Capehart v. Board of Education of Graham Dist.
| Decision Date | 16 April 1918 |
| Docket Number | 3502. |
| Citation | 95 S.E. 838,82 W.Va. 217 |
| Parties | CAPEHART v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GRAHAM DIST. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted April 9, 1918.
Syllabus by the Court.
One proposing to teach school who is, under the provisions of section 106 of chapter 45 of the Code of 1913 (sec. 2161) excused from institute attendance by the county superintendent of the county in which he proposes to teach for some reason deemed sufficient by such county superintendent, need not have a certificate of such fact in writing, in order to have the benefit thereof.
The appointment of a teacher by trustees of a subdistrict under the provisions of section 56 of chapter 45 of the Code of 1913 (sec. 2097), to be binding upon the board of education must be in writing.
It is immaterial whether all of the members of the board of education have notice of a special meeting, in accordance with the provisions of section 32 of chapter 45 of the Code of 1913 (sec. 2071), or not, where it appears from the minutes of said meeting that all of the members of said board were present thereat and participated therein.
Where, in a district, the conditions exist which are required for the establishment of a graded school, in accordance with the provisions of section 28 of chapter 45 of the Code of 1913 (sec. 2066), and the board of education and other school officers of said district treat such school as a graded school, and it is in fact conducted as such graded school, it will be considered and held to be such notwithstanding no formal order may have been entered by the board of education so designating it.
One dealing with a public officer must inform himself as to the authority possessed by such officer. The public will be bound by the acts of a public officer only so far as he possesses authority to act.
Where a board of education takes charge of a graded school and relieves the trustees of the subdistrict from their duties in regard thereto, such trustees have no authority to employ a teacher, or teachers, for such school, or for any grade therein.
Error to Circuit Court, Mason County.
Action by Mary Capehart against the Board of Education of Graham District. From a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the circuit court on appeal from justice of the peace, defendant brings error. Reversed, verdict set aside, and cause remanded for new trial.
Musgrave & Blessing and John E. Beller, all of Point Pleasant, for plaintiff in error.
B. H. Blagg, Rankin Wiley, and Somerville & Somerville, all of Point Pleasant, for defendant in error.
To recover salary claimed to be due her by the board of education of Graham district, in Mason county, the plaintiff instituted this suit before a justice of the peace, where she had judgment for the amount claimed, to wit, $210, being six months' salary, at the rate of $35 per month. Upon an appeal from this judgment to the circuit court of Mason county, a like judgment was rendered against the defendant, and this writ of error is prosecuted thereto.
On the 23d day of July, 1914, the trustees of the subdistrict known as New Haven met at the schoolhouse in said district, and selected the plaintiff to teach the primary grade in the New Haven school for the next school year. At that time the plaintiff had no certificate authorizing her to teach school, but she claimed that she had taken examinations, as a result of which she subsequently procured a certificate. The trustees, however, entered into no contract in writing at that time with the plaintiff. Thereafter, on the 1st day of August, the board of education of the district held a meeting and passed a resolution taking over the management of the New Haven school, and relieving the trustees of any duties in regard thereto, including the duty of employing teachers. The trustees claim not to have been advised of this fact, and on the 22d day of August entered into a contract in writing with the plaintiff employing her as teacher for the primary grade in said New Haven school. Prior to this date, however, to wit, on the 10th day of August, the board of education selected teachers for all of the grades in said school. It appears that at the time the board was in session for this purpose two of its members inquired of the plaintiff if she had a certificate authorizing her to teach school, and she advised that she had not. These two members state that she told them in addition that she did not know whether she would secure a certificate. She states that she told them that she did not have a certificate, but she had grades entitling her to a certificate. This information was desired by the board of education with a view of determining whether they would employ her. Upon ascertaining that she did not have a certificate, they employed a full quota of teachers aside from the plaintiff. When the plaintiff presented herself to teach school at the opening of the school term she was denied the opportunity to enter upon the work under the contract made by her with the trustees on the 22d day of August, and she states that, on account of its being so late in the season, she was unable to get another school, and consequently lost the salary she would have received as teacher for the six months for which she had contracted to teach the New Haven school, to wit, the sum of $210. A great many questions are presented by counsel on either side of this case, but, stripped of all unnecessary verbiage, the controversy resolves itself into a solution of the question of whether or not the plaintiff had a valid contract with the trustees to teach the primary grade in the New Haven school.
The first ground relied upon by the defendant to defeat the recovery here is that the plaintiff did not have a certificate showing her attendance at the institute during the year 1914, nor did she have a certificate excusing her from such attendance. It is conceded that the plaintiff did not attend the institute for five days during that year, as is contemplated by the law, but that she attended only one day. She says, however, that she was excused from attendance by the county superintendent on account of her illness and the illness of her mother. Under the law the county superintendent had the authority to excuse her. He does not deny that he did so excuse her, although he was a witness for the defendant in this case. The insistence of the defendant is that, in order for such an excuse to be valid, it must be in writing. The statute does not say so, and we see no reason for placing such a strict construction upon the language used. The statute makes it the duty of the county superintendent to see that no one teaches in the schools of his county unless he has attended the institute for five days, or been excused from such attendance for a good and sufficient reason. The county superintendent who is authorized to excuse the teacher from institute attendance is the county superintendent of the county in which such teacher proposes to teach, and we can see no reason why he should be required to give a certificate...
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