Capital National Bank v. Coldwater National Bank
| Decision Date | 02 December 1896 |
| Docket Number | 7346 |
| Citation | 69 N.W. 115,49 Neb. 786 |
| Parties | CAPITAL NATIONAL BANK AND KENT K. HAYDEN, RECEIVER, v. COLDWATER NATIONAL BANK ET AL |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR from the district court of Lancaster county. Tried below before STRODE, J.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb & Harvey and G. M. Lambertson, for plaintiff in error.
Pound & Burr, Darnall & Kirkpatrick, and Charles O. Whedon, contra.
See opinion for cases referred to by counsel.
There were submitted with this case on the oral argument four others which involved the same question. These were the Coldwater National Bank v. Charles E. Magoon et al. Capital National Bank v. First National Bank of Cadiz, Hayden receiver of the Capital National Bank, v. Genesee Fruit Co. and Hayden, Receiver, v. Samuel Cupples Woodenware Co. All five of the cases had been determined adversely to the receiver of the Capital National Bank, in the district court of Lancaster county, and were in this court presented upon as many records. It is not necessary to state the facts involved in each, for the sole question presented is fully illustrated by the facts of this particular case.
The Coldwater National Bank, in October, 1892, was doing a banking business at Coldwater, Michigan. At that time the Capital National Bank was engaged in a like business in Lincoln, Nebraska. On the 22d of said month the Hemingford Bank and Job Hathaway executed their promissory note to the Capital National Bank for the sum of $ 4,000, due in ninety days from its date. On the same day this note was indorsed, without recourse, by the payee, Charles W. Mosher, its president, and R. C. Outcalt, its cashier, and sold to the Coldwater National Bank. The Hemingford Bank had with the Capital National Bank a sufficient current account to cover all the payments which it attempted to make as hereinafter described, and was not aware that the aforesaid note had been sold. On December 7, 1892, the cashier of the Hemingford Bank sent his check on the Hemingford Bank to the Capital National Bank with instructions that the same should be indorsed on the said note. This note was received by the Capital National Bank from the Coldwater National Bank for collection on January 10, 1893, and on the 20th of said month, having received $ 2,500, the balance due thereon, the Capital National Bank returned said note, duly canceled, to the Hemingford Bank. The Capital National Bank ceased to do business on January 21, 1893, and on the next day was taken possession of by a national bank examiner, by whom its assets were soon afterwards turned over to a receiver of said bank duly appointed by federal authority. It was insolvent when the examiner went into possession, and had never remitted the above $ 4,000, or any part of it, to the Coldwater National Bank. This action was brought in equity for a judgment requiring full payment of the above $ 4,000, with interest, out of the funds of the Capital National Bank in the hands of the receiver. On the trial it was shown that when the Capital National Bank was taken possession of by the receiver it had on hand $ 11,000 in cash. The district court, by its judgment, required the receiver to pay in full the said sum of $ 4,000, with interest as prayed, on the theory that this amount was a trust fund which, as such, had come into the hands of the receiver.
It is conceded by the plaintiff in error that the relief granted by the district court was in conformity with the views expressed more or less directly by this court in Wilson v. Coburn, 35 Neb. 530, 53 N.W. 466, Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. Morris, 36 Neb. 31, 53 N.W. 1037, Griffin v. Chase, 36 Neb. 328, 54 N.W. 572, and State v. State Bank of Wahoo, 42 Neb. 896, 61 N.W. 252, but it is urged that a re-examination of the principles involved should satisfy us that these cases proceeded upon an erroneous view of the law as now settled. A very careful examination has been made of all cases cited in respect to the pivotal question which has already been sufficiently indicated as having been acted upon by the district court. Of those cited by the defendant in error the following are more or less directly in point, to-wit: Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156, 1 P. 499; Myers v. Board of Education, 51 Kan. 87, 32 P. 658; Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank, 52 N.Y. 1; People v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N.Y. 32; Baker v. New York Exchange Bank, 100 N.Y. 31, 2 N.E. 452; Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N.Y. 131, 1 N.E. 537; Importers & Traders' Nat. Bank of New York v. Peters, 123 N.Y. 272, 25 N.E. 319; Elmira Savings Bank v. Davis, 142 N.Y. 590, 37 N.E. 646; Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. King, 57 Pa. 202; Harrison v. Smith, 83 Mo. 210; Stoller v. Coates, 88 Mo. 514; Third Nat. Bank of St. Paul v. Stillwater Gas Co. 36 Minn. 75, 30 N.W. 440; Davenport Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa 722, 45 N.W. 1049; Independent District of Boyer v. King, 80 Iowa 497, 45 N.W. 908; Nurse v. Satterlee, 81 Iowa 491, 46 N.W. 1102; Continental Nat. Bank v. Weems, 69 Tex. 489, 6 S.W. 802; Smith v. Combs, 49 N.J.Eq. 420, 24 A. 9; Jones v. Kilbreth, 49 Ohio St. 401, 31 N.E. 346; First Nat. Bank of Central City v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 259, 23 P. 986; In re Johnson, 103 Mich. 109, 61 N.W. 352; Howard v. Walker, 92 Tenn. 452, 21 S.W. 897; San Diego County v. California Nat. Bank, 52 F. 59; Massey v. Fisher, 62 F. 958; First Nat. Bank of Montgomery v. Armstrong, 36 F. 59; Foster v. Rincker, 4 Wyo. 484, 35 P. 470; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. 104 U.S. 54, 26 L.Ed. 693; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U.S. 566, 33 L.Ed. 683, 10 S.Ct. 390; Peters v. Bain, 133 U.S. 670, 33 L.Ed. 696, 10 S.Ct. 354; Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. [Eng.] 696.
In the cases cited in this controversy there are two classes, one of which proceeds upon the theory that a lien may be enforced against the specific deposit so long as it can be actually identified, or should be held segregated by implication of law on account of a fraudulent concealment by the officers of the bank of its insolvent condition when receiving a very recent deposit, whereby the depositor was induced to make such deposit. The other treats the deposit as in its essence a trust fund, incapable in its very nature of being commingled with other funds. In argument it was insisted, on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that in any event there must be an identification of the fund proposed to be charged as being composed, in part at least, of the very money which had come into the hands of the receiver. In support of this contention there were cited Wasson v Hawkins, 59 F. 233, Boone County Nat. Bank v. Latimer, 67 F. 27, Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank, 65 F. 690, Northern Dakota Elevator Co. v. Clark, 3 N.D. 26, 53 N.W. 175, Standard Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 74 F. 395, and Spokane County v. Clark, 61 F. 538. These adjudications insisted upon a specific identification to entitle to equitable relief, but they are of little value in this case, because they belong in the first of the two classes above indicated. They furnish no light as to the principle applicable to the second class, and it is with that class that we are at present concerned. As illustrative of the confusion into which it is easy to fall in this matter, we refer to Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dowd, 38 F. 172, cited by the plaintiff in error. In this case it was sought to impress upon a fund in the receiver's hands a trust, because as such it had been deposited in the bank, the relation of debtor and creditor being expressly disclaimed. The judge of the federal court who heard and determined this case ignored the distinction, which should have been recognized, and enforced the rule applicable where it is sought to reclaim the money actually deposited, and, a specific deposit not having been traced into the hands of the receiver, there was a denial of equitable relief. For this reason we cannot see that the Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dowd, supra, should have any special weight in the determination of the question with which we are now concerned, and in this view we are in accord with the conclusions...
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