Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner

Decision Date06 June 1989
Docket NumberNo. A89A0509,A89A0509
Citation384 S.E.2d 394,192 Ga.App. 251
PartiesCAPITOL FISH COMPANY v. TANNER.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James B. Hiers, Jr., Donald F. Daugherty, Atlanta, for appellant.

Glenville Haldi, Atlanta, for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Judge.

This discretionary appeal was granted to determine whether the employer, Capitol Fish Company d/b/a Capitol Foods of Augusta, Inc. (Capitol), is immune to tort liability, by being in the status of an "employer" bound to provide workers' compensation benefits for the deceased helper for one of Capitol's drivers.

Taken in the light most favorable to the appellee plaintiff, who filed this wrongful death suit and is respondent in Capitol's motion for summary judgment, the material facts are these: the deceased was hired and employed as helper by Capitol's employee truck driver. The truck driver paid the deceased with funds provided by the appellant. (It is conceded that Capitol gave the driver an amount of money each day. Capitol says this was to reimburse the driver for hiring a helper. But we are construing the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff takes the position that since the driver was not required to hire a helper and could pocket the money if he wished, this money was not a reimbursement for or intended for the hiring of a helper.) The deceased received no employee benefits from Capitol, and no income tax or FICA or other tax was withheld. In short, to paraphrase the plaintiff's words, Capitol "did not know the deceased was alive" until after he had been killed.

Now, says the plaintiff, the employer Capitol should be estopped from claiming tort immunity in such a case as this, for the employer has had all the advantages of ignoring the employee while he (theoretically) was employed by it. Thus persuaded, the trial court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment denying tort immunity. Held:

1. The appellee plaintiff suggests this case, as equity, lies in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. However, the posing of an equitable defense in response to a motion for summary judgment in a case in this court's jurisdiction, clearly does not make this a case in equity. See Georgia Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III; Rogers v. Miller Peanut Co., 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 469; Equitable etc., Society v. Bischoff, 179 Ga. 255, 175 S.E. 560.

2. The trial court erred in denying Capitol's motion for summary judgment seeking immunity from liability in tort. This case is controlled by American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Harris, 61 Ga.App. 319, 6 S.E.2d 168, where the material facts are very similar. The matter is also conclusively controlled by legislative decree. OCGA § 34-9-1(3) provides: " 'Employer' shall include ... any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers' compensation benefits to an injured employee, notwithstanding the fact that no common-law master-servant relationship or contract of employment exists between the injured employee and the person providing the benefits." (Emphasis supplied.) The plaintiff evidently does not dispute that Capitol provided and stands ready to provide workers' compensation benefits for the deceased.

Further, and in any case, according to OCGA § 34-9-8, Capitol is deemed the statutory employer of the deceased, liable by law to pay workers' compensation benefits. Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 499, 277 S.E.2d 41. We shall not attempt to improve on Wright's clear explanation of the beneficent public policy underlying this statutory scheme, except to say the obvious, which is that the object of the rule is to provide a remedy for the greater number of eligible employees although it deprives some of a remedy in tort. See also Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 149 Ga.App. 229, 253 S.E.2d 805.

The plaintiff is not in error to say it appears the employer has all the benefits of ignoring the deceased and providing him no employee benefits while he was alive, and now being able to take advantage of...

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5 cases
  • Redfearn v. HUNTCLIFF HOMES ASS'N, INC.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1999
    ...18. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 191 Ga.App. 139, 140, 381 S.E.2d 84 (1989); see King, supra; Levingston, supra. 19. Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga.App. 251, 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989); Walsh v. Campbell, 130 Ga.App. 194, 202 S.E.2d 657 20. To the extent that McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731, 492 S.E......
  • Reynolds v. McKENZIE-PERRY HOMES, INC.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 22, 2003
    ...between the injured employee and the person providing the benefits. (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga.App. 251, 252(2), 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989); Sykes v. Smolek Grading, Inc., supra at 634, 420 S.E.2d 85. Thus, when workers' compensation benefits are paid ......
  • Liniado v. Alexander
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 5, 1991
    ... ... Regal Textile Co. v ... Feil, 189 Ga. 581, 6 S.E.2d 908. See Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga.App. 251, 384 S.E.2d 394 ...         Judgment reversed and case ... ...
  • Sykes v. Smolek Grading, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 23, 1992
    ...exists between the injured employee and the person providing the benefits.' (Emphasis supplied.)" Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga.App. 251, 252(2), 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989). OCGA § 34-9-8(a) is inapplicable here. Under that provision, the general contractor, in this case the subdivision dev......
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