Capps v. Violett

• Decision Date: 15 December 1972
• Citation: 488 S.W.2d 695
• Parties: Herman Randall CAPPS, Appellant, v. Peggy VIOLETT, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 695

488 S.W.2d 695

Herman Randall CAPPS, Appellant, v. Peggy VIOLETT, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Dec. 15, 1972.

Maxey B. Harlin, William J. Rudloff, Harlin, Parker, Lucas & English, Bowling Green, for appellant.

Robert D. Simmons, Douglas E. Robertson, Allender, Simmons & Robertson, Ray White, J. Marshall Hughes, White & Hughes, Bowling Green, for appellee.

OSBORNE, Justice.

This appeal arises out of an automobile accident which took place on U.S. 31W bypass in Bowling Green, Kentucky, about dusk on the afternoon of November 16, 1969. U.S. 31W bypass is a four-lane highway, without a center median, running generally north and south. It has free access on both sides from multiple cross streets and private driveways.

Herman Randall Capps, on the occasion giving rise to this controversy, attempted to enter U.S. 31W from its east side intending to cross the two northbound lanes of traffic and, upon reaching the west side, to turn back to his left to the south.

Appellee, Peggy Violett, was proceeding north following a green Mercury automobile. The Mercury planned to, and did, turn into the driveway from which Capps was existing. There was no traffic in the southbound lanes. The impact between Violett's and Capps' cars took place at approximately the center of U.S. 31W and immediately in front of the drive from which Capps had exited. No one in the Capps vehicle was injured. Peggy Violett received multiple injuries and was awarded a judgment of $18,540 by the jury pursuant to the direction of the trial court to return a verdict in her favor.

It is the contention of the appellant herein, Capps, that the trial court should not have directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the appellee but, instead, should have submitted the question of both appellant's and appellee's negligence to the jury. In support of this argument, appellant cites our cases of Webb Transfer Lines v. Taylor, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 88 (1968); Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808, 170 S.W.2d 337 (1943); Deason v. Odem, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 598 (1970); 3 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, § 114.18, p. 36, citing Shook v. Bristow, 41 Wash.2d 623, 250 P.2d 946 (1952) and others.

Appellee contends just as strongly that the trial court acted properly in directing the verdict and cites in support of her position our cases of Chambliss v. Lewis, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 207 (1964); Tooke v. Adkins, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 220 (1967); Vaughn v. Jones, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 583 (1953) and others. Neither party cites our most recent case of Killman v. Taylor, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 574 (1970), where we bring all these cases together and endeavor to classify and distinguish them. There we pointed out the distinguishing features and separated the cases into two categories as follows:

'The specific type of case with which we are concerned involves a collision between a motor vehicle on a through highway and a motor vehicle entering upon that highway from an inferior highway or a private entrance. The particular question is whether the operator of the vehicle on the through highway can be held guilty of negligence constituting a proximate cause of the collision, so as to render him liable to a passenger in one car or the other, or so as to bar his own claim for damages. We are not concerned here with the question of the other driver's negligence, which ordinarily has been fond to exist as a matter of law.

In one group of cases, which we shall call 'Group A,' this court held that the negligence of the driver who entered upon the through highway was as a matter of law the sole cause of the collision. In that group are Vaughn v. Jones, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 583; Chambliss v. Lewis, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 207; Riggs v. Miller, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 69; Davidson v. Davidson, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 221; and Tooke v. Adkins, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 220.

In a second group of cases, 'Group B,' we held that there was a jury issue as to whether the driver of the vehicle on the through highway was guilty of negligence constituting a proximate cause of the collision. In that group are Metcalfe v. Hopper, Ky., 400 S.W.2d 531; Tilford v. Garth, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 6; Browning v. Callison, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 941; Indianapolis & Southeastern Trailways, Inc. v. Blankenship, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 267; and Ellison v. Begley, Ky., 448 S.W.2d 371.'

We believe this case falls under Group A. Without discussing in detail whether or not Capps was negligent in pulling out, we will only comment that in our opinion when Capps was about to enter a four-lane road with dual...