charges the defendants with having staged this brawl and the defendants charge the complainant with having hired strike breakers to assault and beat the pickets. Which of these charges is true it is impossible to determine on the present proofs; nor is it necessary to do so at this time. The net result of the picketing, however, seems to have been interference with the free ingress and egress to complainant's store, the intimidation of customers and would-be customers, and the general disorder usually incident to the massing of excessive numbers of pickets in front of or near an employer's place of business.

Upon the filing of the bill of complaint an order to show cause with limited restraint was entered. No restraint against picketing was imposed by that order, nor was such restraint sought by the complainant. A copy of the proposed contract submitted to the complainant by the defendants and which complainant refused to sign is attached to the bill of complaint. It provides for the closed shop, recognition of the union as sole bargaining agency, increases in wages of all employees and decreases in working hours, together with stated vacations with pay. The increases in pay demanded were from 20 to 25 per cent. of the scale of wages then in force, and the reduction in hours demanded ranged from three to twenty hours a week. The first provision in the proposed contract reads as follows: "First, that the employers will employ solely and exclusively members of said union and no others, and that only members of said union in good standing will be recognized by the said employer as members of said union."

The contract and its schedules comprise seven pages of closely typewritten matter. There are twenty-three numbered paragraphs of the contract specifying what the employer shall do for or pay to the employee. I find not a single provision in the contract saying what the employee shall do for the employer. It provides for the complete and abject surrender of complainant's business to the control of the defendant union and upon its execution the complainant, whose capital is invested in the business, and whose capital and enterprise have made possible the striker's employment, would be reduced to a mere figurehead with practically no control of its own property and business. On behalf of the defendant it is claimed that this form of contract was submitted as a basis only for negotiation; but it is significant that the complainant was told to sign within thirty-six hours or a strike would be called; modification of the form of contract submitted was refused by the defendant union, and immediately upon the expiration of the time limited, and the complainant's refusal to sign, the strike activities were begun, and picketing commenced with signs and placards, prepared in advance and apparently waiting only the arrival of the zero hour to be put into use. These facts are admitted by the defendants. On the return of the order to show cause the defendants filed 215 pages of answering affidavits. These affidavits are fourteen in number, thirteen of the affiants being members of the defendant local and seven of them being former employees of the complainant. But they cannot be accepted at their face value because it is perfectly obvious that the affiants did not and could not have had personal knowledge of the alleged facts to which they make oath. Cf. Mullins v. Merchandise Drivers Local Union No. 641, 120 N.J.Eq. 376, 185 A. 485. Quinn's affidavit contains categorical denials of each charge of picketing of a threatening or intimidating character and of interference with complainant's business and free ingress and egress of customers. He denies that the strike is to enforce the closed shop (only), but charges that it is for better working conditions, shorter hours, and higher pay. It also appears from this affidavit that Quinn is employed as a salesman by the Christian Schmidt Furniture Company. If he has been in a position to obtain at first hand the information or the facts alleged in his affidavit, and it does not so appear, he has had little time within those three weeks to attend to his employment. The affidavits of Green, Oppenheim, Kaufman, Rous, Vogel, and Bagley are of no greater weight. It also appears from the defendant Quinn's affidavit that the same form of contract had been presented to the Retail Furniture Dealers Association prior to its submission to the complainant, and that that association had been requested to advise its members to adopt it. The Retail Furniture Dealers' Association, as its name implies, is an association of employers engaged in the retail furniture business in Newark and vicinity, and of this association the complainant is a member. It is also in evidence that two retail furniture houses in Newark or vicinity, one of which employs the defendant Quinn, and the other of which employs the defendants' affiant Oppenheim, who is treasurer of the defendant local, have already signed a similar contract with the defendant union. There are many other facts and circumstances connected with this controversy which indicate that this strike is but part and parcel of an attempt to unionize the entire retail furniture industry in Newark and vicinity and of the widespread campaign on behalf of "labor" to unionize all industry in this country. There is now pending in this court another bill of complaint filed by a retail furniture dealer in Newark against the defendant local, the defendant parent union and others, seeking restraint of picketing and other strike activities resulting from complainant's refusal to sign a similar contract. A. Finkenberg's Sons, Inc., v. Retail Furniture, etc., Union, Docket 120, page 165. In that case no strike exists, the sole purpose of defendants' activities being to compel unionization of the complainant's business, not only against its will, but also against the will of the employees. Cf. Feller v. Local 144, International Ladies Garment Workers, etc., 121 N.J.Eq. 452, 191 A. 111.

At the oral argument on the order to show cause the complainant...

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12 cases
  • Feldman v. Warshawsky
    • United States
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    ... ... 501, 116 A. 925; South Jersey Furniture Corp. v. Dorsey, 95 N.J.Eq. 530, 123 A. 543; ... ...
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