Feller v. Local 144
| Decision Date | 24 March 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 206.,206. |
| Citation | 191 A. 111 |
| Parties | FELLER et al. v. LOCAL 144, INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS UNION, et al. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
Suit by Joseph Feller and another, partners trading as S. Feller & Sons, and others against Local 144, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and others. From an order striking out the answer, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Isserman & Isserman, of Newark (Abraham J. Isserman, of Newark, and Carol King, of New York City, on the brief), for appellants. Edward A. Schilling, William A. Schilling, and Merritt Lane, all of Newark, for respondents.
The question involved in this case is the right of the defendant, a labor organization, to intervene between employer and employees by picketing and thereby inducing the employees of the complainants to leave their employment and join the union of the defendant, and this though no controversy or strike exists in the business places of the complainants.
It is unnecessary to go into the details of the pleadings whereby this issue of law is raised. It is sufficient to say that the complainants, manufacturers in the city of Newark, filed their bill to restrain such interference with their employees. An injunction was granted, and subsequently an answer filed declaring a right on the part of the defendant to picket the plants of the complainants and thereby effect the purposes above set forth was struck out.
At the common law, as will be shown by authorities hereafter cited, there is a property right in the services of the employee by the master and a property right by the employee in his employment which cannot be infringed by outside interference. It is an axiom in law that for every wrong there shall be a remedy. Conceding such right at common law, it would seem to be important only to consider whether the right has been in any wise modified by statute or decisions in our courts so as to enable the defendants to maintain the answer which was struck out in the court below.
Legislation upon the subject of labor as between employer and employee has enacted certain modifications of the common law, and appellants contend that by statute the door has been opened to permit the acts complained of and with the purposes claimed, as set forth in the answer, and cite to that end section 1 of chapter 28 of the Laws of 1883, p. 36 (3 Comp.St.1910, p. 3051, § 128) and chapter 207 of the Laws of 1926, p. 348 (Comp.St.Supp.1930, § 107—131a).
The first provides "that it shall not be unlawful for any two or more persons to unite, combine or bind themselves by oath, covenant, agreement, alliance or otherwise, to persuade, advise or encourage, by peaceable means, any person or persons to enter into any combination for or against leaving or entering into the employment of any person, persons or corporation."
The second provides that "no restraining order or writ of injunction shall be granted or issued out of any court of this State in any case involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, enjoining or restraining any person or persons, either singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from peaceably and without threats or intimidation recommending, advising or persuading others so to do; or from peaceably and without threats or intimidation being upon any public street or highway or thoroughfare for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information, or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation persuade any person or persons to work or abstain from working, or to employ or to cease to employ any party to a labor dispute, or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation recommend, advise or persuade others so to do, provided said persons remain separated one from the other at intervals of ten paces or more."
It will be observed that the act of 1883 (supra) goes no farther than to permit agreements to do the things therein specified. In other words, it relieves against the charge of conspiracy if such agreements are entered into. Whether the effort to carry such agreements into execution is valid must depend on the legality of the acts themselves. That this is the limit of its scope and purpose is evident from the language and is established by the decision of this court in Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 77 N.J.Eq. 219, 224, 79 A. 262, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 445.
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... 33 Pa. D. & C. 599 Lipoff v. United Food Workers Industrial Union, Local No. 107, et al No. 5632 Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania February 9, 1938 ... Greek Restaurant Workers' Club et ... al., 99 N.J.Eq. 770, 134 A. 309 (1926), Feller et ... al. v. Local 144, International Ladies Garment Workers ... Union et al., 121 N.J.Eq. 452, ... ...
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...complainant's business, not only against its will, but also against the will of the employees. Cf. Feller v. Local 144, International Ladies Garment Workers, etc., 121 N.J.Eq. 452, 191 A. 111. At the oral argument on the order to show cause the complainant expressed itself as willing to neg......
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