Capasso v. Christmann

• Decision Date: 23 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 37211.,37211.
• Citation: 163 Conn.App. 248,135 A.3d 733
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Giuseppe CAPASSO et al. v. Ian CHRISTMANN et al.

163 Conn.App. 248

135 A.3d 733

Giuseppe CAPASSO et al.

v.Ian CHRISTMANN et al.

No. 37211.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 20, 2015.

Decided Feb. 23, 2016.

Laurence V. Parnoff, Stratford, with whom, on the brief, was Laurence V. Parnoff, Jr., for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Eric P. Smith, New Haven, for the appellees (defendants).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and SHELDON and SCHUMAN, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The plaintiffs, Giuseppe Capasso and G.L. Capasso, Inc.,¹ appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, Ian Christmann and Carolyn Christmann. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' counsel failed to file an adequate opposition to the defendants' motion. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the court's clear and explicit directions, we conclude that the court failed to address the merits of the defendants' motion, and therefore improperly rendered summary judgment in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiffs commenced this action on August 7, 2009. On March 5, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second revised complaint, the operative pleading in this case, setting forth six causes of action. In count one, the plaintiffs claimed that G.L. Capasso, Inc., is the tenant at 15 Oxford Street in New Haven and, since 1984, has used that property as a legal nonconforming use for its construction business, including overnight vehicle parking. The defendants reside at 475 Quinnipiac Avenue, which abuts one side of 15 Oxford Street. The defendants are associated with the Quinnipiac River Community Group that “purports to be a ‘grass-roots neighborhood action group that has been working to improve the quality of [life] for residents on both sides of the Quinnipiac River....’ ”

The plaintiffs alleged that in January, 2009, the defendants disapproved of a fence constructed on 15 Oxford Street and began a series of steps to have it removed, including requests to have the city of New Haven intervene. After this effort proved unsuccessful, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants “continued to attempt to force the removal of the fence ... by initiating a public campaign of complaints against the [p]laintiffs regarding their use of the [15 Oxford Street].” This included claims and statements that the plaintiffs “were not good members of the community ... violated the law ... showed their disregard of the damage to the neighborhood by ... installation of a fence ... allowed and caused a deterioration of the environment ... violated ordinances and permits ... and ... owned property potentially contaminated by petroleum products.”

The plaintiffs further maintained that the defendants sought to have a special exception for the 15 Oxford Street property misinterpreted so as to prevent the plaintiffs from accessing it before 7 a.m. from Monday through Saturday and for 24 hours on Sunday.² They also alleged that the defendants conducted “a libelous public campaign against the [p]laintiffs in [e]-mails and in the newspaper” by, inter alia, referring to the plaintiff's fence as a “spite fence” and accusing the plaintiffs of wrongful acts, such as violating zoning laws and the illegal storage and disposal of chemicals on the property. As a result of these actions, which were allegedly motivated by the defendants' desire to gain public attention, greed and “to extort the removal of the fence,” the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages for loss of business, damage to business reputation, and punitive damages.

The remaining counts alleged tortious interference with prospective business relations, extortion,³ intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and a violation of General Statutes § 42–110a et seq., the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The defendants filed an answer to the plaintiffs' complaint on January 22, 2013, but did not raise any special defenses.⁴

After the case was assigned for trial, with jury selection scheduled to begin on June 27, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for permission to move for summary judgment. See Practice Book § 17–44.⁵ The court granted the motion on April 28, 2014, over the plaintiffs' objection.

The defendants filed their motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law on May 23, 2014. They argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because “(1) none of the statements attributed to the defendants is defamatory as a matter of law; (2) in the absence of admissible evidence of pecuniary loss that was proximately caused by the defendants' statements, there can be no genuine issue of material fact and the plaintiffs' defamation claims fail as a matter of law; (3) in the absence of evidence of harm to the plaintiffs' respective reputations that was proximately caused by the defendants' statements, there can be no genuine issues of material fact and the plaintiffs' defamation claims fail as a matter of law; (4) given the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiffs' ‘tortious interference’ claims fail as a matter of law; (5) given the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, plaintiff Giuseppe Capasso's ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress' claim fails as a matter of law; (6) given the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, plaintiff Giuseppe Capasso's ‘negligent infliction of emotional distress' claim fails as a matter of law; and (7) given the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiffs' claim for alleged violations of CUTPA fails as a matter of law.”

Attached to the defendants' memorandum of law were, inter alia: an affidavit from Ian Christmann; a copy of the March 12, 2009 article on the New Haven Independent website about the parties' dispute regarding the fence; a copy of the December, 1984 special exception granted to Giuseppe Capasso for 15 Oxford Street; an excerpt from the deposition of Giuseppe Capasso; and copies of e-mail correspondence between the defendants and local officials concerning the plaintiffs' activities on the property.

The plaintiffs filed their opposition on June 13, 2014. Although they argued that genuine issues of material fact existed as to all of the plaintiffs' claims, and thus that summary judgment was not warranted as to any such count, the plaintiffs made no specific references to evidence in their objection. The plaintiffs attached, inter alia, e-mails from the Quinnipiac River Community Group and the article published on the New Haven Independent website.

At a hearing on July 7, 2014, the court noted that it had conducted a trial management conference in chambers. On the record after that conference, the court had requested that the plaintiffs submit a more detailed response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court stated that the plaintiffs' counsel had “graciously agreed to provide a more detailed response, primarily to help the court, because I need, among other things, citations—two things I'll put on the record. [First] I need specific citation to record evidence on this motion for summary judgment; otherwise, I'll be floundering. Second, I think that your response needs to state with precision what the cause of action in the first count of your second revised complaint is. Obviously, you retain the ability to submit any affidavits or documents or other materials with your—objection.” (Emphasis added.)

On August 18, 2014, the plaintiffs filed affidavits from Carmine Capasso,⁶ Edward Ciarleglio,⁷ and Matthew Martino⁸ in support of their opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On August 18, 2014, the plaintiffs also filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion. Although the supplemental memorandum contained general references to the affidavits that previously had been filed by the plaintiffs, it did not contain specific citations to the evidence of record, as the court had instructed.

The court conducted a hearing on September 15, 2014. At the outset, it recounted its prior instructions to the plaintiffs' counsel to provide specific citations to evidence in the record and to identify specifically the cause of action set forth in count one of their complaint. The plaintiffs' counsel indicated that he had complied with all of these directives. After further inquiry, the court determined that the plaintiffs' counsel had not identified the cause of action in count one.⁹ Turning to the matter of specific citations, the plaintiffs' counsel stated that there were affidavits and exhibits attached to his supplemental memorandum. The court rejected counsel's explanation as follows: “I ordered you to have specific citations to record evidence so that I could—and not just a generalized reference to some pile of materials that you have submitted. The purpose of a brief particularly—in response to a motion for summary judgment that is fact-centered, particularly in a defamation case where the exact words are important, not just the implied words but the exact words, is to provide the court with specific citations to the record. I ordered you to do this. I did not want to embarrass you, I brought you in chambers, but I did order you to do this on the record. You have failed to do this, so I—you have failed to do the two things the court specifically required you to do, and I need to know why I should even consider your objection to this motion for summary judgment under these circumstances. Your philosophy seems to be judge, you do the work.”

After further discussion, the court informed the plaintiffs' counsel that his supplemental memorandum of law opposing the motion for summary judgment was “completely inadequate....”¹⁰ The plaintiffs' counsel, however, maintained that he had complied with...