Caples v. Ward
Decision Date | 03 November 1915 |
Docket Number | (No. 2778.) |
Citation | 179 S.W. 856 |
Parties | CAPLES et al. v. WARD et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Stanton & Weeks and W. D. Howe, all of El Paso, for plaintiffs in error. J. G. McGrady, of El Paso, for defendants in error.
The appeal prosecuted in the case to the honorable Court of Civil Appeals was from an order of the district judge granting a temporary injunction, restraining the sale, under execution, of the interest of Joseph A. Caples in certain real property, a part of the estate of his deceased father, Richard Caples, theretofore levied upon to satisfy a judgment obtained against him by Ward, one of the defendants in error. It is only necessary to determine the question of whether Joseph A. Caples had such an interest in the real property levied upon as was subject to execution. The honorable Court of Civil Appeals reversed the order of the district judge and remanded the cause, holding that he had such an interest; and the writ of error was granted on account of probable error in that decision.
The estate of Richard Caples was devised by will, the provisions of the will pertinent to the issue here, being as follows:
Under the terms of the will the residuary estate of Richard Caples, of which the real estate levied upon to the extent of the interest of Joseph Caples (called in the pleading Joseph A. Caples) is a part, is clearly bequeathed to Margaret A. Caples, the wife of Richard and the mother of Joseph, for life, with remainder over to the five children, by name, including Joseph, share and share alike. Each of the five children was living at the time of the testator's death. Margaret A. Caples is still living, and the life estate in her, therefore, not determined. The real estate levied upon is alleged to be of the market value of $598,500, and the value of Joseph Caples' interest, an undivided one-tenth, $59,850, Ward's judgment against him, with costs, amounting to $3,412.30. The question is whether the remainder created by the will in favor of Joseph Caples is a vested or contingent estate. If a vested remainder, it is subject to execution against Joseph Caples. Freeman on Executions, § 178.
A remainder is vested where there is a person in being who would have an immediate right to the possession upon the termination of the intermediate estate. It is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present right of future enjoyment, a fixed interest, with only the right of possession postponed until the ending of a particular estate. 4 Kent, 202; Bufford v. Holliman, 10 Tex. 560, 60 Am. Dec. 223. To use a common illustration of the books, where there is a grant of an estate to A. for life, and, after his death, to B. in fee, the remainder is a vested one, since the grant creates a present fixed interest, with the right of future enjoyment in B.
According to these established rules, the fifth clause of the will plainly gives Joseph Caples a vested remainder in the residuary part of the estate, for, in terms as positive as those applied to the creation of the life estate, it invests him with a present interest and right to its future enjoyment.
We have, then, only to consider whether the remainder is rendered contingent by the subsequent provisions of the will. The only...
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