Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 37628.,37628.
• Citation: 166 Conn.App. 510,142 A.3d 363
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Annemarie MORRISSEY–MANTER v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER et al.

166 Conn.App. 510

142 A.3d 363

Annemarie MORRISSEY–MANTER

v.SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER et al.

No. 37628.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 1, 2016.

Decided June 28, 2016.

Henry E. Jacobs, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Christopher A. Klepps, Hartford, with whom was Christopher L. Brigham, New Haven, for the appellees (defendants).

ALVORD, PRESCOTT and WEST, Js.

PRESCOTT

, J.

In this wrongful termination of employment action, the plaintiff, Annemarie Morrissey–Manter, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, and Saint Francis Care, Inc.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to four counts of her amended complaint² because one or more genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to her claims that (1) an implied contractual agreement between the parties prohibited her discharge without cause, (2) the defendants terminated her employment in violation of an important public policy, (3) the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating her employment in “bad faith,” and (4) the defendants withheld certain medical records and destroyed evidence that would have supported her cause of action.³ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff was employed as a registered nurse at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center for thirty-two years. On June 4, 2012, at Manchester Memorial Hospital, a patient was seen for cardiac distress. A temporary cardiac pacemaker

(pacer) was inserted into the patient. The patient was then transferred to the emergency department at the defendants' facility, and, from there, into the defendants' cardiac intensive care unit. During the transfer of the patient, an admitting nurse unhooked the patient's temporary pacer from the external pacer

box, and the pacer box was returned to the ambulance crew that had transferred the patient. Subsequently, members of the nursing staff at the defendants' facility were unable to connect the patient's transvenous pacer wire to an external temporary pacer box because the defendants lacked a proper adapter.

During this event, the plaintiff came into the room to offer support to the patient's team and to help stabilize the patient. In violation of hospital policy, but in order to assist the medical team, she took a blade and cut a small portion of the plastic covering the end of the pacer wire in an attempt to make the pacer wire fit into the defendants' temporary pacer box. The plaintiff successfully connected the pacer wire to the temporary pacer box, and, at that point, the patient's blood pressure improved and he stabilized.

On June 7, 2012, Gilda Cabral, a nurse manager, met with the plaintiff and discussed a disciplinary action form that had been prepared against her on June 6, 2012. The form, after describing the event as previously discussed, stated that the patient's condition began to deteriorate the morning following his admission to Saint Francis Hospital, and that Dr. Aneesh Tolat, an electro-physiologist, was asked to assess the patient. After assessing the patient, Dr. Tolat determined that the patient was receiving inadequate pacing because the pacer wire may have been compromised and was not stable. Because of this instability, a new pacer wire had to be inserted into the patient through catheterization

. According to the form, Dr. Tolat emphasized that “a catheter can never be tampered with. Once it is, even if it seems that the wire is functioning correctly, there is always a question as to the stability of the wire.” (Emphasis omitted.) Furthermore, Dr. Tolat was “very disturbed” by the plaintiff's action, which he characterized as “inappropriate and unacceptable.” On the form, the box labeled “termination” was marked as the appropriate disciplinary step to be taken, and the form concluded: “This action posed a significant patient safety concern, as this action could have had potentially lethal consequences to the patient; since this wire was in place to ensure that the patient's heartbeat was paced correctly. By compromising the wire, this resulted in the patient having to undergo a procedure to have a new catheter inserted. In addition, this action posed a significant risk to the [h]ospital because this action is not within the scope of practice for a [s]taff [registered nurse].” (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff resigned her position in lieu of termination.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants on August 27, 2012. In her initial five count complaint, the plaintiff alleged breach of an implied contract of employment, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. On February 14, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff could not establish the prima facie elements for any of the claims alleged in her complaint. In support of their motion, the defendants filed a memorandum of law, an affidavit by an employee in the defendants' human resources department, copies of two disciplinary action forms against the plaintiff, copies of the defendants' disciplinary action policy and pension plan policy, the plaintiff's responses to the defendants' first set of interrogatories, and an excerpt from the defendants' employee handbook.

On April 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In support of her objection, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law, the plaintiff's affidavit, and a copy of the plaintiff's letter of resignation. The court held a hearing on the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's objection on May 5, 2014. At that time, the plaintiff stated that she wanted to amend her complaint to include a claim for spoliation of evidence. The court instructed the plaintiff to file such a request as soon as possible.

On May 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a request for permission to amend her complaint to add a count for spoliation of evidence, alleging that the defendants had destroyed and altered the patient's medical records, and had disposed of the pacer wire in bad faith. On July 28, 2014, which was the second day of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court granted the plaintiff's request. With the court's permission, the parties filed supplemental briefs and exhibits that addressed the claim of spoliation. The court issued its memorandum of decision on January 5, 2015. The court concluded that the evidence submitted did not support the existence of an implied contract of employment, and, thus, the plaintiff's status was as an at-will employee. The court also concluded that the plaintiff had not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the prima facie elements for a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that she failed to cite a relevant public policy that was violated by her termination of employment, and that she failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements of a claim for spoliation because there was no evidence that any medical records had been destroyed or that the pacer wire had been destroyed by the hospital in bad faith. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all six counts of the plaintiff's complaint. This appeal followed.

Before reaching the plaintiff's individual claims, we set forth this court's standard of review in a summary judgment case. “The law governing summary judgment and the accompanying standard of review are well settled. Practice Book § [17–49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.... The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings....

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent....

“The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.... The movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such issues but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist.... To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts ... which contradict those stated in the movant's affidavits and documents.... The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.... The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)...