Canton Highlands, Inc. v. Searle

Decision Date14 January 1980
Citation9 Mass.App.Ct. 48,398 N.E.2d 759
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts
PartiesCANTON HIGHLANDS, INC. et al. 1 v. Francis A. SEARLE, Jr. et al. 2

Walter C. Spiegel, Boston, for petitioners.

Alan R. Hoffman, Boston, for respondents.

Before BROWN, GREANEY and PERRETTA, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

By their action the petitioners, Canton Highlands, Inc. (Canton), and Helen A. Cohen, the owners of lot 140 and 143 respectively, in a subdivision of land located in Canton shown on Land Court plan 12219K (the K plan) sought to eliminate rights in a way (called by the parties "way X") which is shown on that plan and which traverses both lots. The various respondents, the owners of lots 36 (Searle), 37 (the Connollys), and 3 and 11 (the Mahoneys), respectively, in the subdivision, filed answers objecting to the petition and claiming rights in the way. The petitioners appeal from a decision by a Land Court judge who found that the various respondents had rights in way X by express grant, by estoppel, or by implication through reference in a deed to a plan, and who ordered the petition dismissed. We affirm the decision.

The case was tried on a statement of agreed facts and exhibits and on the testimony of seven witnesses. From these sources and the judge's memorandum of decision we draw these facts. The original tract was registered in 1929. Subdivision of a portion of the tract into house lots occurred in 1938, and way X was created on that subdivision plan. In 1973, John W. Keith Builders, Inc. (Keith), purchased the remaining unsold lots in the subdivision, together with a substantial portion of adjoining land. Keith realigned the lots into the configuration shown on the K plan. That plan shows way X running in an east-west direction and meeting two other paper ways at its terminal points. These paper ways have access to High Street, a public way. In 1973, Keith also acquired two lots from the petitioner Cohen and her husband in exchange for lots 142 and 143. The Cohens built their home on lot 142. Their title certificate for lot 143 made the parcel expressly subject to way X as shown on the K plan. In January, 1976, Keith conveyed its remaining unsold lots to Canton. Canton's title certificate was also expressly made subject to the right to use the streets and ways shown on the K plan. In September 1976, Canton sold lots 36 and 37 to one Carey. This conveyance was subject to the right to use the streets and ways shown on the K plan in common with others. In May, 1977, Carey sold lot 37 to the respondents, the Connollys. This conveyance granted appurtenant rights to use the streets and ways shown on the K plan. In September, 1977, Carey sold lot 36 to the respondent Searle subject to easements of record in force and applicable. The Mahoneys purchased adjoining lots 3 and 11 as one parcel in 1970. Their title certificate describes the parcel as bounded easterly by one of the paper ways and southerly by way X, grants lot 11 appurtenant rights in a paper way running in a southwesterly direction from High Street (accessible only by use of way X) but makes no reference to the use of any other way. There was evidence that Carey had informed the Connollys and Searle that lots 140 and 143 were subject to an easement which would make it difficult to build on either lot and that in all likelihood those lots would not be developed. There was also evidence that the respondents were accustomed to use way X to traverse lot 143 and for leisure walks, and that on several occasions during the winter months the Connollys and Searle had utilized the way as a necessary means of ingress and egress from their properties. It was stipulated that way X and the two other paper streets have not been constructed on the ground, that four ways named and shown on the K plan had been so constructed, that presently there is material growth, including trees and bushes, over lot 143 and in the area of way X, and that the Canton planning board has never required bonds or covenants under the Subdivision Control Law for the completion of way X or any of the other paper ways.

1. Rights of the Connollys. The rights of these respondents in way X (and the petitioners' correlative burdens) are governed by the language in the Connollys' title certificate, which indicates that the conveyance of lot 37 granted them appurtenant rights in the streets and ways shown on the K plan. The language granting the appurtenant rights carried forward language from previous instruments in the chain of title, which had granted rights in way X first to Canton and then to Carey. Thus, the Connollys possess rights in the way by reason of an express grant referenced to a plan which clearly delineates the length and breadth of the easement. In view of this, the judge properly rejected the petitioners' arguments that the Connollys' grantor did not intend to convey appurtenant rights in way X, and that the conveyance to the Connollys was ambiguous as to its application to way X so as to necessitate the admission of extrinsic evidence to identify the scope of the easement. 3 The judge correctly ruled that the grant was unambiguous in its terms and that the easement granted was precisely formulated on the K plan.

The petitioner's reliance on the decision in Walter Kassuba Realty Corp. v. Akeson, 359 Mass. 725, 271 N.E.2d 660 (1971), to support its argument that the grant is ambiguous is misplaced. In that case the respondents, the owners of registered land abutting the petitioner's land to the north, claimed rights over paper extensions of ways into the land sought to be registered. The ways in question were partially constructed, and the plans showed basically the registered parcels and the abutting ways without any indication of the extent of the ways. None of the deeds contained an express grant of easement. The court in Kassuba Realty was concerned only with an asserted easement by implication, a type of easement which by definition necessitates the use of extrinsic evidence to evaluate the circumstances surrounding its creation and existence. See Wellwood v. Havrah Mishna Anshi Sphard Cemetery Corp., 254 Mass. 350, 354-355, 150 N.E. 203 (1926); Dale v. Bedal, 305 Mass. 102, 103, 25 N.E.2d 175 (1940). The court concluded that because the paper extensions had never been laid out or used and because the respondents had adequate and convenient access apart from the paper ways, the respondents had not established a grant by implication over the extensions.

By contrast, the Connollys' certificate and prior instruments in this case contain clear and specific express grants of easement over way X by reference to a plan which shows the way in its entirety. In these circumstances the ambiguity present in the Kassuba Realty case does not exist. The result here is governed in principle by the case of Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 53, 158 N.E. 321 (1927), which held that a certificate of title stating that its lot was subject to a right of way referred to and appearing on a specific plan had the effect of creating easements by express grant over the way.

Other arguments by the petitioners designed to postulate an ambiguity as to the easement are equally without merit. The facts that way X has never been constructed on the ground and that the respondents have other means of access along constructed ways to public streets do not create a latent ambiguity in the grant or require its elimination. An unrestricted easement or way by express grant is not limited in duration to the necessities of the estate's owner, and the fact that the owner of the lot has acquired another way out does not permit the inference that the granted easement has been extinguished. Atlanta Mills v. Mason, 120 Mass. 244, 251 (1876). See Park, Conveyancing § 242 at 275 (1968). Similarly, lack of constant use or obsolescence will not destroy the easement (Emery v. Crowley, 371 Mass. 489, 495, 359 N.E.2d 1256 (1976)) because an express easement can be extinguished only by grant, release, abandonment, estoppel or prescription. Ibid., and cases cited. Moreover, in this case the way was and is used by certain respondents for emergency access and egress to and from their lots as well as for periodic pleasure walks. Lastly, the fact that way X is drawn on the plan with dotted lines is of little significance in overcoming the effect of the express grants. For all that appears in the record, the use of dotted and solid lines on the plan serves only to distinguish between property lines and other markings and has no bearing upon the definition or scope of the rights of way contained on the K plan.

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8 cases
  • Melrose Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • June 20, 2016
    ...intended to create an easement by implication. Id. at 728, 271 N.E.2d 660. This case is closer to Canton Highlands, Inc. v. Searle, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 48, 53–56, 398 N.E.2d 759 (1980), which distinguished Akeson, than to Akeson itself. As here, the court in Searle was required “to determine the......
  • Patel v. Planning Bd. of North Andover, 88-P-586
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • April 11, 1989
    ...North Landers Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Falmouth, 382 Mass. 432, 436-437, 416 N.E.2d 934 (1981). See also Canton Highlands, Inc. v. Searle, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 48, 53, 398 N.E.2d 759 (1980). Nevertheless, we conclude that neither the steps taken nor the attendant circumstances in this case result......
  • Harrington v. Lamarque
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • March 27, 1997
    ...Refinery, 109 Mass. 292, 297-298 (1872); Hill v. Taylor, 296 Mass. 107, 116, 4 N.E.2d 1008 (1936); Canton Highlands, Inc. v. Searle, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 48, 54-55, 398 N.E.2d 759 (1980). Further, because the plaintiffs possess deeded rights to access and use the pedestrian pathway and the beach,......
  • Perry v. Another
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • January 30, 2017
    ...house lots shows the clear intention of the parties that the strip be used for that purpose"). See Canton Highlands, Inc. v. Searle, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 48, 53–56, 398 N.E.2d 759 (1980) ; Estes v. DeMello, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 638, 645, 814 N.E.2d 1 (2004). See also Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 55......
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