Cantey v. Clarendon County
| Citation | 85 S.E. 228,101 S.C. 141 |
| Decision Date | 06 May 1915 |
| Docket Number | 9098. |
| Parties | CANTEY v. CLARENDON COUNTY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Clarendon County; H F. Rice, Judge.
Action by Madison Cantey, administrator, against Clarendon County. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Purdy & O'Bryan, of Manning, for appellant.
Davis & Wideman, of Manning, for respondent.
The plaintiff recovered judgment against Clarendon county for $2,000 exemplary damages for the lynching of his intestate Marion Cantey, who was taken from the custody of two constables who were carrying him to jail on a warrant which charged him with assault and battery with intent to kill. One of the constables testified that there were eight or nine persons in the crowd which took Cantey from their custody and shot him to death.
By section 6 of article 6 of the Constitution and the statutes enacted thereunder, the lawmakers undertook to make a law which would at least aid in preventing the crime of lynching in this state. The Constitution provides that in case a prisoner lawfully in custody of an officer is taken from his custody, through his negligence, permission, or connivance "by a mob or other unlawful assemblage of persons," and, at their hands, suffers bodily violence or death, the officer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and provides for his prosecution, and suitable penalties on conviction. The same section provides that in all cases of lynching, when death ensues, the county where such lynching takes place shall be liable to the legal representative of the person lynched in exemplary damages of not less than $2,000.
Appellant's sole contention is that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury what constitutes "a mob or other unlawful assemblage of persons," and in not leaving it to them to find, without such instruction, whether the persons who lynched Cantey constituted "a mob or other unlawful assemblage of persons," within the meaning of the Constitution and statutes.
It was clearly the duty of the court to instruct the jury and explain to them the meaning of the words used in the Constitution and statutes. It is a well-settled rule of construction that technical words or phrases used in a statute, especially one dealing with legal proceedings, shall have their technical meaning, unless a contrary intention appears. The phrase "unlawful assemblage" has a...
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