Caplan v. 1616 East Sunrise Motors, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | 87-2791,Nos. 87-917,s. 87-917 |
| Citation | 522 So.2d 920,13 Fla. L. Weekly 627 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 627 Robert CAPLAN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. 1616 EAST SUNRISE MOTORS, INC., Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Young, Stern & Tannenbaum and Barry S. Franklin and Jeremy Koss, North Miami Beach, for appellant/cross-appellee.
McCune, Hiaasen, Crum, Ferris & Gardner and Bryan W. Duke, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
We affirm the judgment entered upon a directed verdict for the defendant, 1616 East Sunrise Motors, Inc. [Sunrise]. We assume, but do not decide, that a franchised motor vehicle dealer as well as a manufacturer may be held liable to a consumer under the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act [], §§ 681.10-.108, Fla.Stat. (1983). Nevertheless, we hold that Sunrise, as the purchaser of an automobile dealership company, is subject to no successor liability, under the Lemon Law or otherwise, for its predecessor's sale of the defective motor vehicle where there is no evidence to trigger any of the exceptions to the general rule of no successor liability, outlined in Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982).
Additionally, we affirm the separate order awarding Sunrise attorney's fees under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, §§ 501.201-. 213, Fla.Stat. In so doing, we reject Caplan's contention that Sunrise--the dealer--cannot be a prevailing party as required by Section 501.2105, Florida Statutes, 1 because Caplan recovered a judgment on his claim against the co-defendant--the manufacturer. 2 While it is true, as Caplan argues, that a plaintiff need not recover on each of his alternative theories of liability against a particular defendant to be a prevailing party, Hendry Tractor Co. v. Fernandez, 432 So.2d 1315 (Fla.1983), no amount of success against one defendant--even if sufficient to fully compensate the plaintiff--can be considered success against a different defendant. Thus, a defendant who prevails against a plaintiff may properly view as irrelevant that the plaintiff prevailed against another defendant in the same action. See Quijano v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 520 So.2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
We do not agree with Caplan that Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Black, 460 So.2d 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), holds that recovery of judgment against any single defendant precludes other defendants against whom no recovery is had from being considered prevailing parties for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees. Instead, we read Black as announcing the extremely narrow rule--indeed, one uniquely confined to the Patient's Compensation Fund statute--that where the Fund is properly joined as a defendant in a suit against one of its members, and the Fund thereafter exercises its option to appear and actively defend itself upon its evaluation that the claim against the health care provider may exceed $100,000--the amount required to trigger the Fund's liability to the plaintiff--an ultimate verdict of less than this amount does not make this voluntarily-appearing defendant a prevailing party. But where, as in Quijano, the Fund has no possible liability--and its participation as a defendant is involuntary--a judgment in its favor makes it a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees.
Lastly, we turn to Sunrise's contention in its cross-appeal that it was awarded too little in attorney's fees. Sunrise presented unrebutted evidence that its attorneys spent 177 taxable hours on the case and that a rate of $125 an hour was reasonable, but was awarded only $13,678.50 instead of the approximately $22,000 that had been requested. Caplan contends that the amount of fees...
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